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COMMENT
THE LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS-A SURVEY
In conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each
district court may specify its own specialized procedural regula-
tions. In the subsequent exhaustive study the myriad of such
local federal rules are collected and categorized into twenty-one
subsections for purposes of critical analysis. The objective is not
only to collate the various disparate rules but also to evaluate
their efficacy, with each category treated in terms of its own partic-
ularized raison d'etre. Attention is also directed toward those
areas in which a national standard might profitably be considered,
a factor which necessarily must be weighed against the desir-
ability of local discretion. As such, this comment should be of
interest to scholars and judges, in addition to practitioners, who
are concerned with the development of procedural concepts in
the federal courts.
A LTHOUGH THE practice and procedure of federal district
courts in civil cases is governed primarily by a body of uniform
rules1 promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to a Congres-
sional mandate,2 Federal Rule 83 specifically authorizes district
court judges to adopt additional, localized standards not inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules or other statutes.3 This power, though
hedged with limitations,4 has been the imprimatur for a plethora of
'FED. R. Civ. P.
2 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The Enabling Act requires that the Federal Rules may
not a bridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right and must preserve the common
law right of trial by jury insured by the seventh amendment to the Constitution.
Ibid. A general power to enact procedural rules has been accorded by statute to all
courts established by Congress, but these rules may not be inconsistent with federal
statutes or commandments of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964). Since
the Supreme Court has utilized its more specific grant of power under § 2072 to
adopt rules for the district courts, however, the scope of the general rule-making
power under § 2071 is necessarily subordinate and ancillary.
8FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides that each district court, by action of a majority of
the judges thereof, may promulgate and amend procedural rules for local practice
so long as they are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules. See Advisory Committee's
Notes, 28 U.S.C. APP. at 6171 (1964); 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1711, at 179-80 (Wright ed. 1958) (hereinafter cited as BARRON &
HOLTOFF).
' The district courts may not formulate procedural rules which are: (1) Incon-
sistent with the Federal Rules. FED. R. Cav. P. 83; see Leighton v. Paramount Pictures
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individualized rules which have generally remained unchallenged
and untested by subjection to the comprehensive scrutiny of judicial
decision or scholarly inquiry.5 Indeed, one legal scholar has char-
acterized the fruits of the power as the "soft underbelly" of federal
procedure.6
A cursory examination of the currently effective local district
court rules reveals a maze of decentralized directives, encumbered
by trivia and often devoid of explanation. Perhaps, however, a
categorical examination of the common subject-matters of these
rules, aided by scientific analysis of the particularized viewpoints of
federal judges and practitioners, can uncover specific underpinnings
and thus promote an interpretation of the advisability of variegated
local standards in the context of an efficient federal court system.
To this end, a comprehensive analysis of specific rules common to
many districts has been undertaken with a view to discerning their
efficacy in both a theoretic and pragmatic context. Complementing
this analysis were two written questionnaires, one set to the judges
of each federal district court and another to a sampling of the fed-
eral bar throughout the country. Approximately fifty per cent of
Corp., 340 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965); Dredge Corp. v.
Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964); Radack v. Nonvegian America Line Agency,
318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 82 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); Adams v. Jarka, 8 F.R.D. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Moore v. George
A. Hormel & Co., 2 F.R.D. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See also Farmer v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 285 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1960), where the court held that a local rule
discriminating against nonresidents in bond requirements was unjustifiable within
the "limited authorization of Rule 83." Cf. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), dis-
cussed in 3A BARRON & HoLTzo1' § 1711, at 51 (Supp. 1965).
(2) Inconsistent with Federal Statutes. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S.
479 (1933); Washington-Southern Nay. Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steam-
boat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1924); United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, 247
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 951 (1950); Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 61 F.2d
736 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 740 (1932); Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co.,
supra.
(3) Unreasonable. See United States v. Obermeier, supra; Woodbury v. Andrew
Jergens Co., supra (dictum); Godfree v. Peak, 30 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (local
rule barring appeal from police court if both prosecutor and appellant fail to sign
bill of exceptions held unreasonable and invalid); cf. Farmer v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 285 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960).
(4) Non-Uniform and Discriminatory. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280
(5th Cir. 1964).
1 Only two scholarly articles bearing on the local rules have been published, and
neither of these provides a broad-gauge examination of the rules. McAllister, Pre-
Trial Practice in the Southern District of New York, 12 F.R.D. 373 (1952); Van
Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical Expert System,
32 F.R.D. 498 (1963).
OLetter from Professor Charles Alan Wright to the Duke Law Journal, November
16, 1965.
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the questionnaires sent to each group were returned in completed
form, and the collated responses have been incorporated in the
analyses of specific rules below.7
Within this interpretational framework, specific rules have been
isolated and examined in the following order:
1. Attorneys
2. Divisions within a District
8. Calendars and Motions
4. Pleadings
5. Notification of a Claim of Unconstitutionality
6. Orders Grantable by the Clerk
7. Bonds and Undertakings
8. Depositions and Discovery
9. Pre-trial
10. Stipulations
11. Continuances
12. Dismissal for Want of Prosecution
13. Trial Conduct and Procedure
14. Impartial Medical Examinations and Testimony
15. Exhibits, Records, and Files
16. Juries: Empaneling and Instructions
17. Costs and Fees
18. Motions for New Trials
19. Appeals
20. Bankruptcy and Receivership
21. Habeas Corpus Procedure
ATrORNEYS
The authority of the district courts to make rules regarding the
admission and discipline of attorneys is derived from act of Con-
gress" as well as Federal Rule 83. In addition, courts have been
held to have inherent authority to act in this field apart from any
statutory grant of power.9 The district courts thus have broad dis-
I A questionnaire was sent to each of the 89 districts in the United States, and 42
completed questionnaires were returned. 150 questionnaires were forwarded to a
sampling of the federal bar which included each district, and 75 returns were made
from 55 separate districts.
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964): "In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
' EX parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529 (1824); Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 1947); In re
Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16 (No. 12811) (D. Ala. 1865); cf. Goldsmith v. United States
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1925).
"[The statutory provision giving the district courts of the District of Columbia
authority to prescribe qualifications for membership in the bar] . . . is a statutory
Vol. 1966:-1011] 1013
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cretion to deny'and to prescribe conditions for admission to their
respective bars,10 although this power may not be exercised arbi-
trarily.1
Practically all of the districts which have promulgated local rules
have included prescriptions relating to the admission of attorneys
to the federal bar. The substantive requirements are generally com-
prehensive, although the elaborateness of the machinery for enforce-
ment varies considerably. Typical requirements for admission are
that the candidate be a member of the bar of the state in which
the district is located,12 that he be of good character 8 and that he
take the prescribed oath.' 4 In addition, some districts require resi-
dence or maintenance of an office within the state,'5 and a few insist
that the candidate pass an examination.' 6 Many districts have es-
tablished a committee of judges or members of the bar to ascertain
a candidate's qualifications' 7 while others place this burden upon
the judge before whom admission is moved.'8
One questionable requirement for admission is that of member-
ship in the bar of, or residence within, the state wherein the dis-
trict lies. The ostensible reason for requiring membership in a
state bar is that the federal courts rely to a great extent on the state
courts with their more elaborate bar examination machinery to
weed out undesirables. However, this practice does not necessitate
limiting membership to the local state bar or residents of the state.
While a non-member of the district bar may often appear specially
concession to the general rule that the courts may make rules of procedure regulating
the administration of justice in the absence of statutes." Laughlin v. Clephane,
supra at 105.
20 See Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856); Ex parte Burr, supra note
9; Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953); In re Chopak, 160 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 835 (1947).
12In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950);
see Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (reviewing state proceeding); Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (same); In the Matter of Dreier,
258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958).
12 E.g., D.N.J.R. 2 (B); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 4 (a); E.D. TENN. R. 1 (a).
23 E.g., D. KAN. R. 3 (b); W.D. LA. R. 2 (a); D. ME. R. 3 (b).
24 E.g., D. MD. R. 2; E.D. PA. R. 5 (c); W.D. WASH. (GEN.) R. 2 (a).
"1r E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1 (b) (residence); D. KAN. R. 3(b) (residence and office);
E.D.N.C. (GmN.) R. 1 (B) (both); E.D. VA. R. 9 (1) (residence).
16 E.g., ED. & W.D. ARK. R. 1 (b) (court in its discretion may waive examination
for members of Arkansas bar); D.D.C.R. 93 (b); S.D. OHIo R. 3 (7).
"7E.g., N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 6(a) (ii) (judges); D.N.M.R. 3 (b) (members of bar);
E.D. OKLA. R. 4(c) (members of bar).
2 "E.g., S.D. FLA. R. 14; D. MD. R. 2; E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 3 (a). D. MASS.
R. 3 (b) places the burden on the United States Attorney for the district.
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in a particular action, there seems to be little reason for requiring
in every case the special appearance of an attorney who regularly
appears in the district court but who, for example, is a member of
the bar of a neighboring state. This argument obtains even where
such permission is granted as a matter of course. Moreover, it would
seem to be in the interests of the district court to require counsel
who appear regularly to submit to the requirements of membership
in that district's bar. Membership in the bar of any state should
render an attorney eligible to apply for membership in the district
bar, and the residence of the attorney should be immaterial.
Desirable innovation might also be made in those districts which
provide little or no machinery for inquiring into the qualifications
of applicants for membership in the bar. While doubtlessly some
examination is made by the judge before whom admission is moved,
a busy judge probably has little time to make a comprehensive in-
quiry into the candidate's qualifications and admission may tend to
follow as a matter of course. 9 The variance among the districts may
reflect differing degrees of confidence in the local state court's ad-
mission procedure. However, by virtue of the somewhat distinctive
substantive and procedural practice within the federal judicial sys-
tem, it would seem that even where the state's machinery is ade-
quate, the federal courts should be charged with making an inde-
pendent and meaningful evaluation of applicants.20 The need for
adequate machinery is doubly compelling where members of the
bar of any state are eligible for membership in the district bar.
Most districts permit attorneys who are not members of the
district bar to appear specially in a particular case.21 The language
of the rules is generally permissive and extension of the privilege
is within the discretion of the court.22 Practically all of these dis-
29 W.D.N.C.R. 1 (A) expressly states that admission to the federal bar of a mem-
ber of the North Carolina bar shall, upon the payment of the fee and the taking
of the oath, follow as a matter of course.
All but three of the district judges responding to the questionnaire stated that
admission to the bar of their district was virtually automatic for members of the
state bar. 88% of the practitioners responding to the questionnaire felt that there
was no need to impose requirements for admission to the bar of the district court
beyond that of admission to the bar of the highest court of the state.
20 Cf. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (disbarment); Selling v. Rad-
ford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917) (same).
2 E.g., E.D. ILL. (CiV.) R. 1 (d); W.D. LA. R. 2 (c); M.D. PA. R. 2.
"2 See, e.g., E.). MicH. R. 1 (2); N.D.N.Y.R. 2 (d); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 4 (c).
Permission to appear specially has been held a "privilege" rather than a "right,"
denial of which is reversible only upon an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Cassidy,
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tricts require an out-of-state attorney appearing specially to join
with local counsel in the case.23 Joinder of local counsel is also
generally required of members of the district bar who maintain no
residence and/or office in the district.24 Supplementing these re-
quirements, significant powers have been accorded local counsel to
enable them to serve meaningfully as partners in the conduct of
an action. For example, most districts provide that service of papers
may be made upon local counsel.25 Further, many require local
counsel to sign papers,20 enter appearances27 and/or possess author-
ity to act for the client and to confer with the judge and opposing
counsel.28 An occasional district requires that local counsel "mean-
ingfully participate in the preparation and trial of the case." 2 The
cases are split on whether nonjoinder carries the penalty of dismissal
of the action. 0
249 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1957). The rule of discretion has been held to be inapplicable
in criminal cases, the constitutional right to counsel being strictly interpreted to
mean counsel of choice. United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946).
28 E.g., N.D. GA. R. 1 (d); S.D. ILL. R. 1 (e); M.D. PA. R. 3. The only rule promul-
gated by the Middle District of Alabama requires joinder of local counsel in civil
rights cases. M.D. ALA. R. 1.
The local-counsel rule does not apply to attorneys appearing pro se. Avins v.
New York Post Corp., 185 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Further, the rule should
be waived where local counsel cannot be obtained. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg,
333 F.2d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
A state court has been held not to be barred by the fourteenth amendment from
requiring joinder of "exclusively" local counsel with attorneys who regularly practice
in other states, even when they are also members of that state's bar, regularly prac-
tice in its courts, and maintain both a residence and an office in the state. Martin
v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground
that the justifications for the rule advanced by the state court-to ensure presence
of attorneys at the call of their dockets, service of papers without travel to another
state, attendance of attorneys on "matters of urgency" and the presence of an
attorney who is familiar with local procedure-"plainly have no relevance to peti-
tioner who has an active practice in [the state] .... " Id. at 28 (dissenting opinion).
These Justices viewed the requirement as violative of equal protection in that the
attorney practicing in two states was singled out for discriminatory treatment by
requirements having no rational connection with his fitness to practice law in the
local state court. Id. at 29 (dissenting opinion).
2" E.g., N.D. IND. R. 1 (d); D. MD. R. 2, 3; E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 4 (a).
2rE.g., S.D. FLA. R. 15; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 7 (a); E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 4 (a).
26 E.g., D. DEL. R. 4 (D); N.D.N.Y.R. 2 (d).
27E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1(d); D. DEL. R. 4(D); E.D. VA. R. 9(5).
28 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1 (d); N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 3; D. NEB. R. 5 (f.
20D. HAwAI R. 1(e); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 4(c); see D. IDAHO R.. 2(d) (local counsel
must appear on all matters heard and tried).
so Compare Schifrin v. Chenille Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1941) and Stevens
v. Gertz, 103 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. Mich. 1952) (dismissal inappropriate since party
rather than attorney penalized), with MacNeil v. Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157
(D. Del. 1958) (dismissal proper in certain cases). Compare Keogh v. Pearson, 35
F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 1964).
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The practice of requiring joinder of local counsel with non-
members of the bar appearing specially or members of the bar who
do not reside or maintain an office within the district should be
re-examined by the courts.31 The justifications for the requirement
which may be abstracted from the various rules do not, with one
exception discussed below, appear compelling.
One apparent justification may be that local counsel will be
more familiar with local variances of procedure.32 However, if an
attorney wishes to assume the obligation of informing himself of any
local variances, there would seem to be no objection. Such a rule
also ensures a local address to which papers may be mailed,38 but
a nonresident attorney can be required to accept service by mail,34
and if he wishes to take the chance of delay because of distance
there should again be no objection. The rule does ensure that
someone is available locally to confer about the case with the judge
or opposing counsel. 5 However, this policy may be effectuated by
requiring nonresident counsel to be available to confer with the
judge upon stated notice and to accept collect long-distance tele-
phone calls from opposing counsel for purposes reasonably calcu-
lated to advance the case, the expense of which would not be a
taxable cost. In the latter instance a rule of reason such as is uti-
lized in discovery proceedings 8 would be necessary to avoid harrass-
3141.8% of the practitioners responding to the questionnaire thought that the
local counsel rule had detrimental effects, such as increasing the cost of litigation
(34.7% of all responding practitioners), increasing the difficulties of communication
among the litigation team (14.7%), and increasing the possibility of conflict with a
local counsel selected only because of the requirement "(5.3%). Despite recognition
of these effects, 82.7% of the practitioners responding to the questionnaire thought
the rule served a needed purpose. See notes 32, 35 infra.
The Western District of North Carolina recognizes the problem of increased
costs of litigation and provides that local counsel is not required where the amount
in controversy or the importance of the case does not appear to justify double
employment of counsel. W.D.N.C.R. 1 (B). The rule warns, however, that such special
permission "will be the exception and not the rule," and that "no out-of-state
lawyer will be permitted to practice frequently or regularly in this court without
association of local counsel." Ibid.
2 Of the 82.4% of the responding practitioners who thought the local counsel
rule served some useful purpose, 80.7% thought that local counsel were needed
because they would have a better knowledge of local court procedures. 75.8% also
felt that local counsel were needed because they would be better acquainted with
"local conditions."
3 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 5 (b).
"See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 77.4% of the responding practitioners
who thought that the local counsel rule served a useful purpose were of the opinion
that local counsel are needed because they may be more easily contacted.
36 See FED. R. Crv. P. 30 (d).
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ment, but its application should not be difficult and any doubts
might properly be resolved against the nonresident attorney.
Another justification for the local counsel rule may be that a
court has less control over the conduct of non-members of the dis-
trict bar and a lesser knowledge of their character. Thus, it may be
argued that if a member of the local bar is joined he will exert a
restraining influence upon the non-member.87 This does not, how-
ever, provide a justification for the requirement that members of
the bar of the state in which the court is seated, but who do not
reside or maintain an office in the district, join with exclusively
local counsel. Moreover, the argument that lack of control over
non-members necessitates the local counsel rule appears specious.
An attorney who appears before a given court would seem to submit
to the authority of the court as fully in that particular case as a
member of the bar and would be amenable to such disciplinary
measures as dismissal of his case, contempt proceedings, compulsory
withdrawal from the case, denial or suspension of the privilege of
again appearing before the court and notice of the misconduct to
bars of which he is a member.38 On the other hand, the inadequate
knowledge of the character of non-members is a persuasive reason
for requiring a local attorney to the extent that an adequate investi-
gation is not made by the courts of whose bar the transient is a
member.3 9 However, if and when all federal courts make adequate
investigation of applicants, the local counsel requirement could be
dropped for members of a federal bar; and even at present reciprocal
agreements could be entered into between districts which do make
adequate investigation, each withdrawing the local counsel require-
ment for members of the other bar.40
37 Cf. N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 3. "[W]here the action is one to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained in Iowa by one who at the time was a resident of Iowa
or the action is one to recover damages for the death of a resident of Iowa result-
ing from personal injuries sustained in Iowa, the Court may on its own motion, or
on motion of a member of the bar of either District, before permitting a non-
resident attorney to participate in the case, require a satisfactory showing that the
connection of the said attorney, or the firm or attorney with which he is associated,
was not occasioned or brought about in violation of the standards of conduct [speci-
fied by state law and the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Asso-
ciation] ...." Ibid.
38 See D. IDAHO R. 23. Cf. Schifrin v. Chenille Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1941),
Stevens v. Gertz, 103 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
89 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
10Cf. E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 3 (a). "A member in good standing of the bar
of the State of New York ... or a member in good standing of the bar of a United
States district court in New Jersey, Connecticut or Vermont and of the bar of the
1018 [Vol. 1966: 1011
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It is possible that a substantial purpose underlying the rule is
to "make work" for local lawyers.41 In addition, it cannot be gain-
said that in certain instances district courts are antipathetic on
principle to the interposition of outside counsel in local cases. This
attitude is conspicuous in the few districts which require local coun-
sel to "participate meaningfully" in the case.42  Such parochical
attitudes, be they tacit or codified, have no place in the federal
courts, although their influence is so subtle as to make such rules
difficult to eradicate.
Most of the districts which have rules relating to the admission
of attorneys have also made some provision for discipline and dis-
barment, although here again there is variation as to the extensive-
ness of the provisions. Some districts merely provide that an attorney
may be suspended or disbarred "for cause." 43  Others specify in
addition that an attorney who is disbarred in any other court or
convicted of a felony will be disbarred unless he shows good cause
otherwise.44 Many districts utilize a committee45 to recommend dis-
barment, often with specific provision for notice to the attorney and
a hearing.4 Others are silent on this subject, apparently placing
the responsibility of inquiry and of guaranteeing a fair hearing up-
on the judge before whom disbarment proceedings are brought.47
A prescribed procedure for discipline and disbarment would
seem to be desirable, although the specifics of such a procedure-
State in which such district is located, provided such district court by its rules
extends a corresponding privilege to members of the bar of this court, may be ad-
mitted to practice in this court .... " Ibid.
'150. % of the responding practitioners expressed the opinion that the local
counsel rule is possibly inspired by local counsel desiring additional business.
An interesting fact is the correlation between a practitioner's opinion of the
local counsel rule and the rule in his district. 82.8% of the practitioners from districts
having a local counsel rule thought that it served a useful purpose. 100%o of the
practitioners from districts without the rule viewed it, perhaps wistfully, as salutary.
2 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
43E.g., D. IDAHO R. 1 (c); D. KAN. R. 3 (k).
"4 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1 (f); D. NEB. R. 5 (k) (2); D. NEv. R. 1 (f); W.D. OKLA. R. 4 (e).
Some rules, such as D.NJ.R. 5 (A) and N.D.N.Y.R. 4, provide that disbarment or
suspension in the district court ipso facto follows from disbarment or suspension by
any court of record. There is no opportunity for the attorney to show cause why
he should not be disciplined. These rules may be invalid as violative of due process.
See note 48 infra and accompanying text; cases cited note 20 supra. Despite this
ostensible unfairness, however, 45% of the responding judges indicated that disbar-
ment in their courts would automatically. follow from disbarment in the state court.
81.3% of the responding practitioners likewise approved of this practice.
" E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1 (g) (1);N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 8; W.D. OKLA. R. 4 (d).
,1 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 1 (g) (4); N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 8 (b)- (c); E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 1 (H).
47 See, e.g., E.D. Mici. R. 1 (4); W.D.N.C.R. 1; S.D.W. VA. R. 1 (e).
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whether the investigation is made by the judge or a committee,
for example-need not be uniform, so. long as a fair hearing is in-
sured. An investigation and minimal procedural safeguards, such as
notice to the individual and opportunity for hearing, are guaranteed
by constitutional requirements.4  As in any proceeding, however,
it is desirable that needless uncertainty be avoided by local prescrip-
tion of some systematic procedure rather than relying upon inchoate
local custom.
In determining whether any of the local rules regarding at-
torneys should be the subject of a uniform Federal Rule, the two
conflicting factors must be assessed: all attorneys should be treated
equally in the federal courts, but it also appears desirable that
admission and discipline should be within the province of the local
court before whom the attorney seeks the privilege of practicing."
In addition, some local variance may be necessary, given the desir-
ability of allowing most members of the local state bar to be eligible
for admission to the district bar. 0 The latter factors, however, are
most relevant as testimony to the necessity of allowing wide discre-
tion to the district court in the formulation and application of
substantive criteria for admission and discipline."1 They do not
preclude a uniform procedure.52 As noted in the previous discus-
48 Fifth amendment due process requirements apply to exclusions from the practice
of law by the federal government. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866);
In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16 (No. 12811) (D. Ala. 1865). Fourteenth amendment
due process safeguards must be met in the event of an exclusion from the practice
of law by a state. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
"See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
50 Except with regard to the requirement of residence or maintenance of an office
within the state, see note 15 supra and accompanying text, there does not seem to
be a great deal of substantive variance between districts as to the state bar's eligibility
for admission to the federal bar. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
" Additionally, it might be desirable to consider making uniform the rule, e.g.,
S.D . CAL. R. 1 (d), that members of the bar of any federal court or the supreme
court of any state are eligible to apply for membership in the bar of any district court.
52 It may be argued, however, that the use of the word "respectively" in the statute
granting authority to the district courts to act in this field, quoted in note 8 supra,
indicates that the entire question of admission and discipline is to be left to local
discretion.
The practitioners were evenly split on the question of the desirability of a uni-
form rule on the subject of admission to the bar, 44% favoring uniformity, 45.3%
favoring local handling of the question. The remainder either felt that it made no
difference or failed to answer the question. Interestingly, 77.8% of the practitioners
favoring requirements for admission in addition to membership in the state bar also
favored uniformity, while only 39.4% of the practitioners who asserted that member-
ship in the state bar should be sufficient favored uniformity.
A majority of practitioners (53.3%) were of the opinion that disbarment rules
should be formulated locally rather than uniformly.
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sion,53 the inquiry into a candidate's qualifications may suffer from
a lack of an adequate admission process, and needless uncertainty
may result from a lack of prescribed disciplinary machinery. To
avoid these consequences, it might well be salutary to establish a
uniform national procedure for the admission and discipline of
attorneys, which should at least include the establishment of local
committees to deal with these matters in accordance with a pre-
scribed procedure for investigation and with requirements of notice
and a hearing.
A uniform procedure of admission and discipline or, alterna-
tively, the creation of an autonomous national federal bar with strict
requirements for acquisition and maintenance of membership,
would have the added advantage of affording a pretext for the
abolition of the local counsel rule as applied to attorneys who are
members of a federal bar. As indicated above,54 the only justifica-
tion for the rule is the local court's lack of knowledge regarding
the character and qualifications of attorneys not members of its own
bar. This argument is insubstantial to the extent that an adequate
investigation is made by other federal courts, although local sub-
stantive divergences might militate in favor of retaining the rule.
DIVISIONS WITHIN A DISTRICT
The territorial separation of the federal district courts into juris-
dictional units is specifically prescribed by federal legislation and
has been effectuated by districting many states and further sub-
dividing several districts into divisions.5 However, since Congress
has declined to partition some districts on a divisional basis,5 6 sev-
eral courts have achieved this dissection through local rules.57 These
rules have been accepted as proper exercises of the rulemaking
powers of the district courts, perhaps because Congress did not ex-
0' See notes 19-20, 48 supra and accompanying text.
51 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
as Congress has divided the nation into 89 jurisdictional districts, respecting in
each case the territorial unity of the states and counties within the states. Of these
districts, 43 have been further divided by Congress into a total of 169 divisions. The
divisions are also geographically delineated along county lines. 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131
(1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 113-21 (Supp. I, 1966).
50 Of the 89 districts, 46 have not been statutorily divided into divisions. See ibid.
7 N.D, FLA. R. 1; D. MONT. R. 2; E.D.N.C. (GFN.) R. 2 (B); M.D.N.C.R. 3 (b);
E.D. VA. R. 3.
Other districts have been geographically subdivided by local rule for the purpose
of determining the situs of the trial, but these rules have not adopted the formal
nomenclature of "divisions" to designate the resultant geographic sections. D. Amz.
R. 3; S.D. FLA. R.. 3; D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 6.
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plicitly assert exclusive authority.58 Nevertheless, substantial attacks
have been leveled against the recognition of locally created division-
al boundaries in resolving questions of proper jurisdiction and
venue.
These attacks have centered upon the application of the federal
venue statutes, which demand that actions be brought in the division
where the defendant resides.5 9 In Standish v. Gold Creek Mining
CoO° the Ninth Circuit reversed a decision of the Montana Federal
District Court, which had held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
an in personam action where the defendant resided in another local-
ly created division.61 The court of appeals disregarded the local
rule dividing the district on the grounds that it improperly de-
limited the in personam jurisdiction directly conferred by Con-
gress.62 The court discerned a congressional intent that Montana
should have no divisions and therefore the district courts, by local
rules, could not prevent the prosecution of the civil action any-
where in the district as long as personal service within that perim-
eter was effected. 63 Despite the ostensible vitiation of the Montana
local rule by this decision, the rule apparently remained formally
in effect. However, it was challenged again twenty years later with
regard to its effect upon a motion for a change of venue under sec-
tion 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code,6 4 which provides that an action
may be transferred to a district or division where it might have been
brought. The Montana Federal District Court considered the
challenge in McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank6 5 and
held that the transfer of an action under section 1404 (a) could
properly be made from one locally created division to another.06
'
8 See McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 155 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mont.
1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1959). But cf. Standish v. Gold Creek Mining Co.,
92 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938).
28 U.S.C. § 1393 (1964) provides, inter alia: "(a) Except as otherwise provided,
any civil action, not of a local nature, against a single defendant in a district con-
taining more than one division must be brought in the division where he resides."
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964) recognizing "divisions" for transfer purposes.
:0 92 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938).
1 The federal venue statute on which the district court relied was Act of March
3, 1911, 86 Stat. 1101, which was similar in all material respects to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1393 (a) (1964).
02 92 F.2d at 663.
0'Id. at 663-64.
-,28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
Or 155 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mont. 1957).
6 Id. at 662.
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In so holding, the court confined the vitality of Standish to its re-
jection of the rule as a device to abrogate jurisdiction obtained by
personal service within the district. Livingston thus intimated that
to interpret Standish as totally abnegating locally created divisions
would constitute a misapprehension of the fundamental distinction
between venue requirements and in personam jurisdiction. Signifi-
cantly, the Livingston court also indicated that it was an open ques-
tion whether in the situation where divisions are created by court
rule, a trial court is bound by the federal venue prerequisite requir-
ing "nonlocal" civil actions against a single defendant to be brought
in the division where he resides if the district is one "containing
more than one division." 67
The liberal result reached in Livingston appears to more nearly
conform to the basic policy embodied in the federal venue statutes,
which are designed to assist the defendant in achieving a convenient
forum. This same policy could be further effectuated by an exten-
sion of the Livingston result to allow deference to the unity of
locally created divisions on questions of proper venue. In many
respects the local courts are in a better position than Congress to
determine the most equitable division of intradistrict jurisdictional
units for venue purposes. They are likely to have a more realistic
knowledge of travel considerations and a more practical understand-
ing of the possibility of clogging a particular locale with claims
which could be more expeditiously adjudicated in other sections of
the district. Consequently, it would seem advisable to vest dis-
cretionary authority in the district courts to formulate new or addi-
tional divisions within districts for venue purposes, and this power
might be conferred either by an amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or by direct federal legislation.
CALENDARS AND MOTIONS
The judicial task of overseeing the traditional maneuvering of
litigants is most direct under the Federal Rules where the court
must dispose of various motions interposed by the parties. To in-
sure that motion practice does not become unduly burdensome,
district courts have instituted several devices to expedite these pre-
liminary procedures with a minimal consumption of judicial time.
While such mechanisms may be evaluated pragmatically by the de-
67 Ibid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1393 (a) (1964).
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gree of economy which they afford, the dictates of due process may
not be diluted: "the quest for speed and efficiency is balanced by
the need to avoid perfunctory routine disposition, so as to defeat
the very purpose of seeking justice.""" The interplay between these
two ends is a common integer in the evaluation of most local rules,
and the efficacy of the balance struck will be the gauge used below
to assess motion requirements imposed by the district courts.
Two competing methods of motion expedition are the disposi-
tion of all motions at regular, periodic "motion days"0 9 and "the
submission and determination of motions without oral hearing up-
on brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition."70
Sanction for both these devices is conferred by Federal Rule 78,
which neither compels nor precludes their coexistence within the
same local matrix.7 1 The practice in many districts is to utilize both
procedures72 although courts with regularized motion days are gen-
erally more lenient in affording the parties to a motion an oral
hearing or argument.73 The advantages of each method, taken
severally, would appear to vary with the exigencies of a given dis-
trict, and "the optimum procedure for one district may not be the
most efficient and economical for another.""4 While an attempt to
generalize is thus a tenuous endeavor, one district judge has noted
that the motion calendar and its attendant oral accoutrement facili-
tate a faster disposition of motions, while the submission of motions
on briefs alone encourages a more deliberative ruling and greater
judicial control of motions.75 Given its emphasis upon speed, it is
not surprising that the motion calendar is typically employed in
those districts having an abnormally heavy docket.76
61 Steckler, Motions Prior to Trial, 29 F.R.D. 299 (1961).
61 Typical calendar rules allot one motion day per session, D. ALAsKA R. 5 (A),
per week, D. Amiz. R. 9, or per month, D. KAN. R. 11.
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 78.
"Federal Rule 78 requires district courts to establish regular scheduled motion
calendars "unless local conditions make it impracticable." Ibid. The court may, "to
expedite its business," also provide for a completely written advocacy procedure
for motions. Ibid.
72E.g., D. Aiuz. R. 9; S.D. CAL. R. 3; S.D. Miss. R. DESIrNATING MOTION DAYS.
73E.g., D.N.M.R. 9 (right to oral hearing upon request); S.D. Onso R. 7 (no
apparent limitation upon right to oral hearing). But see, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3(c) (no
oral argument without proper showing); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9(f) (no oral hearing of
certain classes of motions unless court otherwise directs).
7, Steckler, supra note 68, at 302.
75 Id. at 302-05.
70 See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3; D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9, 11 (d); E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R.
9(i)-(k).
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While the relative propriety of each format is thus problematic,
both types of rules have generated their own refinements and pecu-
liar problems and these particularities will become the focus of the
subsequent discussion. For example, several districts ameliorate the
potential consumptive threat of oral argument by limiting the time
which will be devoted to each motion.77 Further, in some "calen-
dar" districts, a special motion judge or pre-trial examiner is as-
signed to hear all preliminary motions,78 a divergence from the
normal practice of appointing a single judge to handle all aspects
of a contested case.79 This practice has been castigated as engender-
ing needless duplication ° and has precipitated such anomalies as
intradistrict jurisdictional confusion s' and vacation by one motions
judge of a prior order issued by a coequal colleague.8 2 While the
egalitarian leveling of the caseload afforded by the motion court
system may make it desirable in the most over-burdened courts, the
potentialities for duplication, undue complexity and jurist-shopping
would appear to make the practice an undesirable transplant for
other districts.
A common requirement, even in districts which impose few
barriers to oral argument, is that the movant file a supporting brief
or memorandum containing the authority upon which reliance is
posited. One commentator has asserted that such rules constitute a
judicial reaction to the practitioner's alleged disregard of the re-
quirement that motions state their supportive grounds with partic-
ularity.8 3 In Alaska v. American Can Co.,8 4 the court ruled that a
7 E.g., D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9 (c) (ten minutes for each side); D.N.M.R. 9 (b) (thirty
minutes for each side); E.D. WASH. R. 8 (d) (fifteen minutes each unless a final
hearing).
78 N.D. CAL. R. 20 (a); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9 (a). In the latter district, a pre-trial
examiner hears contests on a number of specified motions, many of them concerning
discovery. His recommendations attain the status of a court order if not objected
to within five days. D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9 (i) (1). See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
26.02[5], at 1042 (2d ed. 1963) (hereinafter cited as MooRE).
7D E.g., D. ALASKA R. 4 (D); S.D. CAL. R. 2 (d); D. DEL. R. 13 (A); S.D. FLA. R. 4 (e);
cf. D. CONN. R. 9 (g) (single judge for "long and complicated cases').
80 Carter, Effective Calendar Control-Objectives and Methods, 29 F.R.D. 227. 237
& n.35 (1961).
S See In re Dunlap's Guardianship, 36 F. Supp. 545, 546 (D.D.C. 1941), where a
judge refused to hear a motion submitted to him after termination of his assignment
in the Motions Division although it was coupled with a seasonably filed motion which
he was required to rule upon.
82 Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 98, 99-100
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
"WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 66, at 242-43 (1963) (hereinafter cited as WrGHT).
FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (b) (1) imposes the requirement of particularity.
8' 21 FED. RuLEs SEav. 12b.31, Case 2 (D. Alaska 1955).
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brief could be required even where the particularity of the motion
conformed to Form 19, appended to the Federal Rules. Since the
forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are deemed by Federal
Rule 84 to be "sufficient under the rules,"' 5 the proviso of many
local rules that failure to file a brief will result in waiver of the
motion"6 poses at the least a latent possibility of conflict with the
authoritative source of district mandates.
In the situation where a motion does not correspond to an ap-
proved form, the waiver sanction may still be assailed both as applied
to the movant and to the opponent who fails to file the reply brief
required by many local rules.8 7 The Fifth Circuit has ruled that
it is improper to grant by default a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule 12 (b) on the ground that the plaintiff failed to file
a responding brief in opposition.88 Although the court skirted the
issue of validity by construing the local rule as being devoid of a
dismissal sanction, the decision clearly implied that this penalty is
too stringent to conform to Federal Rule 1, which demands that
the rules "be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action."' 9 The discretionary power of the
district court is tempered by this directive, asserted the court, and
"the force of this first and greatest of the Rules should not be
blunted by district courts' exaggerating the importance of local
rules and enforcing such rules through inappropriate, over-rigorous
sanctions."90 While it is possible to construe this holding as pro-
scriptive of waiver only where it results in dismissal or summary
judgment,9 1 it clearly contains a germinal implication that such
85 FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
86 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 5 (D) (4); D. Aiuz. R. 9; S.D. CAL. R. 3 (d) (1); E.D. & S.D.N.Y.
(GEN.) R. 9 (b).
"I E.g., rules cited note 86 supra.
s
8 Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1964).
:9 FED. R. Cv. P. 1 (Emphasis added.)
90 335 F.2d at 557.
"I Where the opponent of a motion for summary judgment fails to file counter-
affidavits traversing the movant's affidavits, some courts have held that the facts
contained in the supporting certifications must be taken as true. See Preveden v.
Croatian Fraternal Union of America, 120 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Allen v.
Radio Corp. of America, 47 F. Supp. 244 (D. Del. 1942). The better rule, however,
would appear to vitiate the force of this requirement to accord with the more per-
missive language of Federal Rule 56 (c), which provides that "the adverse party . ..
may serve opposing affidavits." Fan. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Several circuits have so ruled.
United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 287 F.2d 601, 602-03 (10th Cir. 1961); Albert
Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1950). Cf. N.D. IND.
R. 6 (b), requiring submission of a brief on a motion for summary judgment.
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sanctions may be warranted, if at all, only in cases of flagrant disre-
gard . 2 Those rules which are less severe in their requisites9 3 or,
which allow waiver only in the discretion of the judge 4 have erected
a firmer bulwark against similar appellate exacerbation.
An analogous practice is the requirement that a movant for
summary judgment accompany his motion with a statement of the
material facts concerning which he contends there is no material
issue.95 His opponent may,96 and in some districts must,97 respond
with a statement of genuine issues. Such rules may not be immu-
table requisites, however, and one court has properly ruled that dis-
missal for failure to file proposed factual findings is unwarranted
where the issue on motion is purely one of law.98 Proposed findings
of fact, asserted the court, are purposively legitimized only by their
function in revealing "specific facts deemed necessary to support the
judgment." 99 Further, those rules which assert that claims of the
movant, if standing uncontradicted by the opponent's statement,
will be deemed admitted0 0 are eminently assailable as transcending
the bounds of Federal Rule 56 (c).101 That rule allows summary
judgment to be rendered upon consideration of the pleadings, depo-
sitions and interrogatories, and a party who chooses to rely upon
averments in his pleading which contradict a movant's assertions
should not be subject to default for what is tantamount to an addi-
tional and possibly superfluous pleading requirement. 2
In some districts, these issue statements must correspond to the
form of a judicial opinion'03 and may be entered as an order of
"2The Fifth Circuit in the case under discussion placed emphasis on the fact
that plaintiff's counsel was from another district and was expectedly unfamiliar with
the applicable local rules. "[Tihe local rules turned out to be a series of traps for the
free-of-fault plaintiff." Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 835 F.2d 551, 552 (5th
Cir. 1964).
"See D.N.J.R. 10 (failure to file waives right to argue orally); S.D. Miss. R.
DESIGNATING MOTION DAYS (judge may, upon direction to counsel, require briefs of
movants although briefing is not a mandatory matter).
"This is the pattern most rules have followed. E.g., D. CoLo. R. 9(c); E.D. &
S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9; M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 21.
95E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3(d)(2); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 9 (f).
9"E.g., rules cited note 95 supra.
9T E.g., E.D. LA. P.. 4; E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9 (g).
"Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964).
9Id. at 463. (Emphasis added.)
100 E.g., S.D. CAL. P. 3 (d) (2); E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9 (g); D. UTAH R. 7.101 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).
102 See note 91 supra, discussing the divergent positions of the courts concerning
the failure to file counter-affidavits as tantamount to an admission of verity.10
' Steckler, supra note 68, at 309-10; see E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 4 (draft order may
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court. 10 4 This device has been saluted as quite advantageous in
decreasing the volume of evidentiary detail which a judge must sift
and reduce to writing when ruling upon a motion for summary
judgment as to all or some formally controverted facts.105 Never-
theless, rigid enforcement of such a rule by waiving the delinquent
party's position would be equally subject to objection as erosive of
the dictates of both Federal Rule 1 and due process. Absent an
unduly prejudicial sanction, however, the practice of litigant formu-
lation of judicial opinions appears to be a novel and laudable meth-
od of conserving judicial effort and, concomitantly, of overcoming
the reluctance of many courts to subject summary judgment mo-
tions to serious scrutiny.10 6
In those districts which emphasize the use of written briefs and
memorandums, a particularized statement of motion grounds is not
the singular rationale for the requirement. Rather, many districts
manifest a strong preference for deciding motions strictly on the
basis of these documents and without an oral hearing or argu-
ment.1 07 Although hearings and argument are the usual practice
in some federal courts,0 8 several local rules provide that oral motion
proceedings will not be entertained unless the judge so directs. 00
Other districts take a median position while encouraging the writ-
ten submission and resolution of motions, they allow oral argument
upon a "proper showing,"" 0 presumably of "good cause," or dis-
cretionally permit it merely upon the request of one party."' The
be filed at the parties' option); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 5 (motions of over a page in
length must be accompanied by separate form of order).
104 Steckler, supra note 68, at 309-10.
20 1d. at 308-10.
106 Many courts have been reluctant to utilize the summary judgment procedure
for at least two reasons: "First, some judges believe that the lawyers do not give
adequate help, and so consider excessive the labor necessary to decision; and second,
some judges have a highly developed fear of reversal." Id. at 306. The "American
affinity for the traditional trial by jury" may also be assigned as a causal factor of
judicial reluctance. Ibid.
107A hearing contemplates the presentation to the court of witnesses and other
evidence, while oral argument subsumes advocacy of counsel before the judge. Com-
pare N.D. CAL. R. 21 with D. HAWAii R. 2.
108 E.g., E.D. LA. R. 4; D. HAwAIi R. 2 (a) (1) (oral arguments on questions of law
permitted without qualification).
100 E.g., S.D. FLA. R. 4; N.D. IND. R. 6 (b); S.D. Miss. R. DESIGNATING MOTION DAYs;
S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9 (k).
110 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3 (c); W.D. Mo. R. 10.
' E.g., D. COLO. R. 9 (d); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 5; D. MD. R. 7; E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R.
4; M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 21. One court has asserted that even if a party under this
mode of rule requests a hearing, the court may properly deny it. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md. 1964).
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power to limit the right to an oral hearing is found in Federal Rule
78, which allows the court to promulgate rules for the "submission
and determination of motions . . . upon brief written statements
of reason in support and opposition."112 The Ninth Circuit has
held, however, that a hearing may not be precluded on a motion
for summary judgment. 113 The court declined to rest its decision
upon due process grounds,'1 4 reasoning instead that Federal Rule
56 (c), which alludes to service of notice and affidavits prior to "the
time fixed for hearing,""15 requires that an opportunity for a hear-
ing be afforded.116
Rule 12 (d), dealing with motions to dismiss," 7 and rule 56
both allude to "hearings" upon these respective motions although
neither rule in terms requires an oral hearing. It is argu-
able that these rules were impliedly those which were referred to
in the first paragraph of rule 78, which is concerned with the dis-
patch on motion days of "motions requiring notice and hearing."1 18
Viewed with this perspective, the power to require written submis-
sion and determination might be read as limited to those motions
which make no reference to a "hearing" attendant to their resolu-
tion. It is equally arguable, however, that "hearing" does not
necessarily require an oral proceeding: rather, it may be construed
as any procedure, written or oral, by which the court allows the
parties to present the groundwork buttressing their positions."19
Such a construction would seemingly be a more logical reading of
rule 78, which provides unqualifiedly for the processing of motions
without oral hearing.
It is evident from the dearth of allusion to the question in the
Advisory Committee's Notes to rules 12, 56 and 78 that the problem
was not foreseen. 20 Thus, any attempt to glean a definitive inter-
pretation from the rules may be a delusive and misdirected under-
taking. The due process dictates of the Constitution are likely a
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 78.
113 Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 888 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964).
'" Id. at 462 n.14.
115FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
we 388 F.2d at 461-62.
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (d).
218 FED. R. Civ. P. 78. (Emphasis added.)
119 Cf. Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir. 1968), finding "no denial of
hearing" where a motion for summary judgment was determined upon the complaint,
affidavits and briefs. Accord, Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963).
120 See Advisory Committee's Notes, 28 U.S.C. AP. at 6092-94, 6135-36, 6166 (1964).
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more fertile decisional source. Whether an oral hearing is a due
process requisite in a given circumstance is problematic. The Su-
preme Court, in denying the right in an administrative context,
asserted that it "varies from case to case in accordance with differing
circumstances, as do other procedural regulations."'121 The Court
itself will not hear argument upon any motion unless it so chooses. 122
It is likely that the judicial propensity to require oral proceedings
is greatest where ultimate, dispositive motions such as summary
judgment and dismissal are at issue, and the lower federal courts
have divided on the propriety of the practice when such motions
have been decided without oral hearing. 128 A compromise is found
in those rules which accord a party the right to stipulate his desire
for an oral hearing and which deem the right waived if not re-
quested..24 A local rule framed in this format has been upheld by
the Eighth Circuit in a summary judgment case125 and the recal-
citrant Ninth Circuit has also indicated its approval. 20  The voli-
tion afforded the parties would thus appear to satisfy the requisites
of due process while at the same time facilitating to some extent
the quest for judicial efficiency. It is likely, however, that a require-
ment of "cause shown" accompanying the request would be more
effective in reducing unnecessary argument.127  If discretion is
posited in the judge to grant a hearing upon such "proper showing,"
it will presumably be exercised where due process requires, thus
satisfying with more facility the flexible maxim tendered by the
Supreme Court. 28
Several miscellaneous rules designed to streamline district pro-
cedures also warrant allusion in an exegesis of local motions prac-
tice. Some districts, for example, impose a time limit within which
121 FCC v. wJR, 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949).
122 S. Cr. R. 35, 3.
223 See Council of Federated Organizations v. Mize, 339 F.2d 898 (5th Cir, 1964)
(dismissal for failure to state a claim improper constitutionally without hearing);
Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963) (summary judgment may proceed
without oral hearing); Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1962)
(motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction must be heard unless such defect appears
on face of complaint and is incurable).
24E.g., rules cited note 111 supra.
125 Bagby v. United States, 199 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1952).
120 Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964).
127 See Steckler, Motions Prior to Trial, 29 F.R.D. 299, 301-02 (1961).
128 See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md. 1964),
asserting that due process was not violated by the court's discretionary refusal of a
request for a hearing.
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certain motions must be filed.129 Such rules are rather extraordinary
adjuncts to the Federal Rules and to the extent that these limitation
periods are mandatory rather than discretionary, their validity has
properly been questioned by the courts. 30 An analogous practice
is the discussion, hearing and ruling upon all motions at the pre-
trial conference.' 3 ' Although a similar procedure has been recom-
mended as desirable in the expedition of protracted and complex
litigation,'132 the rule has not enjoyed wide acceptance and one judge
has asserted that it is not economical in ordinary cases where mo-
tions must be received "as counsel have the inclination to file
them.' 33 Finally, in an attempt to vitiate the intransigence of at-
torneys who file unnecessary motions or refuse to compromise their
positions with respect to a meritorious motion, many courts impose
upon a counsel who files an unnecessary or frivolous motion the op-
ponent's cost in resisting.'3 4 Unwarranted opposition may meet with
a similar sanction.135 These penalties have been upheld by one
court as tending to bring "unfounded litigation ... to an end" in
accordance with the "whole tenor of the Federal Rules."' 36 As ap-
plied to attorneys, however, the Third Circuit has ruled that such
sanctions partake of criminal contempt and require a hearing and
120 E.g., D.D.C. (GFN.) R. II(f) (certain motions may not be raised when case
is on ready calendar absent "extraordinary circumstances"); N.D. GA. R. 9 (motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment must precede pre-trial by 15 days); E.D. &
S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9 (permission needed after trial calendaring for all motions
other than for final relief); E.D. PA. R. 19 (motions to bring in a third party defen-
dant must be within six months).
13o McSparran v. Gable, 223 F. Supp. 127, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1963). In that case, a
local rule prescribed a six-month period for motions for leave to bring in a third-
party defendant. The court ruled that although framed in mandatory terms, the
rule would be construed to admit the exercise of judicial discretion. Otherwise, the
rule woul' "probably [be] . . . illegal as in conflict with amended FED. R. Cxv. P.
14(a). which provides that a third party complaint may be served '[alt any time
after commencement of the action.'" Ibid. See Edwards v. United States, 223 F. Supp.
1017, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1968), characterizing the same rule as a "guide" to the discre-
tion of the court.
18, E.g., W.D. LA. R. 5 (b) (2); W.D.N.C.R. 7. See E.D. LA. R. 4(D).
132 The Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases
has recommended an early pre-trial where counsel must reveal and discuss the mo-
tions they intend to file. The pre-trial order then contains a schedule for filing and
hearing motions. Steckler, supra note 127, at 300. If mandatory, such a practice
may be invalid. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
103 Steckler, supra note 127, at 800.
E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3 (f); S.D. F A. R. 5 (h); D. KAN. R. 11 (d); E.D WAsH. R. 8;
see M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 21 (o).
135 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 3 (f); D. KAN. R. 11 (d).
180 Deem v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 24 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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ruling to that effect before they may be imposed.1 7 The latter
ruling appears unduly rigid, however, for the district court's in-
herent power to discipline the bar may be exercised by wielding a
less stringent rod than the contempt power.138 The cogent dissent
of Judge Goodrich is more compelling:
If a judge is going to organize, either alone or with fellow
judges, the business of the court, there must be authority to im-
pose reasonable sanctions for the breach of reasonable rules. 180
PLEADINGS
Although a basic aim of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to simplify the manner of pleading in the federal courts, 40 several
local rules prescribe potentially constricting formalities for the pre-
sentation of written claims. Most of these rules seek to aid the
court either by demanding picayune uniformity in the physical ar-
rangement of the pleadings or by requiring the tying of piecemeal
claims or amendments to related allegations.
Physical requirements for pleadings generally encompass the
size, 41 weight, 42 color' 43 and quality of the paper 44 used therein;
the method of printing; 145 and the arrangement and binding of
pages. 46 Although these prescriptions may promote the drafting of
:17 Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
888 (1962). In this case, an undue delay in filing a pre-trial memorandum resulted
in a $100 fine upon counsel, payable to the Government as employer of the judicial
personnel whose time had been wasted by the delay. The majority held that no-
where in the Federal Rules was such a power conferred upon the district courts and
that Federal Rule 83 did not purport to accord such authority. 307 F.2d at 731-32.
13 See id. at 735-36 and authorities cited in notes 5-11 therein (Biggs, C.J.,
dissenting).
130 Id. at 737 (dissenting opinion).
140 See IA BARRON & HoLrzoFF § 251, at 31-33; 2 MooRE 8.02, at 1612.
141 E.g., D. DEL. R. 6 (A) (8! x 13 inches); D. IDAHO R. 3 (b) (legal size paper); D.
NEB. R. 6 (a) (8V x 14 inches); D. NEv. R. 2 (b) (legal size paper).
212 E.g., E.D. & W.D. Am. R. 2 (a) (not less than 16 pounds); D. COLO. R. 7 (a)
("standard weight"); D. NEv. R. 2 (b) (not less than 16 pounds except ripple finish
onion skin of 13 pounds).
143 E.g., D. COLO. R. 7 (a) (white); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 5 (b) (white opaque); D. MONT.
R. 8 (a) (2) (white opaque); D. NEB. R. 6 (a) (white).
1" E.g., D. MONT. R. 8 (a) (2) ("good quality"); D. NEB. R. 6 (b) ("not subject to
unusual fading or deterioration'); D. NEv. R. 2 (b) ("good quality').
1 5 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 2(a) ("typewritten, mimeographed, or printed, in
type not less than pica'); D. COLO. R. 7 (b) ("plainly and legibly typewritten, mimeo-
graphed or printed, without erasures or interlineations materially defacing them');
D. ME. R. 8 (a) ("typed double spaced or printed').1 8 E.g., D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 5 (b) ("unfolded, without back or cover, fastened at top');
N.D. GA. R. 3 (b) ("flat and unfolded'); D. IDAHO R. 3 (b) ("no backs'); N.D. ILL.
(GEN.) R. 9 (b) ("secured on the left margin').
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legible and manageable pleadings within a particular district, they
can create entanglements for counsel when disparate rules exist
among districts.147 Courts should be and doubtless are lenient in
the sanctions imposed for inadvertent transgressions, and a modi-
cum of reasonable latitude would appear to be desirable in the
content of such particularized rules.14
Besides regulating the strict physical form of pleadings, some
local rules demand presentation of isolated claims and amendments
in the context of related allegations. Some of these rules command
physical written incorporation of all amendments into the original
pleadings to which they relate before presentation to the court.149
Others require that a responsive pleading contain a r~sum6 of the
particular pleading to which it responds. 50 Finally, two districts
require the plaintiff, at least one day before trial, to present to the
court a copy of his complaint, accompanied by notations describing
the defendant's response to each element therein.151 These rules
tend to restrict the ease of pleading by imposing hitherto unneces-
sary burdens upon the parties, and to some extent duplicate the
purposes of the pre-trial conference. Nevertheless, the rules may be
pragmatically justifiable because of their maintenance of a clear and
expansive expression of the formal pre-trial positions of the parties.
This may augment a court's ability to rule on motions limited to
the pleadings and avert misunderstandings by the parties as to the
cogency of their legal positions and the need for additional amend-
ments or motions.
Other districts tend to facilitate the ease of pleading in a com-
plaint by hindering the presentation by the defendant of a crippling
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
247 Cf. Brown v. City of Meridian, 356 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1966) (district court
dismissal of a removal petition because the out-of-state attorney had failed to file
the three copies required by local rule held improper).
148 The practical difficulties of complying with divergent physical requirements
for pleadings may at first blush indicate a need for uniformity among the districts
in this area. However, the achievement of uniformity on the federal level may
disturb existent parallelism of federal and local requirements within a few states.
Some of the present disparity in rules of the district courts may in fact emanate
from efforts to conform to state court rules. See N.D. GA. R. 2. Consequently,
although attorneys who practice in federal courts in several different states would
be aided by a uniform federal rule, those whose pratice is only statewide might be
hampered. Perhaps, however, the adoption of homologous rules by the federal courts
would prompt acceptance of identical measures by the states.
140 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 6 (C); D. IDAHo R. 8 (d); D. NEv. R. 2 (d).
150 E.g., ND. ILL. (GEN.) R. 9 (a); N.D. IND. R. 7.
1
" E.D. 8- S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 6 (b).
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12 (b) (6).152 These districts by local rule force the movant to state
the specific basis of his claim under rule 12 (b) (6), requiring him
to file a memorandum supporting his position with citations of
authority.153 Otherwise, he could properly move to dismiss under
rule 12 (b) (6) simply by a general motion without setting forth in
detail the grounds upon which he relies. 5 4 The latter procedure
tends to promote a policy of the Federal Rules favoring liberal con-
struction of the sufficiency of a complaint55 and may be proffered
as a model for wider local adoption.
Finally, at least two districts have adopted local rules prescribing
methods of verification as to the truth of the pleadings by the
parties.15 These rules are somewhat ambiguous, for they do not
specify the instances in which verification must be made: rather,
this procedure is prescribed "whenever it shall become necessary
to verify any pleading.'- 5 7 However, the most reasonable interpre-
tation is that these rules merely provide procedures for those extra-
ordinary situations where verification is commanded either by the
Federal Rules or by a statute.'58 Since the need for specification of
such procedures is contingent on the volume of these extraordinary
cases within a particular district, local variance would seem entirely
proper.
NOTIFICATION OF A CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Several local rules require notice of claims asserting the uncon-
stitutionality of federal statutes,'59 thus enabling the district judges
152 FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). The rule allows a defense based on the failure of
the complainant to state "a claim upon which relief can be granted." Ibid.
253 /Eg., D. ALAsKA R. 5 (D); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 8 (b).
'"4 WRIGHT § 66, at 242 & n.43.
21 See Conley v. Gibson, 855 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Neumann v. Faultless Clothing
Co., 27 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Gay v. E. H. Moore, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 749,
750 (E.D. Okla. 1939); IA BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 255, at 52-56.1 56 D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 6; M.D. PA. R. 14.
167 M.D. PA. R. 14. See D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 6.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 was designed to abolish the necessity for verification except
when specifically authorized by a "rule" or "statute." See IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF
§ 333; 2 MOOR 11.03-.04. It might be contended that the local provisions dealing
with verification procedures are "rules" within the meaning of the exception to rule
11 and command verification in all cases. However, by requiring verification only
in situations of "necessity," see text accompanying note 157 supra, the rules appear to
have only made provision for the special contingency of an exceptive "rule" or
"statute." Moreover, interpreting the rules to cover all pleadings would undercut an
underlying aim of rule 11-eradicating verification to avoid constricting the parties'
willingness to make allegations. See 2 MOORE 11.04; WVGHT § 66, at 239.
I 5 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARm. R. 18; D. COLO. R. 23; D. DEL. R. 22; S.D. FLA. R. 11;
E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 6(a); N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 22(a).
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to comply with section 2403 of the Judicial Code 60 and with Fed-
eral Rule 24 (c),161 which require them to notify the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States when an act of Congress is challenged and
the United States is not a party. Although most of the rules simply
require that the party making the claim give detailed written notice
to the court prior to trial,'16 2 at least one rule imposes the additional
duty of filing with the clerk an extra copy of the pleading contain-
ing the allegation and likewise to file specific instructions for notify-
ing the Attorney General. 63
Besides promoting compliance with rule 24 (c), these local rules
may have the additional utility of (1) alerting the judge of the
necessity of a three-judge panel required for claims requesting in-
junction of a federal statute as unconstitutional;'" (2) informing
the court that the case may pose difficult conceptual problems; 165
16- 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1964). The requirement of notice by the court provided by
§ 2403 enables the Attorney General to exercise his right to intervene in all actions
"in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer
or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of
Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question .... ." Ibid. See FED. R.
Cav. P. 24 (a), providing for intervention by right when unconditionally authorized
by a federal statute.
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (c).
1 1 In addition to inclusion of the title of the case, the notification rules generally
require references sufficient for identification of the statute questioned and the aspects
of the statute upon which the claim of constitutionality is based. E.g., E.D. & W.D.
ARK. R. 18; D. COLo. R. 23; D. DEL. R. 22; S.D. FLA. R. 11; E.D.N.C. (Cxv.) R. 4;
E.D. PA. R. 16. Some rules do not require a statement of the grounds of constitu-
tional challenge. E.g., E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 6 (a); N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 22 (a); E.D. Wis.
R. 10.
Only three of the twenty-two district judges from districts without a notification
rule stated that they had experienced difficulty in providing the Attorney General
with adequate notice of a claim of unconstitutionality.
16 3W.D. PA. R. 11. By this process the court shifts its duty of notifying the
Attorney General to counsel, who performs the function through the conduit of the
clerk. Although this eliminates administrative detail for the judge, it also removes
his supervision of a mandatory responsibility.
164 A three-judge district court must hear claims for injunctions restraining en-
forcement of acts of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1964). At least five days prior to the hearing notice must be given to the Attorney
General, the local United States Attorney and other persons who may be defendants.
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964). Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the
apposite local rules specifically relate the notification procedures for claims of un-
constitutionality to three-judge court requirements. Moreover, some districts have
adopted separate rules requiring notice of claims requiring a three-judge court. E.g.,
N.D. GA. R. 3 (); N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 31.
20 All of the judges from districts requiring notice of a claim of unconstitutional-
ity responding to the questionnaire felt that the principal purpose of the rule was
to facilitate the giving of notice to the Attorney General. However, of the practition-
ers who favored such a rule, 56.5% felt that it was needed to inform the court of a
potentially difficult case, while only 43.5% thought the rule was needed to assure
notice to the Attorney General.
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and (3) allowing consideration by the district judge who has the
greatest affinity for constitutional questions. However, in spite of
these justifications, sixty-five per cent of the federal practitioners
polled objected to the notification rule.166 They intimated that such
a rule is unnecessary because claims of unconstitutionality are gen-
erally included in the pleadings167 and that in any case the judge is
likely to be cognizant of such claims. Consequently, many argued
that a superfluous detailed burden is added to already burgeoning
pre-trial requirements in several districts. However, the meritori-
ousness of these objections must depend to some extent upon the
penalties for noncompliance. If the local rules merely seek to enlist
the voluntary co-operation of counsel in facilitating a judicial duty,
the prescriptions seem more palatable than if failure to accord no-
tice results in waiver of the claim or the rigorous sanction of in-
voluntary dismissal for failure to comply with an "order of the
court" under Federal Rule 41 (b).168
On the other hand, strict enforcement of the requirement of
notice to the court of a claim of unconstitutionality may in fact be
in the best interest of the claimant if such notice aids the court in
notifying the Attorney General under Federal Rule 24 (c). Al-
though neither the rule nor any reported case specifies the effect of
failure of the court to give notice to the Attorney General, some
commentators have suggested that this omission might, upon mo-
tion by the United States, warrant the invalidation of a judgment
holding a statute unconstitutional. 69 The justness of such a result
166 It should be noted, however, that a majority of the practitioners who objected
to the rules came from districts which do not require notice of a claim of uncon-
stitutionality, while a plurality of the practitioners whose districts have such a rule
favored it.
107 Written notice separate from the pleadings is more likely to direct the judge's
attention to the specific claim. Consequently, separate notice is probably necessary
under most of the notification rules, which make no acknowledgment that presenta-
tion of the claim in the pleadings will be sufficient notice. See rules cited note 159
supra. At least one rule specifically provides that notice shall only be contained in
the pleadings, but an additional copy of the relevent pleading must be filed for the
limited purpose of notifying the clerk of the claim. W.D. PA. R. 11.
163 Dismissal under rule 41 (b) operates as an adjudication upon the merits. FED.
R. Civ. P. 41 (b). However, rule 41 (b) might be inapplicable, for the courts may
refuse to hold that local rules have the force of an "order of the court" as con-
templated by the rule. None of the rules contain sanctions for noncompliance,
and there are no reported cases on the subject.
160Legislation, 38 COLUM. L. RV. 153, 154 n.14 (1938). Although the United
States could argue the merits of the constitutional attack on appeal, the attractive-
ness of this alternative is diminished by the absence of direct review by the Supreme
Court, which is available only when the United States has been a party to or has
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is questionable since the claimant is penalized because of the court's
neglect of its affirmative duty. Nevertheless, the very magnitude of
a constitutional claim suggests the reasonableness of requiring assis-
tance of counsel in notifying an important adversary party not
formally joined in the action. Perhaps an acceptable compromise
would be a requirement that the claim be readily identifiable from
the pleadings. Further, leave to amend the pleadings to include a
claim of unconstitutionality should be available only within a period
sufficient to allow the Attorney General to prepare for trial, and
claims filed without the specified period should be waived.
ORDERS GRANTABLE BY THE CLERK
Although Federal Rule 77 (c) authorizes the clerk to grant orders
routinely in only three specific instances and in general situations
"which do not require allowance or order of the court,"'170 several
district courts have substantially expanded the particular areas in
which the clerk may act independently. For example, several local
rules permit the clerk to grant orders where the parties have con-
sented to substituting attorneys,171 extending the time to plead,172
satisfying a judgment or order for the payment of money 7 3 with-
drawing stipulations 7 4 annulling bonds, 7 5 exonerating sureties'76
and discontinuing or dismissing a case. 77 Moreover, absent consent
of the parties, some local rules allow the clerk to appoint persons to
serve process, 78 approve subpoenas duces tecum 179 and dismiss an
intervened in the original action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1252, 2403 (1964); 4 FED.
RULES SERv. 913 (1941).
17O The clerk is specifically empowered to execute mesne process; to issue final
process to enforce and execute judgments; and to enter defaults or judgments by
default. Fa. R. Civ. P. 77 (c). Moreover, he may under FED. R. Civ. P. 58 enter
final judgment upon the verdict of a jury and under FED. R. Civ. P. 68 enter accep-
tance of an offer of judgment.
271 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 14 (D) (1); S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (2); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 10 (2); D.
HAWAII R. 4 (a) (3); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 30 (a) (3).
172E.g., D. CONN. R. 16(1); D. HAWAii R. 4(a) (2); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (2);
W.D. Mo. R. 6 (a) (1); N.D. OKLA. R. 24 (b); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 30 (a) (2).
173 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 14 (D) (2); S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (3); D. HAWAII R. 4 (a) (4); E.D.
ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (5); D. KAN. R. 21 (e); W.D. LA. R. 9 (b) (2); D. MAss. R. 9 (2).
174 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 14 (D) (2); S.D. CAL. PL 7 (c) (3); E.. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (6);
D. KAN. R. 21 (f).
17 "E.g., D. ALASKA R. 14 (D) (2); S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (3); D. HAWAI R. 4 (a) (4); E.D.
ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (6); D. MASS. R. 9 (2); E.D. Mo. R. V (a) (3).
" E.g., D. ALASKA R. 14 (D) (2); S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (3); D. HAWAII R. 4 (a) (4); E.D.
IL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (6); D. MONT. R. 16 (c).
3.77E.g., N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 16(c); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 12 (c).
"'s E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (1); D. HAWAI R. 4 (a) (1); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (1);
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action where a party has failed to answer interrogatories within a
prescribed period of time.8 0
The power of the clerk under the general granting clause of
rule 77 (c) may be extended to the exercise of the functions added
by the aforementioned local rules. This power has traditionally
rested upon the characterization of a function as "ministerial"
rather than "discretionary."'' The latter term generally refers to
reasoned judgments which must emanate from the wisdom of the
court.1 2 Conversely, ministerial duties are conceived of as exercised
pursuant to precise, confining guidelines prescribed by a higher
authority 8 3 and thus may be executed by the clerk. Although some
of the orders authorized by the local rules have "discretionary"
overtones, 8 4 in most cases the clerk's latitude of choice is effectively
D. KAN. R. 21 (a); D. NEv. R. 18 (c) (1); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 12 (a); D.N.D.R. XXI
(1) (a).
1"7 E.g., E.D. OKLA. R. 24 (2); W.D. OmA. R. 23 (2).
1 80 D. MAss. R. 9 (4).
181 See, e.g., Midwestern Developments, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 319 F.2d 53 (10th
Cir. 1963); Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185 (3d
Cir. 1942) (by implication).
182 E.g., Baker v. Sisk, 1 F.R.D. 232, 235 (E.D. Okla. 1938); People ex rel. Trost v.
Bird, 184 App. Div. 779, 172 N.Y. Supp. 412 (1918).
113E.g., Nealon v. Davis, 18 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Flournoy v. City of
Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 174 (1861); Marc v. Pinkard, 133 Misc. 83, 85, 230 N.Y.
Supp. 765, 766 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1928).
"A ministerial act may, perhaps, be defined to be one which a person performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the
propriety of the act being done." Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, supra at 174.
184 Several districts permit the clerk to issue orders for the substitution of lawyers
when the parties have consented to the change. E.g., rules cited note 171 supra. The
Canons of Professional Ethics provide that an attorney may withdraw from the case
only upon a showing of good cause and with due notice to the client so as to allow
sufficient time for the client to secure another lawyer. American Bar Association,
Canon of Professional Ethics 44. Hence the decision to allow the withdrawal of a
lawyer's services appears to be in essence a function of the court. Likewise, the
decision regarding the substitution of lawyers would require discretionary judgment
on matters dealing with the client's interest and delay in court proceedings. Such
a decision seemingly demands that "judicial wisdom" which should be exercised only
by the court. Cf. United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 113, 119 (1848).
Under D. MAss. R. 9 (4), the clerk holds ex parte authority to dismiss a case
when interrogatories have not been answered within the automatic twenty-day exten-
sion added by that rule to the fifteen-day period within which FED. R. Civ. P. 33
requires return. Rule 33 permits the enlargement of the answering period by the
court only upon motion with notice and for good cause shown. Therefore, since
the decision of whether to dismiss the case for failure to answer interrogatives
involves questions of good cause, sufficient notice, and integral interests of the
parties, it would appear that the clerk under D. MAss. R. 9 (4) has been vested with
the power to make eminently judicial decisions.
In several districts the clerk is permitted to extend the time to plead where the
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circumscribed. First, the power of the clerk is often qualified by the
commandment of many of the local rules that the parties must con-
sent to any proposed order.185 Moreover, the ability of the clerk to
resolve questions with finality is limited by a provision of rule 77 (c)
which empowers the court to alter, suspend or rescind a clerk's
orders "upon cause shown."'186 However, neither of these provisions
fully limits the discretionary nature of the clerical duties permitted
under local rules. For example, an attorney might attempt to with-
draw from an action and seek to substitute another counselor in
his place. 8 7 However, adequate protection of the interests of a
party might depend upon continued prosecution of the action by
the withdrawing attorney. Since that party's adversary is not likely
to be concerned with guarding these interests, the court becomes
the only effective source of protection. Consequently, in spite of
mutual consent, the proposed order would seem to demand judicial
scrutiny rather than routine authorization by the clerk. Further-
more, the ability of the court to rescind the order of the clerk under
rule 77 (c) appears to provide an inadequate solution. Unless the
court initiated suspension or rescission of the order, the substituted
attorney is the only logical source of proof that cause exists for re-
versal of the order, and he is placed in the anomalous position of
arguing his own inability to represent the party adequately.
Despite the potential disadvantages of permitting an expansion
in the kinds of orders grantable by the clerk in limited situations,
minor delegations in some instances may eliminate part of the bur-
densome workload of a court and consequently promote careful
parties have consented. E.g., rules cited note 172 supra. Again, FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)
allows the extension of the time to plead only at the discretion of the court for
cause shown. Therefore, the authorization of the clerk under the local rules given
above to extend the time to plead would seem to make it incumbent upon the
clerk to exercise "judicial wisdom and discretion" in considering the issue of just
cause, and undue delay of the case.
181 (1) Substitution of attorneys: e.g., D. ALASKA f. 14 (D) (1); S.D. CAL. R. 7 (c) (2);
E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (3).
(2) Satisfaction of judgments, payment of money, withdrawal of stipulations,
annulment of bonds, exoneration of sureties: e.g., D. ALAsKA R. 14 (D) (2); S.D. CAL.
R. 7 (c) (3).
(3) Time to plead: e.g., D. HAWAII R. 4 (a) (2); E.D. ILL. (Cxv.) R. 20 (a) (2); W.D.
WASH. (Civ.) R. 30 (a) (2).
Some rules, however, do not specify consent as a prerequisite. E.g., E.D. ILL.
(Crv.) ft. 20(a) (6) (withdrawal of stipulations, annulment of bonds, and exonera-
tion of sureties); N.D. OKLA. Rt. 24 (b) (extending time to plead).
180 FD. fR. Civ. P. 77 (c).
287 See notes 171, 184 supra and accompanying text.
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scrutiny of more weighty and complex issues. Perhaps the accelerat-
ing abdication of judicial supervision could be made more palat-
able, however, by modification of local rules to require that the
clerk submit brief, formalized notice of proposed orders to the court
along with a statement of relevant circumstances. The district judge
could, prior to issuance of the order, quickly ascertain whether the
court's intervention was necessary. This procedure would promote
the preservation of judicial time by the court and at the same time
insure retention of judicial scrutiny of orders.
BONDS AND UNDERTAKINGS
The district courts may, under Federal Rule 83,188 promulgate
rules relating to bonds, undertakings and the giving of security,80
although several statutes' 0° and rules'0 ' limit this discretion in sev-
188 FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
188 Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); see also Newell
v. 0. A. Mewton & Son Co., 95 F. Supp. 355 (D. Del. 1950); Fontenot v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 78 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. La. 1948).
Many districts follow the state practice regarding security for costs. See, e.g., D.
ARxz. R. 27; E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 4(b); Warner Co. v. Brann & Stuart Co., 198 F.
Supp. 634 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Fischer v. Kale, 6 F.R.D. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). However,
this is not required by the Erie doctrine. Jefferson v. Stockholders Pub. Co., 1941
F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1952) (by implication); Corthorn v. Cleghorn, 91 F. Supp. 326
(S.D. Mo. 1950); cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), 1965 DuKE L.J. 142. It
is true that Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), required
the district court in a diversity case to apply a state statute requiring plaintiffs in
certain stockholders' suits to post security for expenses, but the court pointed out
that the liability created by the statute "goes beyond payment of what we know as
'costs.'" Id. at 555. Cf. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961), 7 VILL. L. RaV. 292. See also 3 BARRON & IOLTZOFF
§ 1198, at 69-70 (Supp. 1965).
18. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1964) provide for approval by the Secretary of the Treasury
of corporate sureties which guarantee those bonds and undertakings required by
law to be given.
28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d) (1964) requires a bond to be given in all cases removed to
the federal courts upon the condition that the defendant will pay costs if it should
be determined that the case was not properly removed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964) authorizes the district courts to permit the commence-
ment of any action without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor by
anyone who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay costs or give security.
181 In cases where an appellant has not at an earlier stage of an action given
security covering the total costs of the litigation, FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (c) requires, upon
the filing of an appeal, a $250 cost bond from the appellant unless the court of
appeals specifically fixes a different amount or unless the appellant is "not subject
to costs" under the rules of the court of appeals. See Advisory Committee's Note,
86 Sup. Ct. (No. 11) 64 (1966).
FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (d) requires a supersedeas bond in order for judgment to be
stayed on appeal, such bond "conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment in full
together with costs, interest, and damages for delay," and sufficient in amount to
cover such items.
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eral particulars. The most frequent and significant exercise of this
power by the district courts has been the requiring of security for
costs.' 9 2 Some districts properly treat the imposition of security for
costs as a matter for the court's discretion, providing simply that
security may be required of any party.193 Others, however, have
established inflexible rules as a substitute for the exercise of judg-
ment.
Thus, many districts provide that security for costs shall be re-
quired of all nonresident plaintiffs. 9 4 Such an inclusive approach
does not appear to be proper. The ostensible reason for such a
rule is to ensure that a defendant who prevails will not be com-
pelled to seek recourse outside of the district, possibly at some in-
FED. R. Civ. P. 65.1 provides that a surety may be proceeded against summarily
and shall agree to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court enforcing the bond.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (c) requires security for potential costs and damages to be
given by a party securing a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
1 02 In addition, many districts have made rules establishing requirements for
sureties, such as: (1) The provision that any corporate surety approved pursuant
to 6 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1964) may guarantee bonds or undertakings in the local court.
E.g., N.D. GA. R. 7 (c); D. HAWAII R. 7 (c); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 31 (b) (2). (2) The
requirement that corporate sureties must file with the court a written authoriza-
tion of their agents' power to guarantee obligations. E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 8 (a); W.D.
WASH. (Civ.) R. 21 (c) (required only of corporate sureties not approved by Secretary
of Treasury). (3) The provision that no attorney or officer of the court may be
surety. E.g., D. ALASKA R. 16 (B); D. MONT. R. 15 (b); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 31 (d). (4)
Rules requiring that individual sureties must be resident property holders within
the district. E.g., N.D. GA. R. 7 (c) (3); D. HAWAI R. 7 (c); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R.
31 (b) (3). (5) Rules allowing summary judgment to be had against sureties. E.g.,
D. ALASKA R. 16(D); S.D. CAL. R. 8 (c); D. MONT. R. 15 (c). (6) Rules permitting
cash to be deposited in lieu of any bond. E.g., D. ALASKA R. 16 (E); D. HAWAIr R.
7 (c) (1); S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 31 (b) (1); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.1.
Several districts require that the supersedeas bond imposed by FED. R. CIV. P.
73 (d) be, in the case of a money judgment, in the amount of the judgment plus
11% to cover potential interest and damages for delay, plus $250 to cover costs. E.g.,
N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 28; S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 33.
Several districts have specified the amount of the removal bond required by 28
U.S.C. § 1446 (d) (1964). E.g., D. CONN. R. 6 (b) ($250); D. DEL. R. 25 (3) ($500);
N.D. IND. R. 9 (a) ($200).
Many districts require that where a judgment is recovered by a party who brought
suit without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964), the judgment shall be paid to the clerk, who may pay therefrom any
outstanding fees and costs. E.g., D. HAwAn R. 7 (d) (clerk may also pay party's
attorney a fee approved by court); S.D. ILL. R. 3 (balance shall be paid to party
and his attorney as ordered by court if notice is filed that contingent fee contract has
been entered into); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 22. (clerk may also pay party's attorney a
fee approved by court).
1,01 E.g., W.D. KY. R. 4; E.D. LA. R. 7 (D); S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 2.
110,1 E.g., N.D. GA. R. 7 (a); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 2 (a) (unless court otherwise orders);
N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 2 (a) (same, on motion and for good cause shown). Such a rule
has been upheld against the contention that it is discriminatory and thus void.
Russell v. Cunningham, 233 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1956).
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convenience and expense, to enforce an award of costs.195 This
justification is inapposite to the case of a nonresident plantiff who
owns property within the district or situated not far from the defen-
dant's place of residence although without the district. While the
burden of giving security for costs is generally not great, and while
the expense thereof is often a taxable cost borne by the defendani
should the plaintiff prevail,19 6 it would still seem unfair that a
plaintiff should be compelled to shoulder this burden because of
nonresidence per se.
Another questionable provision appearing in some local rules is
that security for costs will be required only of a party seeking af-
firmative relief. 197 If good cause is shown, it is difficult to see the
justification for exempting a party from giving security merely be-
cause he is a defendant. This practice may possibly be justified by
the argument that, while it is not unfair to require one who chooses
to bring another into court to give security to insure that such per-
son will not be injured if the plaintiff's cause is meritless, one who
is in court involuntarily should not be compelled to undergo this
expense when it is not yet determined that he is under any liability.
In rebuttal, however, it may be noted that a defendant utilizes the
facilities of the court to resist a possible lawful claim and it is not
unfair to require him to give security in order that the plaintiff will
not be injured by an unjustified refusal to pay.
There appears to be no general rule that a defendant will, as a
matter of course, be required in any type of case to tender security
for the amount of the judgment prayed for. While an inflexible
rule imposing this burden would work undue hardship in many
instances, it may in some circumstances be necessary to protect a
plaintiff's inchoate equity from dissipation. To the extent that the
requiring of security for judgment is dependent upon the amount
the plaintiff claims, some harassment would be a possible con-
comitant of requiring such a bond. It is submitted, however, that
discretion should be afforded for the imposition of security upon a
defendant where the plaintiff shows a probability that the judgment
2 Cf. Russell v. Cunningham, supra note 194.
190 See, e.g., N.D. ILL. (CIv.) R. 11; S.D. IND. R. 5; E.D.N.C. (CIv.) R. 11 (A); W.D.
WAsH. (Civ.) R. 31 (t).
197 See, e.g., D. CoLo. R. 19; W.D. Mo. R. 4. Security for costs is, however, re-
quired of a defendant who removes the case to the district court. See note 190 supra,
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may otherwise be uncollectable in whole or in part. Irreparable
injury may thus be averted in situations where it is most imminent.
In the light of the above shortcomings in the local rules, con-
sideration should be given to the formulation of a uniform national
policy with regard to the circumstances under which a bond shall
be required. Such a policy is followed in the case of appeal and
supersedeas bonds 98 and although these rules require bonds in every
case falling within their terms, no compelling policy considerations
appear to preclude a grant of discretion in the trial judge in factual
settings diverging from the mandate of these rules. A proper ap-
proach would require security for costs of any party upon a showing
of cause, thus according desirable latitute to the district courts but
ensuring that arbitrary rules will not be applied in cases where
unnecessary hardship might result. In any event, it would be profit-
able to reformulate each local rule along these lines.
DEPOSITIONS AND DIscovERY
Given the pervasive breadth of the discovery provisions enun-
ciated in Federal Rules 26 through 37,199 it is less than surprising
that the local rules implementing these federal precepts are not
extensive. Nevertheless, generic local problems have precipitated a
variety of district rules designed to ameliorate particularly trouble-
some contingencies. The desirability and, indeed, the validity of
these local rules may be measured by the degree to which they
facilitate the ambitious design of the federal discovery procedures,
which were conceived with a view to a self-generating, extrajudicial
process whose operation would eradicate the element of courtroom
surprise.210 In furthering this design, various local rules have en-
deavored to serve discovery in the following ends: (1) to insure
that the process is not unduly protracted; (2) to relieve the onerous
conditions which discovery may impose in a given instance and thus
preserve the fairness of the proceeding; (3) to inculcate a practice
of extrajudicial resolution of pre-trial differences by counsel in order
to reduce the burden of judicial hearings; and (4) to insure the full
effectiveness of discovery as a device designed to avert surprise in
the course of trial and to expedite the entire judicial process. The
fruits of these endeavors will be explored below.
108 See note 191 supra.
10 9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
000 See WRGHT § 81, at 308.
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1. Time Allotted for Discovery. Despite the admonition that a
district court afford a modicum of latitude when determining a
temporal allotment for discovery, 201 many districts have imposed
rigid timetables for the commencement and completion of discovery.
Several rules encourage the immediate institution of discovery pro-
ceedings, 202 either before the pleading process has been completed 203
or upon notice sent to the parties by the clerk twenty days subse-
quent to filing of the complaint.2°4 Two districts have promulgated
a rule apparently intended to operate as a grant of automatic leave
for the taking of depositions immediately upon institution of an
action.205 This latter provision purports to constitute the leave of
court required of a plaintiff by Federal Rule 26 (a) where notice of
deposition is sought to be served within twenty days after com-
mencement. 20 6 However, such a mandate is seemingly contrary to
the spirit, if not the letter, of that rule in that it affords little lati-
tude for postponing discovery where individual exigency would war-
rant a contrary result. Precipitate haste should not, in the absence
of actual necessity, be allowed to work the inconveniences which
the twenty-day rule was designed to avert2 7 and the rule would thus
appear to be an undesirable commodity for interdistrict importa-
tion.
More stringent than the entreaties for rapid commencement are
the local rules prescribing a fixed time for completion of all dis-
covery. A provision fixing the allowance period at ninety days is not
uncommon,20 8 although the usual referent is the date set for pre-
trial.20 9 While these limitation rules may be modified under cer-
-
02 Freehill v. Lewis, 355 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1966).
-02"Counsel are required to begin such discovery procedures as will be utilized...
promptly after the case is at issue and are encouraged to begin even before issue isjoined. Counsel will not wait until pre-trial conference is imminent to begin dis-
covery." W.D.N.C.R. 10. (Emphasis in original.)
203 Ibid.
2.g., D. ALAsKA R. 9(C); E.D. WASH. R. 9 (b).
205 E.D. OKLA. R. 14; W.D. OKLA. R. 14.
20 0 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a).
207 See 4 MooRE 26.09[31], at 1113. But see Keller-Dorian -Colorfilm Corp. V.
Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The Advisory Committee is
presently considering a revision of the twenty-day rule to comport with the diffi-
culties which may arise where a prospective deponent is about to become unavailable.
Advisory Committee's Note, 86 Sup. Ct. (No. 11) 43-44 (1966).
:08E.g., D. MINN. R. (Dec. 22, 1965); D.N.J.R. 19; W.D.N.C.R. 10.
09 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 9 (C); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9 (e); S.D. CAT. R. 9 (c); D. CONN.
R. 10 (a); D. DEL. R. 11 (A); D. Nmv. R. 11 (c); E.D. WAsH. R. 9 (b).
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tain exigent circumstances,2 10 they are quite positive in their
assertion that discovery shall not be protracted beyond the desig-
nated period absent a showing of necessity.211
The consistency of these prescriptions with the Federal Rules is
somewhat problematic. While the discovery provisions of the rules
are devoid of allusion to the time to be consumed by pre-trial spad-
ing, Federal Rule 1 does direct that construction of the precedure de-
lineated be designed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action." 212 It cannot be gainsaid that these rules
which fix a designated discovery period further the rapid resolution
of causes at issue, but it is at least arguable that the court could con-
currently further the mandate of justice by using its discretionary
power to designate the apposite period as the facts demand in each
individual case.2 13 Nevertheless, a majority of practitioners polled
have indicated that such time limits are not inconsistent with the
spirit and purpose of the discovery rules214 and several of the re-
spondents asserted that these rules were quite salutary in preventing
an adversary from using the discovery procedure as a means of
delaying the trial. Given the apparent need for some finite termina-
tion date and the desirability of freeing the courts from a multitude
of discovery motions, the provisions requiring completion at the
time set for the pre-trial conference 21 5 appear to be the most effica-
cious. In designating the conference date, the court retains an
unburdensome yet flexible de facto control over the termination of
discovery. Further, it is manifest that pre-trial operates with most
facility where counsel are fully informed of the factual ramifica-
tions of their case2 16 and a requirement that such information be
210 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 9 (C) (complete "wherever practicable'); E.D. ARK. R. 9 (e)
(extension only "to prevent manifest injustice"); D. CONN. R. 10(a) (leave granted
for "good cause shown"); W.D.N.C.R. 10 (exceptionally difficult case); E.D.N.C. (Civ.)
R. 7 (E) (four extra months for patent, anti-trust and trademark cases).
211 E.g., rules cited note 210 supra. See S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 13 (b) (1), which provides
that where counsel files a notice that the case is ready for pre-trial or fails to object
.to such a notice when filed by an adversary, such action or inaction constitutes a
certification to the court that "all discovery matters have been completed."
212 FEn. R. Civ. P. 1.
213 See M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 22(d) (1), which provides that counsel shall estimate
at an initial pre-trial conference the needed time for discovery and such time may
then be embodied in a pretrial order under M.D.N.C. (CAv.) R. 22 (c).
214 52% of the responding practitioners so indicated, while 36% found such time
limitations incompatible with the Federal Rules. 12% failed to answer the question.
215 E.g., rules cited note 209 supra.
2-1 Cf. former rule 7-1 of the District of Idaho, which required discovery to be
completed before pre-trial and asserted that to "assure justice and expedite the disposi-
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collected prior to the conference would appear to be a desirable
inducement to that result.
2. Operational Fairness. Several local rules are designed to in-
sure that the discovery process does not become too onerous to the
litigants. Pursuant to the requirement that reasonable notice be
afforded all parties when an oral deposition is sought, 17 many dis-
tricts have stipulated that five days shall constitute the requisite
notification unless the court shall order otherwise.218 This latter
qualifying proviso, which affords an allowable judicial discretion,
would appear to be a necessary prerequisite to the validity of such
rules, for "reasonable" traditionally has been measured in a circum-
stantial context and notices of four and seven days have in certain
situations been ruled unreasonable. 219 Given this caveat, however,
such rules may constitute a desirable yardstick for use in the ordi-
nary case and thus enable the court to dispose summarily of the
minor yet irksome controversies concerning the reasonableness of
notification.
Proceeding under the authority of Federal Rule 30 (b), which
allows the district judge to render orders "which justice requires
to protect the [deposed] party or witness from annoyance, embarass-
ment or oppression,"220 several local rules have made salutary pro-
visions for the allocation of certain deposition costs under prescribed
circumstances where special hardship may be extant. Thus, two
districts have adopted identical rules empowering the court to order
the applicant for an oral deposition which is to be taken more than
one hundred miles from the courthouse to prepay opposing counsel
the costs of transportation and a reasonable fee.221 A similar order
may issue where an attorney must be appointed to represent an
absent adverse party.222 Such rules have been held valid under the
tion of the action. To attain this purpose with a maximum [sic] of time and effort
each attorney shall become thoroughly familiar with his case before it is pre-tried."
The present District of Idaho rule governing pre-trial does not explicitly require such
familiarity. See D. IDAHO R. 10.
317 FED. R. CIv. P. 30 (a).
218 E.g., D. CoLo. R. 10 (a); D. KAN. R. 14 (b); D.N.M.R. 8 (a); E.D. OKLA. K. 14;
W.D. OKLA. R. 14.
I19 See Mims v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1949) (where
deponents were scattered across the country, four and seven day notices were not
"reasonable'); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500, 506 (M.D. Pa. 1951)
(two days was unreasonable notice and made deposition inadmissible).
20o FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b).
2 1 E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 5.
222 Ibid.
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mantle of rule 30 (b),223 and this protective imprimatur should
also immunize those rules which allow the taxation of transcrip-
tion 224 and administration 225 costs to the party requesting the depo-
sition. The Federal Rules do not identify the party who is to bear
the burden of deposition expenses and the usual tack is to commit
this matter to the court's discretion.226 A local rule may remove the
issue of expenses from the court's volition, however, and one dis-
trict court has held that those depositions which are not read
or offered in evidence at trial may not be taxed against the losing
party.2 27 Nevertheless, given the normal discretion inhering, in the
court, specific rules which ameliorate unusually onerous conditions
may not be necessary. The fact that these cost rules are not self-
executing 228 buttresses this argument, but it is likely that the pro-
visions were promulgated with a considered view to remedying
recurrent local problems, and the elements of fairness and certainty
which they inject into the discovery process provide such rules with
a valid raison d'etre.
A final provision designed to protect the deponent, as well as a
given party, from "annoyance, embarrassment or oppression ' 229 is
the rule which precludes public attendance at depositions230 and
seals the document from public scrutiny upon filing.23' Although
many districts are not very solicitous of the privacy of the various
deponents once the transcribed statements are filed with the court,23 2
223 North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954);
Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 2 F.R.D. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
-'2E.g., N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 18(b).
22 E.g., S.D. OHIO R. 16 (1); cf. Saper v. Long, 17 F.R.D. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
where the cost of transcription was imposed upon the requesting party despite a
local rule requiring the advancement of traveling funds to attorneys where the
deposition is taken outside the district.
.2 See 4 MOORE 26.36, at 1697-98; Estes, Discovery, 29 F.R.D. 280, 284 (1961);
Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b).
227 Amerman v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 9 FED. RULEs Stav. 26a.71, Case 2 (D.
Mont. 1945), interpreting a now-defunct rule.
228 E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 5, dealing with attorney's costs for depositions 100
miles from court, require a court order. S.D. OHio R. 16 (1) requires the requesting
party to pay the officer's fees for administering the deposition, which may be re-
covered as costs if proof of payment is filed. Contra, N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 18(b),
which imposes transcription costs on the party taking the deposition unless the
court "orders a different apportionment of cost for good cause shown."
22 FED. R. Crv. P. 30(b). See notes 220-23 supra and accompanying text.
210 E.g., D. CONN. R. 7 (a); cf. Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 36 F.R.D.
176 (D. Utah 1964).
31 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 8 (A); S.D. CAL. R. 6; D. CONN. R. 7 (b); D. MASS. R. 14.
232 See N.D. IND. R. 21 (clerk to open deposition upon request of party unless
otherwise ordered by court); N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 17 (clerk opens after ten days).
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such rules are clearly within the discretion accorded by rule 30 (b)28 3
and would appear quite desirable in averting prejudicial publicity
prior to trial.234 In antitrust and patent cases, the confidential in-
formation which is often imparted is especially deserving of protec-
tion, 2 35 and prospective district court draftsmen might well consider
the institution of a specialized provision for such cases.
3. Mechanisms to Insure the Extrajudicial Operation of Dis-
covery. One pervasive philosophical underpinning of the federal
discovery rules is the desire to make the process operative upon the
initiative of the parties, without judicial intervention. 230 Further,
one scholar has noted that "the medium of local court rules can be
utilized to insure that the parties exercise private control of dis-
covery.'237 Several imaginative rules have been designed to further
this end. The most widely adopted of these devices is the require-
ment that before any motion for discovery will be heard, counsel
must confer in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised in the
motion.238 The requisites for compliance include "informal meet-
ings among counsel to work out agreements with respect to volun-
tary withdrawals, redrafts of questions, and other methods of re-
solving difficulties and making reasonable accommodations without
recourse to the court." 239 This conciliation device may be ineffec-
tual where the parties are predisposed to intransigence, 240 and to
avert unnecessary hearings in this event the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has taken the extraordinary step of adopting an ap-
proved set of interrogatories to be interposed "in appropriate
cases." 241 The content of these questions indicates that they were
designed primarily for comprehensive use in personal injury actions,
although the judges significantly refused to promulgate an inter-
233 "[T]he court in which the action is pending may make an order that . .. the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and
their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened
only by order of the court ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b). A local rule may prescribe
in advance the order which a court shall otherwise have discretion to make. Amer-
man v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 9 FED. RuLEs SEv. 26a.71, Case 2 (D. Mont. 1945).
234 See International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963)
(deposition may be sealed by court order to avert pre-trial publicity).
235See Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 36 F.R.D. 176 (D. Utah 1964).
286 4 MooRE 1 26.02[5], at 1041 & n.3.
:
37 Id. at 1041.
38E.g., E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (GEN.) R. 9(f); see D. MD. R. 17; W.D.N.C.R. 8(a); E.D.
PA. R. 20 (d); W.D. WAsH. (Civ.) R. 24.
239 United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
210 See Ibid.242E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (June 22, 1965).
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rogatory inquiring into the extent of the defendant's liability insur-
ance. 242 Although the rule cautions that the list is neither exclusive
nor designed for use in all cases, it clearly states that all "appropri-
ate" objections to the interrogatories will be overruled "unless the
circumstances are truly exceptional." 243 By coupling this provision
with the requirement of a good-faith attorney consultation,244 this
district has erected a model structure to house the extrajudicial
operation of discovery.
Several other rules have been framed to the same effect. Thus,
pre-trial hearing examiners have been used to oversee discovery pro-
ceedings245 and may issue orders and impose sanctions.246 Further,
one local rule has endeavored to resolve the problem of jockeying
and abuse which has emanated from from the oft-assailed rule that
depositions will ordinarily be taken in the order demanded.2 47 In
an attempt to unravel these entanglements, the Eastern and South-
ern Districts of New York provide for abrogation of the priority
rule upon a lapse of forty days from the commencement of an action
and allow depositions to be taken concurrently thereafter. 248 This
novel provision has been construed to sanction concurrence in sepa-
rate but related actions, 249 and a dissemination of this liberal
philosophy to other districts would go far to eradicate the vexatious
litigation which has been the progeny of priority. Consolidation of
the examination of a deponent in a multiple-party suit in an effort
to avert the duplication of numerous burdensome depositions and
interrogatories would also appear to be a desirable subject for local
and possibly uniform promulgation.250
242 The courts are sharply split over the propriety of allowing discovery of a
party's liability insurance in a negligence case. See 4 MooRE 9 26.16[3]. One case
has held that a local rule could not incorporate by reference the state court practice
of allowing disclosure of insurance, asserting that FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) did not
permit such discovery and thus it was not a proper subject for district court rule.
Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962).213 E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (June 22, 1965).
2
"1 E.D. PA. R. 20 (d).
2'r4 MooRa 26.02[5], at 1042 8 n.4a; Hart, The Operation of the Master
Calendar System in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 29
F.R.D. 265, 266-67 (1961).
246 Ibid.
217See 4 MooRE 26.13[l]-[3].
218 E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 4.
240 International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 33 F.R.D. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 325 F.2d
403 (2d Cir. 1963).
250 Compare Rando v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 155 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1960),
allowing such consolidation, with Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co.
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4. Adjuncts Designed to Insure the Full Effectiveness of Dis-
covery. Many districts regard the pre-trial hearing as "part of the
warp and woof of discovery" 251 and give substance to this attitude
by making provision in their rules for the pre-trial exchange and
examination of all documentary and physical exhibits to be offered
at trial, as well as making extensive pre-trial elicitation of stipula-
tions to resolve extant but illusory issues. 252 This utilization of the
pre-trial device does not appear objectionable,25 3 although undue re-
liance on the conference as the source of discovery may engender a
dilatory local discovery practice. Such a danger may perhaps be
averted by the preclusion of discovery subsequent to pre-trial,25 4
although several districts have still found it necessary to admonish
counsel to "make full use of all discovery procedures as provided
[in the Federal Rules] ... instead of seeking information at the
pre-trial conference.)2 55
To insure that information obtained by discovery remains cur-
rently reliable, one district requires that supplemental answers must
be tendered with reasonable promptness upon uncovering any addi-
tional information which would render the response to a prior inter-
rogatory inaccurate or untrue.28 It has been held that failing to
make subsequent disclosure will result in a waiver of the right to
adduce such evidence at trial. 2 7 An identical penalty has been pre-
scribed for the failure to disclose to opposing counsel any witnesses,
writings, and exhibits which were discovered too late for revelation
at pre-trial. 25  Such provisions go far to eradicate the "element of
ambush" 259 from federal litigation and might well be examined with
an adoptive eye by other districts.
PRE-TRIAL
Consistent with the premise of the rules governing pleading and
discovery that cases should be decided on their merits rather than
Ltd., 22 FED. RULES SERV. 306.33, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), denying consolidation where
different parties had interposed separate claims based upon distinct transactions.
211 Kaufman, J., quoted in Estes, supra note 226, at 284.
252 See, e.g., D. COLO. R. 12; D. CONN. R. 10.
2"2 Estes, supra note 226, at 284-86.
2'4 See notes 209, 215-16 supra and accompanying text.
25
r D. KAN. R. 15 (d).
2 8 E.D. PA. R. 20 (1).
25 7 Frankel v. Stake, 33 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
588 Former rule 7-1 of the District of Idaho so provided. Its present counterpart
is silent on the point. See D. IDAHO R. 10.
259 Frankel v. Stake, 33 F.R.D. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
1050 (Vol. 1966: 1011
FEDERAL LOCAL RULES
according to technical procedural requirements or the histrionics of
advocates, Federal Rule 16260 affords a broad latitude to the pre-trial
conference in order to facilitate the delineation of the issues in dis-
pute and the ascertainment of the nature of evidence to be intro-
duced at trial.2 61 Rule 16 states that the court may hold a pre-trial
conference to consider such matters as "the simplification of the
issues; the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof; [and] . .. such other matters
as may aid in the disposition of the action."262
Most district courts have included in their local rules a provision
for pre-trial conferences.2 63 Several of these local pre-trial rules
merely reiterate the authority provided by rule 16;26 however, many
contain significant departures from the basic format of rule 16.
These departures, explored below, manifest an awareness of the
potential infirmities of the pre-trial device.
Since one purpose of the pre-trial conference is to remove the
element of surprise from the trial,265 it is necessary that the attorneys
inform one another and the court of the nature of the evidence
upon which they expect to rely to prove their contentions, and many
local rules have promulgated detailed provisions to this effect.266
The pre-trial conference could, however, be abused if it were re-
garded as a substitute for the discovery process.267 To prevent one
attorney from taking advantage of a more conscientious opponent's
preparation without previously preparing his own case, many local
210FED R. Civ. P. 16.
262 See Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1964); Laws, Pre-
Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 397, 399 (1940); Note, 51 GEO. L.J. 309 (1963).
262 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
213At present 49 district courts have promulgated rules governing pre-trial pro-
cedure.
"' See N.D. FLA. R. 5; N.D. IND. R. 12; N.D. OHIO R. 6; S.D. W. VA. R. 5.
26r See authorities cited note 261 supra.
20 Thus many local rules require the attorneys to meet and discuss or exchange
memoranda in which are included lists of witnesses with some indication of the
testimony they will give, schedules of exhibits, and notations of documents or records
to be offered in evidence at the trial. See D. ALASKA sR. 9 (F) (9), (G); E.D. & W.D.
ARK. R. 9 (f)(1), (2); N.D. CAL.. R. 4(10), (11); D. IDAHO R. 10(d)-(g); D. KAN. R. 15(c)-(1),
(2); W.D. LA. R. 5; D. MD. R. 15 (b) (6), (7); W.D. Mo. R. 20 (d) (8), (9); D. MONT.
P 10 (a) (8), (9); S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 13 (b) (1) (i1); E.D.N.C. (Clv.) R. 7; E.D. OKLA.
R. 17 (b) (2), (4); W.D. Tax. R. 26 (g) (1), (4). Other rules provide that the attorneys
must be prepared to discuss these matters and present documentary evidence at the
pre-trial conference. See D. COLO. R. 12 (b); D. CONN. R. 10 (a); D. ME. R. 17 (b);
D.S.D.R. 11; EJ). TENN. R. 9(c); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 26(e), (f).
207 See Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1949).
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rules require discovery to be completed prior to the date fixed for
pre-trial.268 Moreover, one rule states expressly that the pre-trial
conference is not to be used as a substitute for discovery25 and
others stipulate that attorneys shall make liberal use of discovery
procedures instead of seeking information or admissions at pre-trial
which could have been obtained prior thereto by discovery or simple
request.270 Other jurisdictions provide that no further discovery
will be permitted after pre-trial except by permission of the court
and in order to prevent manifest injustice. 271
It might be valuable, however, to circumscribe the issues in con-
troversy prior to utilization of the discovery devices in order to
avoid the expenditure of effort and funds required to prove facts
which will ultimately be conceded or uncontested. This considera-
tion would vary with the number and complexity of the issues pre-
sented in a particular case. Thus, it might be wise to empower the
court in its discretion to hold more than one pre-trial conference
if it appeared that additional conferences would be necessary or
desirable and the burden of additional meetings would not be too
great on the attorneys involved.27 2 This function might also be
served by attorney conferences held prior to pre-trial but after some
discovery had been completed. Many local rules provide for such a
conference,273 the purpose of which is to simplify the issues and
obtain any stipulations or concessions which the parties at an inter-
mediate point in their preparation might be willing to make. How-
ever, elimination of the need for superfluous discovery may be a
mere by-product of the attorney conference, for in many jurisdic-
tions the principal purpose of this meeting is to consolidate the
results of discovery into a proposed pre-trial order which is pre-
sented to the court at the pre-trial conference. 274 Thus, it would
appear that provision should be made for preliminary pre-trial pro-
288 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 9 (C) (wherever practicable); D. CONN. R. 10 (a) (except by
special leave for good cause shown); D. NEB. R. 21 (a) (unless otherwise ordered).
260 D. DEL. R. 11 (A).
270 Eg., E.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 7 (D); M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 22 (f); E.D. OKLA. R. 17 (b);
N.D. OKLA. R. 17(b); W.D. OKLA. R. 16(b); W.D. TEX. R. 26(d).
271E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(e); E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (Oct. 23, 1958).
272 See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadway Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
WRIGHT § 91, at 348.
-73 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9 (g); D. KAN. R. 15 (c); S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 13 (b) (1)
(III); E.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 7 (G); W.D. PA. R. 5 (II) (C) (5); W.D. TEx. R. 26 (g).
274E.g, D. KAN. R. 15 (c) (6); D. NEv. R. 11 (d); M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 22 (1); W.D.
WAsu. (Civ.) R. 26 (g).
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ceedings to be held at the court's discretion where the complexity
of the issues warrants a conference designed to limit the scope of
discovery to facts which are actually in dispute.2 5
A potential pitfall in utilizing the pre-trial conference to deter-
mine the issues to be litigated is the possibility that the attorney
will be incapable of limiting the issues through either (1) unfamil-
iarity with the case itself or (2) lack of authority to enter into stipu-
lations regarding facts which are not to be controverted at trial.
The former contingency is anticipated by local rules which require
the conferring attorney to be thoroughly versed in the nuances of
his case 276 or require attendance at the pre-trial conference by the
attorney who will actually try the case.2 77 The potential hindrance
to factual stipulations posed by an attorney's lack of authority to
enter such accords is eliminated by rules of several district courts
which require counsel to obtain prior and generalized authorization
from their clients to enter into stipulations.2 7 8 While it is evident
that an attorney should be familiar with his case in order to fulfill
the purposes of pre-trial, it may be less obvious that the attorney
should obtain a prior imprimatur from his client to stipulate when-
ever he may have reason to doubt his authority to act at the pre-
trial conference. The attorney should not be permitted to frustrate
efforts to remove issues from controversy by pleading lack of author-
ity where this authority might have been obtained prior to the
conference, and a local rule to this effect would appear to be a
salutary addition to the provisions of those districts which make
extensive use of the pre-trial device.
While settlement may properly be considered at the pre-trial
27 See authorities cited note 272 supra. Civil Rule 22 of the Middle District of
North Carolina provides for initial and final pre-trial conferences unless counsel stipu-
late to the contrary and the court approves. At the initial conference the attorneys are
to be prepared to estimate accurately, among other things, how much time will be re-
quired for completion of discovery; whether separation of issues would be feasible;
and, if so, whether discovery should be limited to the issues first tried. M.D.N.C.
(Civ.) R. 22 (a), (d).
270 E.g., D. DEL. R. 11 (C); N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 16; E.D.N.C. (CIV.) R. 7 (H); W.D.
TEx. R. 26 (h).
277 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(d); S.D. CAL. R. 9(a); D. DEL. R. 1I(B); N.D.
GA. R. 11(c); D. KAN. R. 15(f; W.D. LA. R. 5(b) (1); D. ME. R. 17(c); D. MD.
R. 15 (a); W.D. MICH. R. 5 (d); W.D. Mo. R. 20 (c); D. NEB. R. 21 (b); N.D. OKLA. R.
17 (b); W.D. PA. R. 5 (II) (C) (5) (d); D.S.D.R. 11. Compare W.D.N.C.R. 7 (attendance
of trying counsel suggested but not required).
278 E.g., N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 16; D. MD. R. 15 (a); S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 13 (b) (1)
(VI); E.D. Wis. R. 12.
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conference as a matter which may aid in the disposition of the case,
care must be taken that this aspect of the discussion is not empha-
sized to the exclusion of all others.27 9 The purpose of pre-trial is
to prepare for, not to avoid a trial.28 0 One local rule states expressly
that "the primary objective of pre-trial should be to facilitate trial
and a just judgment" and that "compromise settlement shall be
regarded as a by-product of such procedure rather than the end
sought." 28't Further, the rules which provide for discussion of com-
promise either list possible settlement as one among many matters
to be discussed, 2 2 or circumscribe what might be regarded as objec-
tionable consequences of a settlement discussion. For example, the
Western District of North Carolina provides for the discussion of
settlement with the proviso that "any party has the right to decline
to discuss settlement and insist on an immediate trial.128 3 Other
rules provide that the possibility of settlement may be explored but
that any discussion shall not be mentioned in the pre-trial order
which subsequently governs the conduct of the trial.2 84 A similar
clause contained in several rules forbids mention of the compromise
discussion in the pre-trial order, at trial, or in any motions or argu-
ments.28 5 These provisions are ostensibly designed to insure that
matters explored in the settlement discussion will not be utilized
by the judge as the basis for the issuance of his pre-trial orders and
will not be incorporated in the record. Such limitations should
serve to allay misgivings as to the consequences of making an ernest
effort to reach an accord.
Two major departures from the format of rule 16 which appear
in several local court rules are a mandatory requirement for pre-
279 See Brennan, Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted Case, 23 F.R.D.
376, 378-79 (1958); Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163,
167 (1956).280 See WRIGHT § 91, at 349.
28 1 E.D.N.C. (CI.) R. 7 (L) (4).
282 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9 (f) (5); D. COLO. R. 12 (b) (13); E.D.N.C. (Civ.) R.
7 (G) (5); W.D. PA. R. 5 (II) (C) (5) (c). See D. IDAHO R. 10 (j) (4).283 W.D.N.C.R. 7.
28" E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 9 (1); D. CONN. R. 10 (d); D. ME. R. 17 (d).
28r E.g., D. MD. R. 15 (c); E.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 7 (L) (4). E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (Oct.
23, 1958) provides for the discussion of settlement first at the attorney conference and
again at the pre-trial conference with the court. However, no disclosure of the settle-
ment discussions prior to pre-trial is permitted at pre-trial except by mutual agree-
ment of all counsel made in advance of the pre-trial conference. This is another
manifestation of the desire to encourage counsel to discuss settlement by removing
the possibility of undesirable consequences, in this instance, using prior admissions of
weakness to persuade the court to opt for a settlement.
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trial conferences2 6 and an explicit authorization of the court to
impose sanctions for noncompliance with the local pre-trial rule.28 7
Rule 16 provides that the court may at its discretion require counsel
to attend a pre-trial conference, 288 but those local rules which re-
quire pre-trial conferences in all civil cases2 9 deprive the court of
this initiative with regard to the necessity or desirability of pre-trial.
This might give rise to a proceeding which, if a particular judge
were not enthusiastic about pre-trial or merely doubted the need
for a pre-trial conference in a specific case,290 would be an annoying-
ly perfunctory and superfluous undertaking.
The second significant variance from the structure of the pre-
trial provision contained in the Federal Rules is the authority
assumed by many local courts to discipline departures from local
pre-trial procedures. Rule 16 makes no provision for the imposition
of sanctions, yet many local rules provide that for failure to appear
or other noncompliance the court may impose such penalties as the
circumstances warrant, including dismissal of the action, entrance
of a default judgment, imposition of costs, exclusion of evidence, or
striking the names of formerly qualified witnesses.291 Where a court
280 E.g., W.D. LA. R. 5 (a); D. ME. R. 17 (a); W.D. MicH. R. 5 (a); D. NEv. R. 11 (a);
E.D. OKLA. R. 17 (a); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 26 (a).
987E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(c); N.D. GAL. R. 12; D. CONN. R. 10(g); D. DEL.
R. II (B); D. KAN. R. 15 (j); D. ME. R. 17 (f); S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 16; M.D.N.C. (Civ.)
R. 22 (m); E.D. OKLA. R. 17 (b); W.D. PA. R. 5 (11) (H); W.D. TEx. R. 26 (s); E.D.
Wis. R. 12.
288 "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference to consider . . . such other matters as
may aid in the dispositionn of the action." FED R. Civ. P. 16.
211 See note 282 supra. Many local rules leave the determination as to the necessity
of a pre-trial conference to the court or to the court and counsel. Of the latter type,
some provide that there will be a conference unless the parties stipulate to the contrary
and the court approves. E.g., D. KAN. R. 15 (a); E.D.N.C. (CIV.) R. 7; M.D.N.C. (Civ.)
R. 22. Others provide that the court may, and upon the application of any party will,
hold a pre-trial conference. E.g., S.D. IND. R. 17; N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 16; D. NEB. R.
21 (a). Either rule reserves the decision to the court and counsel and their practical
effect is the same as far as the parties are concerned, for if one party wants a confer-
ence under either approach, it will be held. The only real difference lies in the discre-
tion accorded the court. Under the first rule the court's authority may be exercised
positively to override the parties' determination that no conference is necessary, or not
exercised at all if the court agrees with the joint stipulation. Under the second rule
the court may call a conference, but it has no authority to veto one party's determina-
tion that a conference should be held.
-99 IA BARRON & HOLTzOFF § 473, at 841 n.22.
201 E.g., N.D. CAL. R. 12; D. CONN. R. 10 (g); D. ME. R. 17 (f); E.D.N.C. (Crv.) R.
7 (P); W.D. TEx. R. 26 (s).
Local rules authorizing dismissal of the action are consistent with Federal Rule
41 (b), which authorizes the court upon motion by the defendant to dismiss for failure
1055
is generally empowered to impose "penalties, '' 292 however, the utili-
zation of this power to assess fines against counsel for noncom-
pliance with the pre-trial provisions has been overturned absent a
conviction for contempt.293 However, the facilitation of an efficacious
pre-trial conference would appear to be enhanced by authorizing
the imposition of fines against defaulting attorneys where more ex-
treme sanctions, such as dismissal or orders precluding the use of
certain evidence or witnesses, would unduly prejudice a party's posi-
tion on the merits.294
Local pre-trial rules vary widely with regard to the particularity
they require of pre-trial memoranda and the specificity with which
they prescribe the degree of pre-trial preparation by counsel. The
Southern District of New York provides a detailed list of subjects
to be considered at the attorneys' conference which precedes the
pre-trial conference, and a comprehensive form is provided for the
proposed pre-trial order which is to be submitted to the courts be-
fore the pre-trial conference. 295 Further, two districts establish time
schedules which govern the attorney's preparation with regard to
discovery, filing of pre-trial memoranda, and the attorney confer-
ence prior to pre-trial. 29 6 Conversely, several jurisdictions2 7 incor-
porate by reference the subjects for pre-trial consideration listed in
Federal Rule 16298 but leave to judicial discretion such matters
as scheduling and the content of any memoranda the court may
require. Despite this divergence, it would appear that the docket
may be such that precise pre-trial procedure is nesessary to facilitate
to prosecute or to comply with the Federal Rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Moreover,
provisions authorizing default judgment or imposition of costs are consistent with
Federal Rules 55 and 54(d) respectively. FED. R. Civ. P. 55, 54(d). Evidentiary pre-
dusion orders authorized by the local rules are analogous to the sanctions which
may be imposed for noncompliance under Federal Rule 37(b). See FED. R. Civ. P.
37 (b) (2) (ii).
292E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(c); D. DEL. R. 11(B). The Eastern District of
North Carolina provides for "penalties" in addition to specified sanctions. E.D.N.C.
(Civ.) R. 7.
"I See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 888 (1962), where the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
was denied authority to impose a fine on an attorney for noncompliance with the
pre-trial rule absent an adjudication of contempt.
"'See Note, 51 GEo. L.J. 309, 341-45 (1963); Note, 38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 158
(1963).
295 S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 13 (l).
29 0S.D. CAL. R. 9(e)-(i); W.D. PA. R. 5 (II) (C) (1)- (6).
2 9 E.g., D. ME. R. 17; D.N.D.R. IV (5); see S.D. Onio R. 10.
218 See text accompanying note 262 supra.
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litigation and that comprehensive pre-trial rules are fully justified.
However, where these factors are not present, there is no need for
greater elaboration than is present in rule 16. Thus, it would ap-
pear that the form of pre-trial rules should be determined according
to the particular needs of the jurisdiction rather than with regard to
a uniform pattern, without discounting the possibility of incorpo-
rating provisions which have proven successful in meeting similar
needs in other jurisdictions.
STIPULATIONS
Stipulations entered into by the respective parties are a frequent-
ly utilized and expeditious device designed to facilitate discovery,
trial, and the final disposition of an action. Although there is no
Federal Rule dealing with stipulations generally, several sections
govern their use in specific contexts. This unsystematic approach to
the subject of stipulations is likewise reflected by its cursory treat-
ment in the various district court provisions.
Nine Federal Rules contain references to stipulations. 99 For ex-
ample, rule 29 provides that "if the parties so stipulate in writing,
depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place,
upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be
used like other depositions. ' 300 In the absence of such a stipulation,
depositions may be taken only in accordance with the relevant
rules, 301 which delineate the procedure for taking depositions in
some detail.302 Rule 39 (a)303 provides that when a trial by jury has
been demanded, the parties or their attorneys may consent to trial
by the court sitting without a jury by written stipulation filed with
20D FED. R. Civ. P. 29, 39 (a) (1), 41 (a) (1) (ii), 48, 53 (e) (4), 59 (c), 71A (i) (2), 73 (a),
75 (0, (g), (b); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 80 (c), (e).
300 FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
a01 2A BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 701, at 198 & n. 1; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a).
102 Rule 28 prescribes the qualifications for persons before whom depositions may
be taken, for example, within the United States, an officer authorized to administer
oaths or a person appointed by the court in which the action is pending. FED. R.
Civ. P. 28. Rule 30 lays down certain prerequisites for valid oral depositions, in-
cluding reasonable notice in writing to every other party and the transcription of
testimony which must be taken under oath. FED. R. Civ. P. 30. Rule 31, governing
the taking of depositions upon written interrogatories, provides that within ten days
after being served with a notice that his testimony is to be taken a party may serve
cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Thereafter,
within five days the latter may serve redirect interrogatories, and within three days
after being served with redirect interrogatories the party initially served may serve
recross interrogatories. FED. R. Cxv. P. 31.
"OS FED. R. Cxv. P. 39 (a) (1).
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the court or by oral stipulation made in open court and entered in
the record. Enabling the parties to waive a jury trial even after it
has been initially requested is consistent with the purpose of rule
39 "to permit the time-saving trial of legal and equitable issues at
one time without loss or surrender of substantive rights." 0 4 Rule
41 (a)305 authorizes the voluntary dismissal of an action by the plain-
tiff without court order by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed
by all the parties who have appeared in the action. This rule thus
permits the plaintiff to remove his case from court if no participat-
ing party will be prejudiced thereby.306 As these illustrative pro-
visions intimate, the desire to expedite proceedings through the use
of stipulations is tempered by the need to afford protection to parties
whose interests might be adversely affected. Thus, stipulations are
frequently required to be written, filed, or made in open court and
entered in the record.307
On the local level, in addition to providing for the use of stipula-
tions in specific contexts, 308 the rules of many districts include a
general provision to the effect that stipulations by or agreements
between the parties or their attorneys will be recognized by the
court only if in writing and signed or made in open court and
entered in the record.30 9 An occasional district rule also provides
30'2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 891, at 60. (Emphasis added.)
Rule 48, another trial-expediting provision, permits the parties to stipulate "that
the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of
a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury."
FED. R. CIv. P. 48. Where a case is referred to a master under rule 53, the parties
may stipulate that his findings of fact shall be final, and only questions of law
arising upon his report may thereafter be considered. FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (e) (4).
05 FED. R. Crv. P. 41 (a) (1) (ii).
30 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 911, at 102 & n.2.1.
A condemnation proceeding may be dismissed by stipulation prior to the entry
of any judgment vesting title in the plaintiff by the filing of a stipulation of dis-
missal by the plaintiff and the defendant affected thereby. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A (i) (2).
To expedite a case on appeal "the parties by written stipulation filed with the clerk
of the district court may designate the parts of the record, proceedings, and evi-
dence to be included in the record on appeal." FED. R. Civ. P. 75 (f).
117 With the exception of rules 48 ("the parties may stipulate . . . .") and 53 (e) (4)
("when the parties stipulate . . . .'), all of the Federal Rules governing stipulations
require a writing, filing, or recording in open court. See FED. R. Clv. P. 29, 39 (a) (1),
41 (a) (1) (ii), 59 (c), 71A (i) (2), 73 (a), 75 (f).
208 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 4(21) (pre-trial statement); S.D. IND. R. 23 (designation
of omitted parts of record on appeal); N.D. & S.D. IoWA R. 16 (authority to stipulate
at pre-trial conference); S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 9 (dismissal or discontinuance of causes);
M.D. PA. R. 20 (continuance by agreement); E.D. TENN. R. 14 (mandatory stipulation
to all undisputed facts).
309 See D. ALAsx,. R. 12; D. ARI. R. 12 (written stipulations need be signed only
by the party or his attorney against whom it is sought to be enforced); E.D. & W.D,
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for court approval of stipulations.310 These general stipulation pro-
visions of the several district courts have the salutary effect of insur-
ing that whenever stipulations are utilized there will be certainty
both with respect to the existence and the content of the agree-
ments. In view of the slight burden imposed by requiring the
parties to reduce their agreements to writing, it would appear that
a uniform Federal Rule might well be considered along the lines
of the provision of the District of Minnesota31 which makes a writ-
ing mandatory unless the agreement is made in open court and
recorded in the minutes. 312
CONTINUANCES
The practice with respect to continuances in civil cases in federal
district courts is almost exclusively governed by the well-accepted
rule that the grant or refusal of a continuance rests with the sound
discretion of the court to which the application is made.313 This
rule is decisional in origin, for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are devoid of reference to continuances. Continuance as a matter
of right, a familiar concept in state court proceedings by virtue of
statutory mandate,314 is absent in federal courts except in those few
districts which by local rule determine their practice with respect
to continuances by reference to state law31 5 or where a rare federal
ARK. R. 6; D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 8; D. IDAHO R. 17 (only those written or oral stipula-
tions which do not disturb the orderly business of the court will be enforced); D.
MINN. R. 18 (required only of stipulations relating to proceedings in court; certain
stipulations binding only upon order of court); D. NEB. R. 14; D.N.D.R. XVII;
D.N.H.R. 4 (no oral stipulations will be enforced); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 8 (parol
evidence of stipulation not made in open court considered only to prevent manifest
injustice); E.D. PA. R. 13 (a) (stipulations relating to business of court must be in writ-
ing and signed or made at the bar and recorded, but parol evidence of stipulations
not made at the bar will be considered to prevent manifest injustice); M.D. PA. R. 8;
D.S.D.R. 6; W.D. Tax. R. 5.3 10 D. ALAsKA R. 12; D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 8 (a); see also D. IDAHO R. 17.
311 D. MINN. R. 18.
3,2 District rules with similar requirements include the following: D.N.D.R. XVII;
E.D. PA. R. 18(a); D.S.D.R. 6.
811 E.g, Grunewald v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 331 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964); Scholl v.
Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1964); Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter, 323 F.2d
586 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam); Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, SA., 225 F. Supp.
222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 F.2d
168 (5th Cir. 1965).
"' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24A0.030 (1962) (witness or party a member of state
legislature); Micu. STAT. ANN. § 4.644 (1955) (party on active duty in armed services).
315Several districts have local rules expressly incorporating state practice as to
continuances. E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 11; N.D. IND. R. 11; S.D. IND. R. 15; E.D. Wis. R.
9; W.D. Wis. R. 10. In each case a state statute authorizes continuances both as a
matter of right and as a matter of discretion. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.14 (1956);
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statute relating to continuances in specialized circumstances is ap-
plicable. 316
Some forty districts have adopted local rules dealing with
continuances.317 Unlike state statutes, which frequently enumerate
a wide variety of grounds for granting a continuance, 18 a majority
of the local federal rules merely authorize a continuance when "good
cause" is shown.319 A common ground for continuance in those
districts without the "good cause" provision320 is the absence of
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1301 (1946), 2-1302 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.145
(1957). In these states, also, state judge-made law provides for the allowance of
continuances on nonstatutory grounds as a matter of discretion. E.g., Jackson v.
Whittinghill, 39 Il1. App. 2d 315, 188 N.E.2d 337 (1963); Gunnison v. Kaufman,
271 Wis. 113, 72 N.W.2d 706 (1955).
The Eastern District of Kentucky by judicial decision also adopts state law,
Lewis v. Bartley, 300 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), which is both statutory,
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 23.130, 188.050, 453.070 (1962), and discretionary with the
trial judge, City of St. Matthews v. Smith, 266 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1954). Likewise, the
District of Nebraska by judicial decision adopts state law. Rhodes v. Houston, 202
F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 909 (1963). Nebraska law, however, is merely a codification of discretionary
power. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1148 (1964). Unlike other districts which by rule or
decision adopt state law, the District of Nebraska also has a local rule prescribing
grounds for continuance. D. NEB. R. 20.
The Northern District of Illinois rule contains no specification of grounds upon
which continuances will be granted. N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 14. State law might thus
be applicable under N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 19 (procedure in absence of local rule). See
also E.D. VA. R. 25.
316 There are only two obscure federal statutes relating to continuances which
might confront federal district courts. See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
§ 201, 54 Stat. 1181 (1940), 50 U.S.C. App. § 521 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 2407 (1964) (suits
against delinquents for public money). Cf. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 40,
10 U.S.C. § 840 (1964) (continuances in court-martial proceedings); Tax Court
Rule 27 (d), 26 U.S.C. App. at 5825 (1964).
3 1
7D. Apiz. R. 15; E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 11; S.D. CAL. R. 11; D. COLO. R. 17;
D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15; M.D. FLA. R. 9; N.D. GA. R. 14; D. IDAHO R. 9; E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R.
11; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 14; S.D. ILL. R. 14; N.D. IND. R. 11; S.D. IND. R. 15; D. KAN. R.
16; E.D LA. R. 5; W.D. LA. R. 15; D. MD. R. 9; W.D. MICH. R. 3; D. MINN. R. 3 (5); D.
MONT. R. 17; D. NEB. R. 20; D. NEV. R. 10; D.N.H.R. 10; D.N.M.R. 10(b); S.D.N.Y.
(CAL.) R. 7 (b) (1); D.N.D.R. IV (4); S.D. OHIO R. 9 (4); E.D. OKLA. R. 19; N.D. OKLA.
R. 19; W.D. OKLA. R. 18; E.D. PA. R. 27 and E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (May 2, 1958);
M.D. PA. R. 20; D.S.D.R. 10; E.D. TENN. R. 7; W.D. TENN. R. 4 (f); W.D. 'WASH.
(GEN.) R. 9 (b); E.D. Wis. R. 9; W.D. Wis. R. 10; D. Wyo. R. 12.
31 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch., 110, § 101.14 (1966) (absent witness, absent evidence,
party in military service in time of war, party or counsel a member of state legisla-
ture in session); see statutes cited note 314 supra.
31 E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 11: "After a case is placed on the trial calendar
no motion for continuance will be granted except for good cause shown."
3-0 Several districts have no provision for "good cause" continuances. E.g., D.
ARiz. R. 15; D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15; N.D. GA. R. 14; N.D. IND. R. 11; S.D. IND. R. 15;
W.D. LA. R. 15; D. MONT. R. 17; S.D. OHIO R. 9 (4); E.D. PA. R. 27 and E.D. PA.
STANDING ORDER (May 2, 1958); M.D. PA. R. 20; W.D. WASH. (GEN.) R. 9. In the case
of the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana, state statutory law is the source
of the "good cause" requirement. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1301 (1946).
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witnesses or evidence,321 a provision which supplements the "good
cause" stipulation in several jurisdictions. 322 Finally, one district
will grant a continuance to permit completion of discovery323 and
four districts recognize other, conflicting engagements of counsel as
a basis for dispensation.324
Although in striking contrast to the specificity of the typical
state statute,3 25 the singular "good cause" requirement in local rules
does not appear to be a limitation on the power of federal courts
to grant continuances. An examination of relevant decisions re-
veals that continuances under these rules have been sought and/or
granted on a wide variety of grounds, including the absence of a
party,326 lack of time for preparation,327 withdrawal of counsel, 328
and need for discovery procedures.3 29 The "good cause" proviso
thus emerges as an open-ended expression of the decisional con-
ferral of discretion upon the district judge to grant continuances
for any reason which will facilitate the orderly and expeditious use
of court manpower and time.330 Indeed, it may be unnecessary to
promulgate any continuance provision, for a large number of cases
have clearly established the ability of a court to grant a continuance
on grounds which appear exigent and without reference to the
existence of a rule.331 Even the rules which expressly prescribe a
continuance procedure for specified grounds are not worded in ex-
clusive terms and would appear to allow a discretionary grant on
other grounds.33 2 In terms of grounds, both the generalized and
321 D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15 (c) (absent witness); N.D. GA. R. 14(b) (absent witness);
W.D. LA. R. 15 (a) (absent witness); D. MONT. R. 17 (absent witness or evidence);
E.D. PA. R. 27 (absent witness); M.D. PA. R. 19 (absent witness).
822 See E.D. LA. R. 5 (A)- (B); D. MINN. R. 3 (5) (b)- (c); D.N.D.R. IV (4) (a),
(c); D.S.D.R. 10 (1)- (3).
323 E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (May 2, 1958) ("only for exceptional good cause").
321 E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 11; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 14; E.D. Wis. R. 9; W.D. Wis. R. 10.
Each of these districts, however, also refers generally to state law. See note 315 supra.
325 See notes 314, 318 supra.
321 See, e.g., Kawaguchi v. Acheson, 184 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1950).
327 See, e.g., Sutherland Paper Co. v. Grant Paper Box Co., 183 F.2d 926, 931 (3d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1951).
328 See, e.g., Grunewald v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 331 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964).
120 See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman 9- Scott Corp. v. Kent, 309 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1962)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 982 (1963).
8o See, e.g., Janousek v. French, 287 F.2d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 1961).
"Sa E.g., Cash v. Murphy, 339 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1964); Grunewald v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 331
F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964); Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter, 323 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1963) (per
curiam).
322 See, e.g., D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15 (b); N.D. GA. R. 14 (b); rules cited note 322 supra.
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enumerative rules are merely expressions of existing case law. Thus,
their efficacy would appear to be largely a product of the procedural
guidelines which these rules establish for the applicants,33 a topic
which will be explored below.
A large number of local continuance rules establish some pro-
cedural requisites to be followed by parties applying for continu-
ances. The wide variety of differences precludes an exhaustive
elaboration, but some generalities can be developed. In terms of a
required time within which application must be made, the rules
are fraught with permissive qualification. Thus, for example, the
most frequent requirements are five days preceding the trial date
"unless otherwise permitted,"3 4 at the time of the calendar call
unless the alleged cause occurs thereafter, 35 or as soon as "diligence"
or "necessity" appears to require a continuance. 3 6 Other rules mere-
ly require an affidavit 337 or application served on other parties fol-
lowed by a hearing or personal appearance by the parties,338 but
make no attempt to define the time at which the application must
be made. Continuance on the eve of or during trial would thus
appear to be permitted by all the local rules in the event that the
circumstances so warrant. This does not appear objectionable when
confined to exceptional situations, a likely result given the discre-
tionary nature of the-grant.
In order to insure that these procedural requirements are fol-
lowed, the local rules also provide for certain sanctions. Thus, for
example, where the local rule requires application five days before
trial, an entreaty received less than five days before trial, if granted,
may result in the imposition of one day's jury fees upon the appli-
cant in the discretion of the judge.83 9 Other sanctions include the
imposition of costs,3 40 disciplinary action against the movant at-
torney,341 automatic denial of the application,3 42 or, where the facts
"' Even this justification is questionable where the local rule does not specify
the procedure required when applying for a continuance. E.g., D.N.H.R. 10.
33, E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 11; D. Nay. R. 10.
:35D.N.D.R. IV(4)(a); S.D. OHio R. 9(4); D.S.D.R. 10(3).
36D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15(b); N.D. GA. -. 14(a); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 16(a); W.D.
TENN. R. 4 ().
33
7 E.D. PA. R. 27; M.D. PA. R. 19.
838 S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 7 (b).
339 E.g., rules cited note 334 supra.
340 E.g., D. MONT. R. 17.
1,4 E.g., D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 16 (a).
42 E.g., N.D. GA. R. 14 (a).
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demonstrate a want of prosecution, dismissal and default of the
case. 343 Imposition of costs as a condition of granting the applica-
tion appears to be the most frequent condition, whether imposed
by local rule or general discretionary power.344
Where express grounds are stated in the local rule, such as ab-
sence of a witness or evidence, the procedural requisites are gen-
erally more detailed. The minimal requirement is an affidavit
stating matters about which the absent witness is expected to testi-
fy.3  Additionally, however, most of the rules require proof of
diligent efforts to secure the attendance of the witness3 46 and a show-
ing of reasonable probability that the witness or evidence will be
available at a later date.347 Further, each of these rules provides
that if the adverse party admits that the witness would testify as
alleged in his opponent's application for continuance, the delay
may be denied 348 and the admission subsequently admitted as evi-
dence in lieu of personal testimony.349 The admission of anticipated
testimony may, however, be prejudicial to the adverse party if it
operates as a waiver of evidentiary objections such as competency
of the testificant or hearsay. Foreseeing this difficulty, several rules
have stipulated that the use of this "testimony" at trial will be
subject to all proper objections at that time.35 0 The continuance
hearing might be the best forum in which to raise such objections
initially, however, for the judge could then determine whether the
witness' presence at trial is necessary to rule on the evidentiary
objection. If such necessity should appear, for example, on the
question of the competency of an expert witness, a continuance may
be warranted despite the admission.3 51
343 E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (CAL.) R. 7, 16(b), which appear to be in essence a dismissal
for want of prosecution. See also Agronofsky v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 248
F.2d 829 (Sd Cir. 1957) (per curiam); Dismissal for Want of Prosecution, notes
358-76 infra and accompanying text.
3" E.g., MacKay v. American Potash & Chem. Co., 268 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1959);
Vevelstad v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Three Parcels of
Land, 224 F. Supp. 873 (D. Alaska 1963).
311 E.g., D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15 (c).
340 E.g., E.D. LA. R. 5 (B); W.D. LA. R. 15 (a); D. MINN. R. 3 (5) (c); M.D. PA. R. 19.
3,7 E.g., N.D. GA. R. 14 (b); D. MONT. R. 17; E.D. PA. R. 27.
318 Generally the rule still allows the trial judge to grant the continuance if it
appears necessary to him. E.g., D. MONT. R. 17, which authorizes a denial of the
continuance where the adverse party admits that the absent witness would testify in
the manner alleged unless a trial without the witness or evidence would work an
"injustice" upon the moving party.
319 E.g., D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15 (c).
810 D.N.D.R. IV (4) (b); D.S.D.R. 10 (2).
251 Cf. D. MONT. R. 17; note 348 supra.
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The advantage of a local rule with explicit procedural requisites
is that it not only aids the litigants to prepare the application prop-
erly, but it also assists the trial court in expeditiously apportioning
the use of judicial time. The local rules dealing with the time and
manner of motion are commendable in this respect and may be
especially salutary in thwarting the use of the continuance device
as a deliberate delaying tactic, a practice which has not been infre-
quent.352 Strict enforcement of such provisions would go far to dis-
courage the use of continuances for dilatory purposes.
One practice which has been the subject of several local rules is
the voluntary agreement between counsel to continue a case without
seeking approval of the court. Most districts do not favor such
private accords and an order of court is usually an essential prereq-
uisite.353 Even in those few districts which apparently allow an
automatic continuance of right when accomplished by agreement,
certain conditions such as imposition of jury fees or time limita-
tions are imposed.3 4 While the prohibition may in some instances
operate as an inhibition to eventual private settlement, it would
appear warranted as a method of insuring the orderly expedition
of crowded dockets and of averting delays attributable to the neglect
of counsel. The rules apparently reflect this latter view.
A final matter of importance in this area is the absence in the
rules of the effect of a continuance upon the status of a case on the
docket. Only three rules make reference to this question. One rule
merely notes that a continuance will have the effect of removing a
case from the ready calendar unless the judge orders otherwise.8 5
A second states that when a continuance expires, the case resumes
a subordinate position on the ready list.310 The third rule, that of
the Northern District of Georgia, deals only with cases of indefinite
continuances. It authorizes placing a case on the inactive list or
311 See, e.g., Scholl v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1964); Agronofsky
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 248 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1957); Vevelstad v. Flynn,
230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1956); Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222
(N.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th
Cir. 1965).
'5'E.g., D.N.D.R. IV (4) (c).
35,'D. Amiz. R. 15; E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (May 2, 1958); W.D. WAsH. (GEN.)
R. 9 (b).
D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 15 (d).
' ' E.D. PA. STANDING ORDER (May 2, 1958) (case to have position no better than
tenth on ready list).
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dismissing without prejudice with the stipulation that the case may
be reinstated at the request of either party at any time.8 57 On bal-
ance, there would seem to be little need for any rule development
in this area. So long as the trial judge maintains control over the
docket and calendar and has the inherent power to impose condi-
tions upon any continuances granted, it would seem that any prob-
lem with respect to the docket effect of a continuance can best be
handled by utilization of those discretionary tools on an ad hoc basis.
DIsMIssAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
Federal Rule 41 (b) specifically authorizes dismissal for want of
prosecution only upon motion by the defendant,358 but in practice
the district courts have relied upon their inherent power to dismiss
without being prompted by a party.359 Thus, several district courts
have adopted local rules providing for the automatic dismissal of
an action upon the expiration of a stated period of time after the
commencement of a proceeding.3 60 The crucial periods vary in
duration from six months to two years361 and these rules generally
provide for a warning, frequently thirty days 3 62 before final entry
of a dismissal order. A few courts, however, provide for no warn-
117 N.D. GA. R. 14 (c). Although the question has never been litigated, this rule
may, by allowing a dismissal, subject the plaintiff to the hazards of a lapsed statute
of limitations. This effect could be avoided by an express stipulation of the parties
at the time of dismissal.
"
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).
a Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage
Co., 115 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1940); 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 918, at 139 n.3. In
Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 992 (1959), the court approved a local rule allowing dismissal on the initiative
of the court despite argument that Federal Rule 41(b) demanded that motions for
dismissal emanate solely from a party.
3(o E.g., D. ALASKA R. 18; D. CONN. R. 15; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 21; S.D.N.Y. (GEN.)
R. 23; E.D. WASH. R. 11.
"01 Six months: e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 9; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 21; E.D. WASH. R. 11.
One year: e.g., D. ARz. R. 14; D. COLO. R. 24; D. CONN. R. 15; N.D.N.Y.R. 11.
Two years: E.D. PA. R. 18 (where an action has been docketed for a period of
more than two years); D. MAss. R. 12 (same). See United States v. Thompson, 114 F.
Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Dismissals under Federal Rule 41 (b) have been ordered
ex parte where no action has been taken for an "unreasonable" period of time. 2B
BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 918, at 140 n.7.
A majority (50.3%) of the practitioners polled were of the opinion that dis-
missal should not be ordered without the lapse of at least two years. It is interesting
to note that 33% of the responding practitioners were opposed to any rule imposing
a sanction as harsh as dismissal.
311 E.g., D. COLO. R. 24 (b); N.D. OKLA. R. 30; M.D. PA. R. 21-A; D. Wyo. R. 14.
Cf. D. DEL. R. 12 (reasonable notice); S.D. IND. R. 16 (ten days); D.N.M.R. 13 (fifteen
days).
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ing.8s Arguably, the existence of the rule is sufficient notice of pro-
posed action by the court, and as a matter of course a party should
be diligent in prosecuting his claim. Nonetheless, the absence of a
warning appears to be particularly onerous if the dismissal operates
as an adjudication upon the merits, a result which Federal Rule
41 (b) appears to command.364 Provisions contained in local rules
may, however, avert dismissal with prejudice, for at least one case has
upheld a local rule providing for a civil nol-pros without prejudice
as not inconsistent with rule 41 (b).365 One procedure which has
been occasionally followed is that of a tentative entry of dismissal
without prictr warning, subject to future reinstatement of the action
upon a showing of cause.360 Since Federal Rule 77 (d) apparently
311 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 18; D. Asuz. R. 14; N.D. FLA. R. 7; W.D. WASH. (GEN.) R.
10. All but one of the practitioners who responded to the questionnaire felt that
notice was necessary and should be afforded.
"' The rule provides that "unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack
of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." FED. R. Civ.
P. 41 (b). (Emphasis added.) Cf. United States v. Thompson, 114 F. Supp. 874, 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). It is interesting to note that 64% of those attorneys responding to
the Law Journal questionnaire felt .that dismissal for want of prosecution should be
conclusive on the merits, although nearly all asserted that notice should precede
dismissal.
305Burns Mortgage Co. v. Stroudt, 2 F.R.D. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1942). The court
distinguished "nol pros" as used in the local rule from "dismissal" within the
meaning of Federal Rule 41 (b). Id. at 220. However, this type of subtle labelling is
unnecessary. Judicial characterization of a given dismissal as "without prejudice"
should be sufficient, for under Federal Rule 41 (b) a dismissal operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits "unless the court in its order" specifies otherwise. Further,
it may be argued that the existence of a local rule providing that dismissals for want
of prosecution are to be "without prejudice" constitutes a standing order to that
effect and prevents the consequence of an adjudication upon the merits. For local
rules authorizing dismissal without prejudice, see, e.g., D. COLO. R. 24; E.D. PA. R.
18. None of the districts having rules which make no provision for warnings specify
that dismissals are to be "without prejudice." See rules cited note 363 supra.
seeSome districts have provided for reinstatement. See, e.g., S.D.W. VA. R. 8,
which allows reinstatement within six months after dismissal upon motion by any
party affected and upon a showing of good cause. See United States v. Thomson,
114 F. Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Arguably, this result is authorized by rule 6(b) (2), which provides that when
under the Federal Rules or "by order of court" an act is required to be done
within a specified period of time, the court for cause shown may permit subsequent
performance where a prior failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. FED. R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(2). But see Adams v. Jarka Corp., 8 F.R.D. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), which
stated that 6(b)(2) was applicable only to time periods specified in the Federal Rules.
One jurisdiction has made provision for the procurement of an order of general
continuance where "special circumstances exist which warrant inactivity in a case."
Upon the entry of such an order, the case would be immune from dismissal for
want of prosecution. D. KAN. R. 17(b).
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requires that a party receive notice of the entry of a dismissal
order, 67 utilization of this tentative entry technique could at least
insure some warning to the plaintiff before his rights are perma-
nently resolved.
Besides attempting to afford general assurance of the diligent
prosecution of actions, some local rules also provide for dismissal
upon the failure of a plaintiff to comply with specific procedural
requisites prior to trial. These rules encompass the failure to effec-
tuate service of process within a specified period of time after the
commencement of an action,8 68 failure to appear at the trial,369 a
plaintiff's failure to "make ready" his case for docketing on the trial
calendar, 70 and failure to appear at a pre-trial conference or other
hearing. 71 Arguably, such omissions may be penalized without a
specific local rule by invoking the edict of Federal Rule 41 (b),
which provides for involuntary dismissal where a plaintiff has failed
to obey an order of the court. However, a more desirable construc-
tion of this rule would call for its application only on a case-by-case
basis where explicit court commands have been directed to a party.
If all the mandates prescribed by local rules are viewed as "orders"
within the ambit of rule 41 (b), the resultant conversion of these
prescripts into an unyielding set of maxims enforced by the severe
penalty of dismissal would lay a dormant trap for even a diligent
plaintiff. 7 2 Dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to attend a pre-trial
30--FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d).
In Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963),
the court invalidated a local rule which contained no provision for notice of a
dismissal, holding that the rule was inconsistent with Federal Rule 77 (d), which
requires notice of orders and judgments to the parties. Moreover, even though rule
77 (d) excludes such notice to parties who are in default for failure to appear, the
court refused to construe this exception as dispensing with notice in all cases of
dismissal for want of prosecution, reasoning that any appearance by a party is
sufficient to avoid the limitation. Thus, notice may be dispensed with only as
regards "parties who have never made an appearance" and must be furnished where
dismissal is predicated upon a party's failure to appear at a subsequent stage of
the proceedings. "Since appellees were plaintiffs here, they had made an appear-
ance. This was sufficient to entitle appellees to notice of the dismissal of the action."
Id. at 542.
z18 D. Aiuz. R. 7 (one year); N.D. GA. R. 21 (sixty days) (willful failure); D. ME.
R. 7 (three months).
300 D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 14; N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 21 (b); E.D. WASH. R. 16.
37 N.D. GA. R. 21 (willful failure).
371 Ibid.; cf. S.D. IND. R. 17.
872 See Adams v. Jarka Corp., 8 F.R.D. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). That case involved
enforcement of Civil Rule I of the District Court of New York, which provided that
summons and complaints must be served on each defendant within three months
of issuance. The action is to abate automatically without any warning by the
Vol. 1966: 1011]
hearing, for example, appears particularly onerous when adopted in
a jurisdiction which has established pervasive and detailed pre-trial
procedures. Moreover, such rules tend to penalize the client for
his lawyer's neglect 373 Although the same argument may perhaps
be levelled against a rule imposing dismissal for a general failure to
prosecute an action, it is more likely that a plaintiff would be
prompted to make inquiry when his attorney has taken no action
for a lengthy period than where he has failed to comply with a
technical rule during a shorter period. The harshness of imposing
automatic dismissal might be ameliorated by requiring the court
clerk to give notice of default to the client before entry of dis-
missal, 374 although this would entail additional administrative bur-
dens. Moreover, it would appear salutary to mitigate all of these
specialized dismissal rules by imposing a notice requirement prior
to dismissal and a provision for reinstatement upon a showing of
excusable neglect. The need for such mitigative provisions would
appear especially pressing in view of the fact that most of the courts
court regarding the failure of effective service and without an opportunity to correct
the defect after the three-month period unless the defendant has been served within
this three-month period, or has appeared generally in the cause, or unless the
plaintiff within this three-month period has procured a court order for an extension
for the time of service of summons or complaint upon the showing of good cause.
The plaintiff in the instant case did not make service of summons within the pre-
scribed period and attempted to avert dismissal by arguing that he did not know
of the existence of Civil Rule I, that Civil Rule I was inconsistent with rules 6 (b)
and 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore invalid, and that
his delay in making service of summons was intentional and was prompted by the
pendency of a case before the United States Supreme Court the disposition of which
would be determinative of the questions involved in his own cause of action. Despite
the fact that the plaintiff had later obtained an extension of the time for effective
service through an ex parte order of the court and had subsequently effected proper
service, the court ordered the action dismissed. The ex parte extension order, reasoned
the court, was invalid when issued because of the automatic abatement of the action
upon the expiration of the three-month period.
'3 This argument was rejected by the majority in Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S.
626 (1962), on the ground that in a system of representative litigation a party is
deemed bound by the knowledge and acts of his attorney. However, a vigorous
dissenting opinion urged that this approach placed an unreasonable burden upon
a layman plaintiff to supervise the daily professional duties of his counsel. Id. at
643 (Black, J., dissenting). See also notes 291-94 supra.
It is interesting to note that despite the potential severity of such a rule, 65%
of the practitioners polled asserted that dismissal for failure to appear at a pre-
trial conference was a proper sanction. Those who opposed such a rule, however,
were almost uniform in commenting that it imposed an unduly harsh penalty upon
a client for the dilatory actions of his attorney. A more appropriate remedy in the
view of this latter group of practitioners would involve the imposition of disciplinary
penalties against the culpable lawyer. See notes 30, 38 supra and accompanying text.
37" See Link v. Wabash R.R., supra note 373, at 642, 647 (Black, J., dissenting).
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with dismissal rules have indicated that little discretion is exercised
in their enforcement.375 It would seem that the modicum of latitude
afforded by the proposed provisions would not unduly erode the
paramount policy of furthering the prompt and orderly disposition
of claims and would at the same time insure a measure of fairness
to the plaintiff whose delay is reasonable or whose counsel has been
dilatory.
TRiAL CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE
A variety of local court rules regulate the conduct of the trial
and behavior in the presence of the court. In any one jurisdiction
these rules are not usually so inclusive as to encompass the full
range of impermissible conduct. Rather, the rules of a given district
appear concerned with a narrow band on the spectrum of possible
courtroom occurrences. Other, less overt factors, including tradi-
tion, the pressure of conformity, reason, and informal notification
of required conduct,37 6 operate to supplement court rules in effect-
ing the necessary goals of order and decorum while minimizing
undesirable distractions. Conceptually, the rules regulating court-
room conduct may be separated into three categories: those which
concern the conduct of the attorney in the presentation of his case,
those which affect presentation of the cause of action, and those
which regulate general courtroom decorum.
The local rules, to a greater or lesser extent in different dis-
tricts, affect the three phases of the attorney's presentation by regu-
lating the opening statement, the manner of presenting evidence
and the final argument. Limitations on the opening statements to
the jury are extremely divergent, generally specifying the content,3 77
duration,378 order of presentation 379 and dispensability of introduc-
'7 84% of the judges who responded to the questionnaire asserted that enforce-
ment of the terms of local rules relating to dismissal for want of prosecution was
strict and without discretion.
370 These informal notifications could range from the "no smoking" sign on the
door to the admonition of a judge directed to a boisterous spectator.
877 E.g., W.D. LA. R. 13 (a) ("full and fair opening of the case'); D. ME. R. 20 (b)
(not "argumentative'); S.D. Miss. RuLE ON OPENING STATEMENT (Dec. 22, 1965) (fair);
M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 25 (no argument).
378 E.g., D. ME. R. 20 (b) (thirty minutes with extension by leave of court); M.D.N.C.
(Civ.) R. 25 (authorizing judge to set time limits); W.D.N.C.R. 9 (same).
370 The standard procedure is to allow the party with the affirmative burden to
make his statement and at the conclusion to allow the opponent to make his. E.g.,
D. IDAHO R. 14 (d); D. NEB. R. 22 (e); E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 7 (A); M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 25;
W.D.N.C.R. 9.
The party with the negative burden may be allowed the option of presenting his
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tory argument.380 In regulating the method of presenting evidence,
the rules may restrict the number of attorneys who may examine
or cross-examine witnesses,38 1 the position 3 2 and posture88 of the
attorney during such examinations and the number of persons who
may be examined upon a given point at issue.8 4 Finally, local rules
frequently establish guidelines and restrictions affecting summary
argument by designating the order of presentation,8 5 the permis-
sible number of participating attorneys for each side,380 the proper
statement at the close of his opponent's evidence. E.g., D. ARiz. R. 16; D. IDAHO R.
14(d); D. ME. R. 20(b). One rule allows the party with the affirmative burden to
reserve time to rebut the opposing party's opening statement. E.D. TENN. R. 17.
One district would appear to reserve the opening statement as the sole prerogative
of the party having the affirmative burden. W.D. LA. R. 13 (a).
310E.g., compare D. ARiz. R. 16 (statement optional) with D. IDAHO. R. 14(d)
(statement may be "waived') and W.D. LA. R. 13 (a) (affirmative "shall" make
opening statement). One district prohibits opening statements except by judicial
permission. D. CONN. R. 11 (c). In the absence of rule, the necessity of an opening
statement should be left to the discretion of the court.
381 E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 13 (A) (one attorney for each party may examine or cross-
examine each witness except by leave of court); D. ARIz. R. 16 (same); D.D.C. (GEN.)
R. 19 (same); D. IDAHO R. 14 (f) (same); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 15 (b) (same); E.D. PA.
R. 29(c) (2) (giving court power to regulate the number of actively participating
attorneys); E.D. TENN. R. 17 (no more than two attorneys per side).
282 E.g., D. IDAHO R. 14 (b) (remain at table or lectern except by leave of court); D.
MINN. R. 5 (remain at table except to approach bench or witness with exhibits); D.
NEB. R. 5 (j) (remain at table or lectern except to approach bench or witness with ex-
hibits); M.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 2 (g) (remain behind table or lectern except to approach
bench or witness with exhibits); E.D. OKLA. R. 31 ("suggestions" for conduct: "do not
walk around').
283 E.g., D. MINN. R. 5 (2) (standing); D. NEB. R. 5 () (seated at table or standing
at lectern except by leave of court); D.N.H.R. 2(5) (standing); D.N.D.R. III(2)(b)
(seated or standing); E.D. OxLA. R. 31(3) (standing where reporter can hear and
not "walking around"); W.D. Tx. R. 28 (19) (dignified posture).
884 Rules may regulate the number of witnesses who may testify on a particular
issue. E.g., D. MONT. R. 10(g) (number of experts may be limited by the court); D.
ORE. (GEN.) R. 15 (e) (no more than two experts by a party except by leave of court);
E.D. PA. R. 29(a) (1) (court may regulate the number of witnesses); E.D. TENN. R.
16 (limiting character, impeachment, and expert valuation witnesses to three except
by leave of court). The local rules also regulate appearances by an attorney as a
witness for his client. E.g., D. ALAsKA R. 13 (B); D. ARIZ. R. 19; D. ME. R. 20 (d); D.
MONT. R. 1(j); D.N.M.R. I (g); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 15 (a); E.D. PA. R. 28 (a).
885 The usual practice is to allow the party with the affirmative burden to begin,
followed by the negative, with an opportunity for the affirmative to close. E.g.,
D. ARIM. R. 16; M.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 8. Where the negative offers no evidence in
defense, some districts do not permit the affirmative to dose. E.g., E.D.N.C. (GEN.)
R. 8; E.D. PA. R. 30(b). Some districts allow the court in its discretion to alter
the standard order. E.g., E.D. PA. R. 30(d) (multi-party and third-party actions).
One district requires the negative to argue first. D. MINN. R. 10(6).
8sE.g., D. ALAsKA R. 13(A) (two except by leave of court); D. ARIZ. R. 16 (one
except by leave of court); D.D.C. (GEN.) R. 19 (two); N.D. & S.D. IOWA R. 19(b)
(two except by leave of court); D. NEv. R. 1 (e) (5) (same); D.N.H.R. 2 (3) (one).
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position and posture of the attorney8 7 and the time allotted.888
These restrictions on the attorney's freedom to conduct his case
are more than mere nuisances and may well operate to impair his
effective presentation8 9 or hamper trial tactics.390 However, it is
evident that many of the provisions are effectively designed to expe-
dite the trial by eliminating dispensable, time consuming, or dis-
tracting influences. In pursuit of these objectives, however, the local
rules affecting the presentation of a party's case constitute a patch-
work quilt of often questionable pattern.
In addition to designating the conduct of the attorney in the
presentation of his case, local rules of three districts have authorized
substantial alteration in the trial of certain civil actions.8 91 Con-
sistent with Federal Rule 42 (b), which authorizes a court to separate
claims or issues for trial,392 the rules of these three districts permit
the judge in his discretion to try separately the issues of liability
and damages. The clear purpose of these rules is to expedite the
administration of justice by avoiding unnecessary delay in the pro-
duction of evidence on damages where the plaintiff is unable to
establish liability.393 The second trial on the issue of damages may
be before the same or a different jury,394 a provision which has
prompted an unsuccessful attack on the ground that the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial had been infringed.3 99 Before the court exercises
"' E.g., W.D. Mo. R. 18 (standing); W.D. TEx. R. 28 (b) (9) (from lectern facing
jury).
181 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 13 (C) (one hour); N.D. & S.D. IOWA R. 19 (a) (one hour or
as judge directs); W.D. LA. R. 13(b) (court fixes time); D. ME. R. 20(a) (same);
D. MD. R. 4 (one hour).
o11 For example, narrow limitations on the number of participating counsel and
their freedom of movement may seriously preclude the use of an attorney's well-
developed, effective style.
300 For example, restrictions on the number of witnesses to prove a crucial fact
may affect trial preparation and the order of presenting evidence.
''
1 N.D. ILL. (Clv.) R. 21; M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 28; W.D. Tax. R. 25.
30 FaD. R. Civ. P. 42 (b).
3'3 Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A.J. 1265 (1959). See Note,
46 IowA L. Rav. 815 (1961) for an interesting analysis of the considerations to be
made in accomplishing a saving of time by separation of trials.
3" N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 21 provides that the jury shall be the same unless the
parties stipulate otherwise. M.D.N.C. (Crv.) R. 23 provides that the jury may be the
same or different as seems just and proper. W.D. Tax. R. 25 provides that the jury
may be the same or different as the court deems conditions require.
301 In Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1960), the court affirmed a judgment from .the district court of the Northern
District of Illinois rendered upon a jury verdict for the defendant. The court had
ordered that the issues of liability and damages be tried separately and consecutively.
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its option to divide the trial, however, it should be convinced that
there is likely to be a saving in time3 6 and also that there will be
no hardship or expense resulting from separate actions.807
The practice of separating liability from damages may also be
adopted on an ad hoc basis by the presiding judge under rule 42 (b)
without the inv6cation of a preformed district rule. The added
advantage of local rules on the subject would seem to lie in the
establishment of more explicit guiding criteria for the courts and
the clear enunciation of judicial policy. The language of newly
promulgated Federal Rule 42 (b) sanctions this type of separation
with or without local rule "when separate trials will be conducive
to expedition and economy." 398 The notes of the Advisory Commit-
tee accompanying this amended rule explicitly state that the separa-
don of issues for trial is to be "encouraged where experience has
demonstrated its worth."30 9
The local rules which assure the decorous behavior of persons
in the courtroom are directed toward both the attorney and the
general public. In many districts, conduct of the attorney is guided
by explicit incorporation of the Canons of Ethics in local rules. 400
Others require the counsel to be present at all times during the
trial401 or purport to regulate the dress40 2 and manners of the bar403
Many districts have adopted rules proscribing certain behavior
by any person inside or in the vicinity of the courtroom. The most
In holding that the preliminary trial on the issue of negligence did not abridge
plaintiff's right to a trial by jury under the seventh amendment, the court clearly
reserved judgment on the case where the same jury would not be used to try the
subsequent issue of damages when the plaintiff succeeded on the issue of liability.
282 F.2d at 642. It is interesting to note that both parties originally objected to the
splitting of the trial. Id. at 640. The plaintiff apparently felt that his chances of
recovery would be better where the jury was allowed to assess his injuries. It is
likely that the defendant objected because he thought that recovery would be nominal
if the same jury who heard the evidence on fault awarded damages. See Weinstein,
Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831 (1961).
"" See Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 815 (1961).
117N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 21 expressly makes this significant reservation.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (b).
"' Advisory Committee's Note, 86 Sup. Ct. (No. 11) 45 (1966).
400 E.g., D. MONT. R. 1 (f); E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 1 (J); E.D. PA. R. 7; E.D. TENN. R.
3; W.D. TEx. R. 28 (a).
401 E.g., N.D. GA. R. 15; D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 15 (c).
402 W.D. Tax. R. 28 (b) (19).
413 The local rules of the district courts of Oklahoma and those of the western
district of Texas deal in some detail with the expected conduct of the bar. E.D.
OKLA. R. 31; N.D. OKLA. R. 32; W.D. OrLA. R. 29; W.D. TEx. R. 28. The picayune
particularity of the treatment renders questionable the conduciveness of formalized
court rules as opposed to custom to deal with such a subject.
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common type of rule in this area regulates or restricts the use of
photography, recording devices, and broadcasting systems. 404 The
remaining provisions dealing with courtroom behavior are less com-
mon and somewhat irascibly prohibit such conduct as reading, eat-
ing, or smoking.40 5 Other rules with more generality attempt to
insure that respect for the court will be preserved.40
The fact that the local rules in most jurisdictions do not con-
tain definitive coverage of the conduct of persons during court
proceedings suggests that order and decorum are accomplished by
divergent means in different districts.40 7 The court has inherent
discretionary power to regulate behavior in the courtroom where
such action would expedite the trial, avoid distractions, and assure
the dignity of the courts, 40 8 and adoption of somewhat inflexible
rules to accomplish these objectives may well be undesirable.40 9 The
only important functions served by formalizing requirements of
courtroom behavior into rules would appear to be the advance
notice which they give410 and the announced guidelines which they
delineate.
IMPARTIAL MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND TESTIMONY
Since Federal Rule 35 has explicitly authorized district courts,
upon motion, to order an examination of a party whose mental or
physical condition is in issue 4 1 1 district court rules imparting addi-
tional purposes and specifications into this area may exceed the per-
401 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 34; N.D. GA. R. 45; D. NEB. R. 33. Many local rules allow
photography for ceremonial proceedings such as naturalization. E.g., N.D. ILL. (GEN.)
R. 34; D. KAN. R. 18; E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 11; W.D. TEx. R. 28 (b) (20) (8).
In all federal criminal trials in the district courts the exclusion of photographers
and broadcasters is guaranteed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
405E.g., D.N.D.R. 111(2)(a); W.D. Tax. R. 28(b)(20). The necessity of formal
local rules in this area is doubtful since the same objectives may be reached by
informal admonition to persons who, in their occasional or rare appearances as
spectators in the courtroom, would not be apprised of the content or even of the
existence of local court rules regulating their activities.
00 E.g, D. MONT. R. 24; D.N.D.R. III (1)(b); W.D. TEx. R. 28.
°0An alternative inference deducible from the lack of thorough regulation in
the rules of any one district is that many of the rules reflect little more than the
personal predilections of the particular judge.
400 E.g., In re Greene, 160 F.2d 517, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
400 In many cases, it would appear that the local rules on courtroom conduct are
aimed at reducing recurring problems. See, e.g., note 404 supra and accompanying
text.
410 Advance notice to the attorney of peculiar local rules regulating trial conduct
may well be essential to enable adequate presentation of his case, especially where
he is unfamiliar with local practice.
411 FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (a).
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missible scope of local regulation.412 Most of the relevant local rules
permit the appointment of an impartial medical expert, upon mo-
tion of either the court or of a party, to make preliminary examina-
tions and to give trial testimony.413 Although designation of the
examining physician under rule 35 corresponds with the suggestion
of the moving party,414 the rule might be construed to permit the
court both to initiate a motion for the appointment of an expert
and to name him without consulting either party.415
Even assuming that rule 35 parallels the local rules by impliedly
permitting the naming of an impartial medical expert without the
authorization of a permissive local rule, some of the district rules
appear substantially inconsistent with rule 35 with regard to persons
who may be subjected to examination. Federal Rule 35 refers to
"any party,"' 41 6 but some local rules provide that "the injured per-
son" may be examined. 417 Although some commentators have advo-
cated an expansion of the scope of examinable persons,418 this result
has been deemed to be beyond the inherent powers of the courts
in implementing rule 35.419 Therefore, it is unlikely that examina-
12 Cf. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960); Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
285 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960). See note 414 infra. But see BA BARRON & HoLTZOPJ
§ 1723, at 54 n.18 (Supp. 1965), which discloses that the impartial medical testimony
rule for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was upheld by that court in an un-
reported decision. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to review
the decision, also in an unreported opinion, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Hankinson v. Van Dusen, 359 U.S. 925 (1959).
113E.g., N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20(a); E.D. OKLA. R. 16(1); N.D. OKLA R. 16(1); W.D.
OKLA. R. 15-A (1); D. ORE. (Crv.) R. 37 (a); W.D. Tax. R. 24 (a); cf. E.D. PA. R. 22 (a).
414 See 2A BARRON & HOLTZoFF § 822, at 480; WRIGHT § 88, at 340 & cases cited
n.16.
'
1 5 Leach v. Grief Bros. Cooperate Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942); cf.
Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 992 (1959); 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 825, at 494; WRITrr § 88, at 340. Rule 35
provides that an order may be made "only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties .... " FED. R. Civ.
P. 35 (a). (Emphasis added.) However, it does not specify by whom the motion must
be made.
410 FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (a). (Emphasis added.)
417N.D. ILL. (CIv.) R. 20(a); E.D. OKLA. R. 16(a); N.D. OKLA. R. 16(a); W.D.
OKLA. R. 15-A (1); E.D. PA. R. 22 (a); W.D. Tax. R. 24(a). (Emphasis added.) Com-
pare D. ORE. (Civ.) R. 37, which uses language practically identical to that of the
aforementioned local rules except for the substitution of "party" for "injured person."
418 Expansion would permit the examination of employees and other third per-
sons who are not parties, but whose injuries are in issue in the case. See WRIGHT
§ 88, at 340 & n.13. Proposals have been advanced to amend Federal Rule 35 (a) to
authorize examination in cases involving the condition of a blood relative of a
party or a person or agent under the legal control of the party. 2A BARRON &
HoLTzoFF § 821.2, at 478.
"'Ibid.; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 940, 1024-25
(1961). Cf. Dinsel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
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dons could be extended to persons other than parties without an
amendment of the Federal Rules. Hence the local rules achieving
that end are seemingly invalid.420
Furthermore, using impartial experts as examiners and witnesses
constitutes a substantial limitation on the adversary system, which
may partially explain the failure of rule 35 to sanction specifically
the use of such experts. 421 Moreover, this limitation has been at-
tenuated by supplementary requirements of some local rules. For
example, rule 35 provides that where a party requests a copy of an
examination taken by his adversary, he forfeits his right to with-
hold his own medical reports. 422 However, some local rules force
complete disclosure of the impartial reports, 423 tacitly permitting a
non-moving party, against whom the ordered examination may oper-
ate, to learn the basis for his adversary's position without disclosure
of his own reports. Since additional medical witnesses may con-
ceivably be permitted, 424 the non-moving party is placed in an ad-
vantageous position by such knowledge. Furthermore, although the
practice under rule 35 has been to allocate the expenses of a medical
examination to the moving party,425 many local rules apportion these
expenses either as costs, 426 or to the losing party4 27 or equally be-
tween the parties. 428 Therefore, a party opposed to the examination
may be forced to finance disclosures which undermine his position.
Moreover, some local rules provide for an expansion of the role
of the impartial medical expert during trials. Literally interpreted,
rule 35 encompasses only expert testimony directly related to the
20 See note 412 supra and accompanying text.
"' See WRIGHT § 88, at 339. In jurisdictions without local provision for impartial
experts, each party presents witnesses who give testimony favorable to his position.
This procedure permits legitimate differences of opinion among the experts and
recognizes variances in their schools of thought. Resolution of conflicting testimony
rests with the jury. See Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1962)
(dissenting opinion); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCF § 17, at 35 (1954). McCormick criticizes
utilization of adversary techniques for expert witnesses on the grounds that the
parties are prompted to choose "the best witness" instead of "the best scientist" and
that the method overemphasizes conflicts in scientific opinions which a jury is in-
capable of resolving. Ibid.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (b) (2).
423 E.g., N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20(a) (2); W.D. TEx. R. 24(a) (2).
21 Cf. D. KAN. R. 12. None of the jurisdictions with rules authorizing appoint-
ment of impartial medical witnesses preclude the calling of additional experts during
the trial.
425 See 2A BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 825, at 494.
"' E.g., N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20(c); N.D. Os..A. R. 16(2).
2" Cf. D. KAN. R. 12.
" Cf. E.D. PA. R. 22.
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examination. However, most apposite local rules appear to permit
the expert to render subsequent testimony which transcends the
scope of the examination.429 Also, under rule 35 the expert may
not be presented to the jury as impartial, but under some local
rules he likely would be so identified.430 The aura of neutrality
enshrouding a witness representing the court, coupled with his free-
dom to testify on all relevant medical questions, may be decisive in
many trials where resolution of medical issues is the crux of the
controversy. Consequently, the efficacy of the aforementioned local
rules depends largely upon the problematical ability of the court
to select an expert who is absolutely objective.
However, despite these inherent disadvantages, the appointment
of impartial medical experts has been judicially justified as an effec-
tive means of enlightening the jury and the court on complex issues
which are easily confused by partisan presentation. 431 Consequent-
ly, commentators, 432 judges,433 and legal committees 34 have urged
adoption of rules permitting impartial testimony in state and fed-
eral courts. Nevertheless, the momentum for reform should be ac-
companied by receptivity to methods of insuring the summoning
of demonstrably objective expert witnesses.435 Draftsmen of future
420 Federal Rule 35 (b) (1) provides that if an appointed expert fails to make a
report on the examination, his testimony may be excluded at the trial. FED. R. Civ.
P. 35 (b) (1). This suggests that his testimony should be acceptable only insofar as it
refers to the examination. The local rules, however, contain no such limitation, pro-
viding only that "either party or the court may call the examining physician . ... "
E.g., N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 20 (c); N.D. OKLA. R. 16 (3). Arguably, the expert could under
these rules be asked hypothetical medical questions on issues which are relevant to
the proceeding but which do not bear upon the examination.
,80 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 825, at 494.
,'l Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962).
432 See Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical
Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 498, 502 (1963), where the following "leading authorities"
are listed as advocates of neutral experts: Professors Wigmore, Morgan, and Mc-
Cormick, Judge Learned Hand, and Judge Prettyman.
4'3 See id. at 513. Judge Van Dusen of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania argues
that the credibility of expert testimony has been materially diminished by the conse-
quences of partisan selection and use. Id. at 500.
,3, Those practitioners polled by the Law Journal were divided upon the advis-
ability of a rule requiring impartial medical testimony, although 61% favored such
a precept. See A.B.A. CoM. ON IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TSTIMONY, REPORT (1956). The
Committee concluded that appointment of impartial experts: (1) improves the process
of finding medical facts and vastly increases the likelihood of reaching an accurate
result; (2) relieves court congestion by bringing about settlements; (3) produces a
prophylactic effect upon the formulation and presentation of medical testimony in
court; (4) creates a positive economy in court administration even though a modest
cost is incurred for payment of the experts.
485 A basic problem is the ability of the court to choose an "impartial" expert in
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rules on the subject may rely upon expert medical panels to choose
witnesses430 or require a finding of extreme disparity in the medical
positions of the opposing parties before appointment is permitted.43 7
EXHIBITS, RECORDS, AND FILES
Most of the districts rigorously seek to insure the safety of trial
documents during related proceedings by prohibiting their removal
from the custody of the clerk by all persons other than court offi-
cers.43 8  Relaxation of this supervision is discernible only in the
willingness of one jurisdiction formally to permit photocopying of
the documents, 439 another district's allowance of removal upon per-
mission of the court,440 and avoidance of responsibility by a few
other districts which require counsel to retain all exhibits.441
However, the protection afforded disposition of the documents
after termination of the trial is less guarded in several district courts.
Some districts go so far as to permit destruction without notice to
the parties of exhibits which have not been removed within a speci-
fied period of time,442 a practice which was excoriated by almost all
of the practitioners polled. Other rules provide for destruction or
sale by the marshal of documents which remain in the clerk's cus-
tody without reclaim after notice has been given.443 Only a few
view of the variety in schools of medical thought. 2A BARRON & HoL'rzoFF § 825, at
87 (Supp. 1965). Many of the federal practitioners polled questioned the plausibility
of constructing a reliable standard of impartiality.
,10 E.g., N.D. It.. (Civ.) R. 20 (a) (2); W.D. PA. R. 5 (11).
"17 One district court has achieved a compromise between maintenance of an
adversary system and the use of impartial witnesses. The Western District of Penn-
sylvania has adopted a rule allowing the appointment of an impartial medical expert
only upon the presentation of an affidavit by a competent and objective medical
authority that the position of one party is so biased that it cannot be accepted by
reasonable medical experts. W.D. PA. R. 5 (III)
131 E.g., D. ALASKA R. 19 (A); S.D. CAL. R. 20; S.D. FLA. R. 12; D. HAWAI PL 5 (c).
439 D. MD. R. 12.
41 S.D.W. VA. R. 16 (limited to permanent members of the district court bar).
"I W.D.N.Y.R. 18; E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 14 (placed in custody of clerk unless court
orders attorney to keep them).
2 E.g., D. CONN. R. 12 (may be destroyed six months after "final determination"
of any case); E.D. OKLA. R. 15 (c) (exhibits not withdrawn after "final judgment"
may be destroyed); N.D. OKLA. R. 15 (c) (same); W.D. OKLA. R. 15 (c) (same); E.D.
PA. R. 32 (e) (destroyed sixty days after dismissal or final judgment or, if appealed,
ninety days after disposition notification by appellate court).
'8 E.g., W.D. MIcH. R. 7 (notice given after actions "terminated and closed" and
response necessary within thirty days); E.D. Mo. R. III (d) (2) (notice given four months
after case decided unless appealed and response necessary within thirty days); D.
MONT. R. 20 (b) (notice given thirty days after final judgment where no appeal taken
and response necessary within "reasonable time'); D. NEB. R. 30 (b) (notice given sixty
days after final judgment and response necessary within ten days); E.D.N.C. (GEN.)
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districts place an affirmative duty upon the clerk to mail the exhibits
to the attorneys who have submitted them.
444
Those procedures which command destruction of documents
either with or without notice may be justifiable because the ex-
penditure of time, expense, and space attendant to storage could be
obviated if the attorney were diligent in recovering his documents.
Nevertheless, the harsh consequences which can flow from destruc-
tion may demand less rigid procedures. Among the reasons why
preservation of the documents and exhibits in a given situation
might be essential are (1) their usefulness in connected proceedings
subsequent to the trial; (2) their relevance to other actions, civil
and criminal; and (3) their inherent invaluability or irreplaceabil-
ity. Two districts have sought to ameliorate the problem posed by
the possible utility in related actions by providing that the docu-
ments must be retained until all appeals have become final. 445 How-
ever, other districts permit destruction after a final judgment has
been granted.4 46 Moreover, none of the districts allowing destruction
explicitly recognizes the possible importance of the documents in
supporting a collateral attack upon the judgment. 447
Where the documents may be needed for subsequent, uncon-
nected civil and criminal proceedings, the need for such documents
is most problematical, but the hardships attendant to loss may be
especially acute. The failure to protect these documents in antici-
pation of their use in future criminal proceedings appears to be
particularly onerous because of the severe penalties accompanying
a finding of guilt, penalties which might conceivably be avoided if
R. 14(b)- (c) (notice given thirty days after final judgment and response necessary
within thirty days); S.D. Onto R. 17 (notice given four months after final judgment
and must respond in reasonable time); D.S.D.R. 14 (notice given after appeal time
expires and must respond within ten days). Clerks may sell the exhibits and docu-
ments in some districts rather than destroy them. N.D. ILL. (GaN.) R. 33(c); E.D.
Wis. R. 20(c).
""E.g., D. DEL. R. 10 (A) (unless court otherwise directs, mail mailable exhibits
after final judgment and lapse of time for appeal); D.N.M.R. 5 (b) (may be mailed by
clerk after final judgment and time for appeal expires); D.N.D.R. 16(b) (returned
after time for appeal expires); W.D. WASH. (GEN.) R. 6 (returned in civil, bankruptcy,
and admiralty cases after time for appeal expires).
4" M.D. FLA. R. 12 (B); ED. PA. R. 32 (e).
E10E.g., E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 14(b)-(c) (must be removed thirty days after "final
judgment" or notice given pursuant to which a thirty-day extension is granted); ED.
OKLA. R. 15 (c); N.D. OKaA. R. 15 (c); W.D. OKLA. R. 15 (c); ED. PA. R. 32 (e).
"
7 1n those districts where destruction is forestalled for a substantial period of
time or where return of the documents is guaranteed, the rules in effect operate to
accommodate their preservation for collateral attacks. E.g., D. CONN. R. 12.
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the documents were available. At least one district has recognized
the importance of preserving documents initially used in a criminal
proceeding by precluding their destruction or withdrawal absent an
order of the court.:4 Ostensibly, the same protection should be
extended to documents originally used in a civil proceeding but
having potential value in future criminal actions.449 However, the
ability of the court or clerk to prophesy subsequent need for such
documents in criminal proceedings is necessarily limited and some
procedure which would afford an oral or written hearing appears
to be a necessary adjunct.
Destruction of inherently invaluable or irreplaceable items may
work the most hardship on the attorney and his client, but for this
reason the parties would be most likely to act diligently in claim-
ing such documents. Despite this likelihood, however, even infre-
quent destruction of a valuable object by a clerk unaware of its
worth appears unjust to a party whose attorney has been guilty of
neglect. Moreover, where valuable items are sold by the court rather
than destroyed, the local rules invariably provide that the pro-
ceeds shall enter the court's coffers.450 However, a more equita-
ble solution under the judicial sales scheme would appear to call
for retention of the proceeds for the owner of the items, subject to
payment of a reasonable fine or fee to the court.
Despite the feasibility of various patchwork solutions to these
problems, however, a more general provision covering all disposi-
tions of records and exhibits appears necessary in view of the prob-
lems inherent in destruction or sale. It would appear desirable to
institute a new procedure whereby the clerk is required, upon the
rendering of a final judgment, to send a formal notice to attorneys
who have submitted documents and exhibits. This notice could
require the attorney to state in response (1) whether he intends to
claim the exhibits or (2) whether he wishes the court to destroy
them. If the latter course is chosen, the attorney would indicate
whether he consents to a sale of the documents by the court. Where
the attorney fails to comply with the notice, the clerk would be
commanded to return all of the exhibits at the attorney's expense.
18D. NEB. R. 30(d).
"'Under D. Wyo. R. 20, the potential use of documents in subsequent criminal
proceedings could be taken into account before destruction since documents may be
withdrawn only upon order of the court.
"0 E.g., N.D. ILL. (GEN.) R. 33 (c); E.D. WIs. R. 20 (c).
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Moreover, all parties submitting exhibits could be required to post
a deposit prior to trial which would be utilized to cover mailing
costs either where the attorney requests return of the items or where
they are automatically sent to him upon his failure to respond to
the notice.
JURIES: EMPANELING AND INSTRUCTIONS
A. Voir dire
When the trier of fact is to be a jury, it becomes incumbent
upon the court to see that the jury impaneled is impartial. 41 Voir
dire is directed at accomplishing that purpose by enabling biases of
jurors to be uncovered before the court 452 and by providing the
parties with a basis for the exercise of their peremptory chal-
lenges.453 In implementing this procedure, the theory of the Federal
Rules and of most district court rules bearing on the subject is that
voir dire is best conducted by a variable procedure-either by the
court alone, by the parties or their attorneys alone, or by both, as
the court may see fit in the individual case.45 4
The trial court often finds it expedient to have prospective jurors
451 See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68, 71 (1887); Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per
curiam); Goodman, The New Spirit in Federal Court Procedure, 7 F.R.D. 449,
451 (1947); Holtzoff, Expediting Courtroom Procedure, 26 PA. BA.Q. 10 (1954). "It
must be borne in mind that it is a right of the parties to secure a fair and impartial
jury, but not to obtain a favorable jury." Id. at 11. See generally 2B BARRON
& HoLTzor § 1031.
12 See Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
920 (1959); Williams v. United States, 46 F.2d 731, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1931); Annot.,
73 A.L.R.2d 1187, 1194 (1960).
3See Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
920 (1959); Bailey v. United States, 53 F.2d 982, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1931); Annot., 73
A.L.R.2d 1187, 1191, 1193, 1195-98 (1960).
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 47 (a); D. COLO. R. 14(a); S.D. IND. R. 19; D.N.M.R. 18; E.D.N.C.
(GN.) R. 6; W.D.N.C.R. 4. In addition, several district court rules provide essential-
ly that unless otherwise ordered by the court, voir dire shall be conducted by the
court, which effectively gives the court the same latitude of discretion as that pro-
vided by the Federal Rules. D. ARiz. R. 17; D IvAHo R. 13 (a); D. MONT. R. 10 (e) (1),
D. NEB. R. 22 (a); E.D. WASH. R. 15 (a); W.D. WAsH. (Civ.) R. 28 (b).
Considerable discussion has been devoted to the proposition that voir dire should
be limited as standard practice to examination by the court alone in order to avoid
undesirable waste of time in the selection of a jury. See generally Goodman, supra
note 451, at 451-52; Holtzoff, supra note 451, at 11-12. However, in at least one
federal district court it appears that rules have been adopted which provide for
attorney examination of prospective jurors as a matter of right. D.S.D.R. 12 (2). In
support of such a right, see Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 1187 (1960) (state legislation). Of
the attorneys answering the questionnaire, 34.7% thought there should be a rule
limiting the examination of prospective jurors to the court alone, while 61.3%
favored some form of attorney questioning.
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interrogated individually,455 but collective questioning is required
in at least one federal district court. 56 The local rules of that court
provide that examination of prospective jurors by attorneys be
limited "to general questions directed to the panel as a whole," and
if such examination elicits a response from a juror which in the
opinion of the court warrants further examination, leave may be
granted the attorney to examine such juror specially. 457 Prior to
the promulgation of the Federal Rules, there was substantial author-
ity supporting as error-free procedure a trial judge's refusal to allow
individual examination of prospective jurors45 and it is certainly
a tenable proposition that such a procedure is not inconsistent with
the Federal Rules.459 However, Federal Rule 47 (a)460 vests the trial
court with both the power and the duty to conduct an examination
complete enough to be fair to both parties. Thus, should a situation
arise in which the panel response, or lack thereof, to a collective
examination is wholly unsatisfactory, the trial court would seeming-
ly have the duty to question the prospective jurors individually (or
permit the parties or their attorneys to do so), notwithstanding a
local court rule to the contrary.461
Rule 47 (a) provides that if the trial judge elects to conduct the
voir dire himself, "the court shall permit the parties or their at-
"' See United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345, 348-49 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd,
223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
1"D.S.D.R. 12 (2). The local rules in at least one other district court strongly
suggest the mandatory use of collective questioning on voir dire. D. IDAHO R. 10 (a).
1-1 D.S.D.R. 12 (2).
458 Noland v. United States, 10 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1926); Shively v. United States,
299 Fed. 710, 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 619 (1924); Fredericks v. United
States, 292 Fed. 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1923).
"11 See Holtzoff, supra note 451, at 11-12.
"'o FED. R. Civ. P. 47 (a).
"61 An illustrative example is the unusual situation arising in Boothe v. Baltimore
Steam Packet Co., 149 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Va. 1957), where the plaintiff was the
mother of an attorney "whose popularity in the Alexandria area is generally recog-
nized." Id. at 863. The court realized that serious difficulties would be unavoidable
in selecting a jury in that jurisdiction, but it overcame those difficulties by directing
the interrogation of all prospective jurors "as to their relatonships, associations, and
business dealings, if any, with plaintiff, her son, and his law firm." Ibid. If a similar
situation demanding individual interrogation of prospective jurors arose in a federal
district court having a rule limiting voir dire to collective examination, that restric-
tion of the court's power under those extraordinary circumstances would seemingly
come into conflict with Rule 47 (a) and thus be abated by force of FMn. R. CIv. P. 83.
In the case of D.S.D.R. 12 (2), however, it must be noted that no express restriction
is placed on the court's power to examine prospective jurors individually if the
voir dire is conducted by the court; hence, the attorneys and the court might agree
that the court is to conduct separate examinations in an unusual situation such as
the above.
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torneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as
it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems
proper. ' 46 2 The most common local procedure for effectuating this
directive is to confer upon counsel the right, at the close of the
court's examination, to request that certain additional questions be
propounded to the panel.46 However, some local rules direct that
supplemental questions shall be submitted by counsel prior to voir
dire, with no provision allowing further submission after the court's
examination. 4 4 In most cases it would seem that the operation of
this latter procedure would be compatible with rule 47 (a), since
counsel could be expected to foresee which questions necessarily
must be propounded to provide a complete examination. However,
in those unusual circumstances where an unexpected response is
elicited from a prospective juror, such a procedure should not shield
what would otherwise be the reversible error of a trial judge who
has abused his discretion by failing to pursue an inquiry along a
newly discovered avenue of pertinent investigation when requested
to do so by counsel at the close of voir dire.4 5
In one federal district court the local rules direct that examina-
tion of prospective jurors be conducted by the court clerk, who
administers to them a set of six standard questions plus additional
questions submitted by the parties and approved by the court.40
In Stirone v. United States,467 the validity of this procedure was
tested in the context of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 (a),
which, like the corresponding civil rule, also provides for the con-
duct of voir dire by either the court, the parties, or their at-
torneys. 468 In upholding the clerical interrogatory procedure, the
court indicated that a technical deviation in form from the pre-
scribed practice would not constitute substantial error unless it
'Fvan..R. Civ. P. 47(a).
""E.g., D. Apiz. R. 17; S.D. IND. R. 19; W.D. LA. R. 13(c); D.N.M.R. 18;
W.D.N.C.R. 4.
,, E.g., D. MONT. R. 10 (e) (1); W.D. PA. R. 19; W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 28 (b).
"" See, e.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Casey v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).
186 W.D PA. R. 19.
" 6341 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965).
I'8 "The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct
the examination." FED. R. Cram. P. 24(a).
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caused demonstrable harm to one of the parties.469 Such a principle
might, if given liberal application, effect undesirable results in many
cases, but where the question concerns the proper functionary to
propound a set of standard questions to prospective jurors, the rul-
ing appears to be sound.
B. Jury Instructions
Pursuant to Federal Rule 51, written requests for instructions to
the jury may be filed "at the close of the evidence or at such earlier
time during the trial as the court reasonably directs." 470  By virtue
of this last clause, those local rules which require that requests be
submitted at various earlier times in the trial would appear to be
inconsistent with the Federal Rules only if in an individual case
they failed to satisfy the test of reasonableness. Furthermore, local
rules requiring the submission of requests prior to trial, so long as
they are reasonable in application, would likewise appear to be con-
sistent with the Federal Rules, particularly where qualified by allow-
,60 341 F.2d at 255.
'
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 51. Rule 51 does not make requests for instructions invalid
because not in writing. Winstead v. Hildenbrand, 159 F.2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1947);
Hower v. Roberts, 153 F.2d 726, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1946); Swiderski v. Moodenbaugh,
143 F.2d 212, 213 (9.th Cir. 1944). See Sharp v. Root, 240 F.2d 519, 522-23 (5th Cir.
1957). However, virtually all local rules bearing on the subject do require written
requests. D. A~iz. R. 20; S.D. CAL. R. 14; D. COLO. R. 15; D. DEL. R. 14; N.D. GA. R.
37; ED. ILL. (Civ.) R. 10; N D. & S.D. IowA R. 18; D. KAN. R. 19 (a); W.D. LA. R.
13 (d); D. ME. R. 22; E.D. Mo. R. IX; W.D. Mo. R. 9(b); D. MoNT. R. 10 (f); D.
NEB. R. 23 (a); D. NEv. R. 14; E.D.N.C. (GEN.) R. 9; E.D. OxLA. R. 22(b); N.D.
OKLA. R. 22 (b); W.D. OKLA. R. 21 (b); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 14; D.S.D.R. 13 (3); E.D.
Wis. R. 14 (a); W.D. Wis. R. 14 (a).
At least four tenable arguments support a requirement that requests be in writing.
First, since it is often difficult to follow lengthy oral instructions and to remain
cognizant of a multitude of issues throughout the trial, written requests ward off
a breakdown in communication between counsel and the court. Second, written
requests produce a clearer record for purposes of appeal and eliminate possible
error on the part of the court reporter. Third, written requests apprise opposing
counsel of one another's position, enabling each to formulate more apposite objec-
tions. Furthermore, the requirement that counsel commit their desired instructions
to writing often results in a more thoroughly prepared case and prevents counsel
from "shooting from the hip" to the detriment of their clients. Several of .the polled
attorneys commented that the latter effect was the most salutary result of requiring
written instructions.
92% of the practitioners responding to the questionnaire supported the require-
ment that requests for jury instructions be in writing. And of the practititioners who
answered the query, 63o were able to answer affirmatively that there had been
instances in their experience where oral requests had caused a breakdown in commu-
nication between judge and counsel. On the other hand, only four of the responding
judges were benched in districts which did not require written requests and none of
these felt that there had ever been a breakdown in communications because of
orally submitted requests.
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ing additional requests to be submitted in case of an unanticipated
event471 and where opposing counsel are clearly apprised of each
other's stand on the legal issues involved in the action.472 Many
such rules have been promulgated, and their varying mandates may
direct that requests be submitted prior to pre-trial conference, 473
prior to the commencement of trial,474 prior to or at the opening
of trial47 5 at the close of the plaintiff's case,476 or before the conclu-
sion of testimony by the defendant's first witness.477
Failure to comply with the deadline set for submission of re-
quests may, where the court's general charge was legally proper,
result in a loss of the right to object to a subsequent refusal by the
court to charge the jury specially on particular issues. 47  Likewise,
the right to object to one or more of the court's instructions to the
jury is waived if the failure to submit requests for contrary instruc-
tions derives from the acquiescence of the parties in the validity of
those charges.479 One case,4 0 for example, turned on the determi-
nation of fair market value of property which the Government had
condemned for public use. On pre-trial both the Government and
the owner apparently agreed that capitalization of net income was
a proper method for evaluating the property but they disagreed as
to the factors to be considered in the capitalization formula.48 ' Up-
on trial to the jury, both parties produced expert testimony sup-
porting their respective positions; the court's instructions to the
jury, while allowing a choice between various factors to be included
in the formula, were consistent with the general capitalization of
471 See D. DEL. R. 14; D. Nav. R. 14 (a); E.D. OKLA. R. 22 (b). N.D. OKLA. R.
22(b); W.D. OKLA. R. 21 (b); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 14 (b).
,
72 See D. DEL. R. 14; D. NEv. R. 14(a); W.D. Tax. R. 26 (x).
,
73 W.D. Tax. R. 26 (x).
17'E.g., W.D. LA. R. 13 (d) (seven days); D. NEV. R.. 14(a) (five days); D. ORE.
(GaN.) R. 14(a) (one day in trials which counsel anticipate will require one day
or less to try).
7 E.g., D. AiZ. R. 20; D. COLO. R. 15 (a); D. DEL. R. 14; N.D. GA. R. 37; D. KAN.
R. 19(a); W.D. Mo. R. 9 (b); D. MONT. R. 10 (f); D. NEB. R. 23 (a); E.D. OKLA. R.
22 (b); D. ORE. (GEN.) R. 14 (a).
47 6 E.D. Mo. R. IX.
477 E.D. WASH. R. 17 (c).
478 Turner Constr. Co. v. Houlihan, 240 F.2d 435, 439-40 (1st Cir. 1957); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 205 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1953); Seeraty v. Phila-
delphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 198 F.2d 264-65 (3d Cir. 1952). See D. ARIZ. R. 20.
179 Sill Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 411 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965).
80 Sill Corp. v. United States, supra note 479.
481343 F.2d at 413.
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income approach. 48 2 On appeal the owner raised an objection to
that part of the court's charge which permitted the jury to use its
discretion in taking cognizance of various factors, but the appellate
court stated that
[W]e think the challenge comes too late in view of the apparent
pretrial agreement of the parties on the blueprint of the lawsuit
embodying their respective theories of income capitalization and
the introduction without objection of testimony in support of
those respective theories. No one should be heard to object to an
instruction on the law of the case on which it was tried and sub-
mitted by agreement of the parties. 483
The rationale of this holding has been incorporated in the local
rules of the Arizona Federal District Court. There, requests for
instructions are to be submitted prior to the taking of evidence, and
within such time as the court shall allow, adverse parties must speci-
fy distinctly any objections they have to the requested instructions.
Failure to object to any requested instruction may be taken by the
court to be a stipulation that such instruction correctly states the
law.484 This local rule implements Federal Rule 51, which requires
the court to inform counsel of its proposed action on their requests
prior to final argument so that they may argue the facts in the light
of the law as the court intends to charge it.485 The logical extension
of this policy would seem to be that embodied in the Arizona rule,
which averts a last-minute objection to an instruction upon which
the opposing party based the submission of his evidence. As a pro-
tection against unforeseen hardship, however, such a rule should
be bounded by a power vested in the trial court to receive addi-
tional requests and/or objections and, indeed, the Arizona rule so
provides.
COSTS AND FEEs
Federal Rule 54 (d)48 6 provides that costs shall be allowed to a
prevailing party4 8 7 other than against the United States48 as a mat-
82 Id. at 414-15.
483 Id. at 415.
"8, D. ARiz. R. 20.
185 Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Staengel, 122 F.2d 271, 277-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 680 (1941). See generally 2B BAPAON & HoLTzorr § 1101.
,18 FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (d).
,17 The "prevailing party" is the party who ultimately prevails. Thus, recovery
by the plaintiff in a second trial carries with it an allowance of costs for the first
trial. Connolly v. Commercial Natl Bank, 89 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. La. 1950). A
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party may be the prevailing party and entitled to recover costs even though he
recovers only nominal damages, e.g., Western Elec. Co. v. Williams Sales Co., 236 F.
Supp. 73 (M.D.N.C. 1964), or only part of his claim, e.g., Hines v. Perez, 242 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1957); S. A. Hirsh Mfg. Co. v. Childs, 157 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
Where several actions were consolidated for trial and some but not all of 'the
plaintiffs prevailed, part of the defendant's costs were imposed upon the unsuccessful
plaintiffs. Modick v. Carvel Stores, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see Cornell
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 35 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 201 F. Supp. 679 (S.D. Tex. 1960), afJ'd, 299
F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962). However, in Thompson v.
United Glazing Co., 36 F. Supp. 527 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), where two plaintiffs sued a
single defendant and only one of the complainants recovered, the court refused to
impose part of the costs upon the unsuccessful plaintiff, pointing out that a single
answer had been served, that there had been a single trial and that the defendant
would have been put to the same proof had the unsuccessful plaintiff not been a
party.
Some courts have apportioned costs between the successful and unsuccessful parties
in a given case. Such apportionment is generally within the discretion of the court.
.E.g., Dyker Bldg. Co. v. United States, 182 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Prudence-Bonds
Corp. v. Prudence Realization Corp., 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949). Thus, in Cold
Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 828 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 891 (1956), where the defendant -prevailed on one affirmative defense, but a
large part of the trial was consumed in litigating another affirmative defense upon
which he did not prevail, division of the costs between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant was held not to be an abuse of discretion. Likewise, where an intervenor
tendered claims totaling $65,000 and recovered only on a minor claim for $814.94, the
imposition of ninety per cent of the costs upon the intervenor and ten per cent
against the defendant was held not to be an abuse of discretion. United States ex
rel. Chamberlain Metal Weatherstrip Co. v. Madsen Constr. Co., 139 F.2d 618 (6th
Cir. 1943); accord, Steel Constr. Co. v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 60 F. Supp. 183
(E.D. La. 1945). However, this discretion may be abused. Where the plaintiff's
charges were found to be groundless, but the defendant's very complicated business
dealings made litigation expensive and difficult, imposition of one half of the costs
upon the defendant was held to be an abuse of discretion. Chicago Sugar Co. v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949).
4,s "[C]osts against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed
only to the extent permitted by law." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). This provision is
echoed by § 2412 (a) of the Judicial Code, which provides that the United States
shall be liable for fees and costs only when such liability is expressly provided for
by act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (a) (1964). Section 2412(b) then provides that if
the United States puts in issue the plaintiff's right to recover, a district court or
the Court of Claims may allow costs to the prevailing party in any action against
the United States founded upon the Constitution, any act of Congress, any regula-
tion of the executive department, any express or implied contract with the United
States, or in any action praying for damages in cases not sounding in tort. Such
costs are limited to those actually incurred for witnesses and fees paid to the clerk
from the time of joining of issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1964). Section 2412 (c) per-
mits the allowance in all courts of costs to a successful claimant in a Federal Tort
Claims Act case, such costs not to include attorneys' fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (c) (1964).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1964); Mohr v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Va.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 274 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1960).
When the United States prevails, it may recover costs under rule 54(d) despite
the fact that the other party could not recover costs had it been successful. Locke
v. United States, 1 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Mich. 1940); Solomon v. Welch, 28 F. Supp.
823 (S.D. Cal. 1939). Where the unsuccessful litigants are the United States and
another party, half of the costs are. imposed upon the other party, and half are not
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ter of course unless the court otherwise directs, 48 9 except when ex-
press provision therefor is made by statute or rule. However, this
rule makes no provision for what specific items are "taxable"--that
is, may be assigned-as costs. The Supreme Court has held that
rule 54 (d) grants the local court a measure of discretion in deciding
what items are to be so taxed in a given case,490 although this dis-
cretion is to be "sparingly exercised" with regard to items not spe-
cifically allowed by the Federal Rules or by statute.491 Most of the
imposed on anyone. Republic of France v. United States, 307 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1962). See also Billings County v. FDIC, 71 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.D. 1947).
When a Government corporation is given express authority to "sue and be sued,"
this unqualified authority puts the corporation on the same basis as private parties
with regard to the usual incidents of suit, and costs may be imposed upon such
corporation. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941).
However, the federal courts have power to impose costs upon states which are
parties in the same manner as upon any other party. United States v. Crawford,
.36 F.R.D. 174 (W.D. La. 1964).
,18 See Deering, Millikin & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 169 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), where it was asserted that under rule 54 (d) a district court has the same
discretion in awarding costs which courts of equity possessed before enactment of
the Federal Rules. In Crutcher v. Joyce, 146 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1945), it was held
that costs in an action in equity are not allowable to the prevailing party as a
matter of course; rather, under the old federal common law rule a court of equity
has a certain amount of discretion in allowing costs.
4O Farmer v. Arabian-American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 232, 235 (1964). See also
Angeroff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (Ist Cir. 1959) (allowance of costs to prevailing
party not an absolute right but is within discretion of court); Adlung v. Gotthardt,
257 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (assessment of costs determined by usage as well as
statute); McWilliams Dredging Co. v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways, 187 F.2d 61 (5th
Cir. 1951) (allowance of particular items determined by statute, rule, order of court, or
practice of court); Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 168 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949) (district courts may by rule declare what
items are taxable as costs); Williams v. Sawyer Bros., Inc., 51 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1931) (same); Deering, Millikin & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., supra note 489 (under
rule 54 (d) a district court has same discretion in awarding costs as courts of equity
possessed before enactment of Federal Rules).
The district courts are not required to apply state law regarding costs in diversity
cases. Gandell v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958). However,
they will generally do so unless a federal statute or general rule of court is appli-
cable. Ibid.; Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 18 F.R.D. 433 (D. Del. 1955).
Since the imposition of costs is within the discretion of the court, judicial assess-
ment of costs is ordinarily not appealable, e.g., Intertype Corp. v. Clark-Congress
Corp., 249 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1957), unless the power of the court to tax a given
item is in dispute, e.g., Association of IV. Rys. v. Riss & Co., 320 F.2d 785 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), or an abuse of discretion is alleged, e.g., Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts
Research Labs., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956), or the size of the judgment is also
the subject of appeal, e.g., Swalley v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., supa. Cf.
Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1948).
'91E.g., Cohen v. Lovitz, 255 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1966) (court declined to exer-
cise inherent power to award counsel fees). The general pattern of imposing costs
upon the unsuccessful party is broken by a number of rules and statutory pro-
visions which utilize the imposition of costs as a punitive sanction to effectuate a
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given policy. Thus, in order to deter the filing of inflated claims framed in a man-
ner designed to gain access to the federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (b), 1132 (b) (1964)
permit the district courts to deny costs to and to impose costs upon a plaintiff who
recovers less than the jurisdictional amount.
Other provisions are aimed at the expeditious handling of cases and resolution
of issues and at detering delaying tactics. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1964)
provides that any attorney who so extends or burdens proceedings in a given case
as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required to pay such costs
personally.
The Federal Rules contain several measures imposing costs upon parties as a
sanction for certain proscribed conduct. For example, Fa. R. Civ. P. 37 (c) requires
a party who refuses to admit the truth of any matters of fact or the genuineness
of any document the truth or genuineness of which is subsequently proven to pay
to the other party the reasonable expenses of making such proof unless the court
finds .that there was good reason for the refusal or that the admissions sought were
of no substantial importance. Requiring payment of expenses is the only sanction
for refusal to admit; a party may not be ordered to make an admission. United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). See United Mfg. 8= Serv. Co. v. Holwin Corp., 13 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1952);
Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ohio 1952). Payment of expenses may not
be required under this rule, however, where the admissions sought constitute the
ultimate issue, Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.
1950), are conclusions of law, or are not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case but
are related solely to the defendant's affirmative defense, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Village
of Stickney, 129 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1942).
Another proscriptive provision, FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (a), states that a deponent who
refuses to answer any question or interrogatory and is thereafter ordered to answer
by the court shall be required to pay to the examining party the reasonable cost
of obtaining such order if the refusal was without substantial justification. See
Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Diminico & Pallotta, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 143 (D. Mass. 1959); cf.
Keogh v. Pearson, 35 F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 1964). Other Federal Rules relating to
deposition costs include FaD. R. Civ. P. 30 (d) (discretion to impose "reasonable" costs
when granting or denying a motion to limit deposition); Fro. R. Civ. P. 30(g)
(costs taxable to party who, after giving notice, fails to attend).
One significant impetus toward settlements is contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 68,
which provides that a party who recovers a judgment less favorable than a rejected
offer of judgment made more than ten days before the trial must pay the costs
incurred after the offer was made. There must be a formal offer of judgment in
order to impose costs under this rule, not merely an offer of compromise. Maguire
v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 9 F.R.D. 240 (W.D. La. 1949).
Another significant provision is FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (d), which provides that a
plaintiff who institutes an action which he has previously dismissed in any court
may in the discretion of the court be required to pay the costs of the prior action.
See Gregory v. Dimock, 286 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1961) (no tax upon plaintiff where
defendant's delaying tactics in prior action multiplied costs); Ayers v. Conser, 26 F.
Supp. 95 (E.D. Tenn. 1938) (same).
Other provisions relate to the following: (1) the manner in which costs arc to
be claimed and imposed: 28 U.S.C. § 1924 (1964) (verification of bills of costs); Fan.
R. Ctv. P. 54(d) (costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's notice, and his
action may, on motion, be reviewed by the court); FED. R. Civ. P. 58 (entry of
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs); (2) Special items or circum-
stances: FED. R. Civ. P. 71A (1) (costs in condemnation proceedings); see Advisory
Committee's Notes, 28 U.S.C. App. at 6149-56 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1964) (interest
on money judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 1919 (1964) (costs on dismissal for want of
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (a) (1964) (costs in civil action imposing statutory fine
or forfeiture); 28 U.S.C. § 1928 (1964) (costs in patent infringement action).
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district courts have been content to exercise this discretion on a
case-by-case basis, relying on precedent and local custom. However,
two districts, the District of Alaska and the Southern District of
California, have enacted comprehensive identical rules specifying
what items are taxable as costs payable to the prevailing party.492
Although specific provisions of these rules, discussed briefly below,
are open to question, such specificity goes far toward a needed clari-
fication of local policy toward the taxing of costs.
The basic statute providing for the taxing of costs is section
1920 of the Judicial Code,493 which provides that fees of the clerk494
and marshal,495 fees of the court reporter for stenographic transcripts
necessarily obtained, fees and disbursements for printing and for
witnesses, 498 fees charged for exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained, and docket fees497 may all be taxed as costs. 498
10 D. ALAsKA R. 15 (A), (B); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (a), (b). Other districts have scattered
provisions concerning particular items. See E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 14 (witness fees);
N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 4 (expense of attending distant depositions), 11 (bond premiums);
N.D. IND. R. 16 (bond premiums); S.D. IND. R . 5 (same); E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R.
5 (a) (expense of attending distant depositions), 6 (d) (masters' fees), 9 (stenographic
transcripts); N.D.N.Y.R. 22 (masters' fees), 25 (stenographic transcripts); E.D.N.C.
(Civ.) R. 11 (A), (B) (bond premiums and witness fees); M.D.N.C. (Civ.) R. 27 (a), (b)
(same); E.D. WASH. R. 23(f) (witness fees); W.D. WASH. (Cv.) R. 31 (f) (witness
fees, bond premiums, necessary incidental expenses ordered by court).
A number of districts have provided for the manner in which costs shall be
claimed, dealing with such matters as the time within which costs must be claimed,
the form of the bill of costs and notice to the other party. See, e.g., D. Asuz. R.
25 (costs must be claimed within ten days after entry of judgment); D. IDAHO R.
19 (a) (claim within five days after entry of judgment); D. NEv. R. 18 (a) (same); E.D.
Mo. R. X (c) (bill of costs must be verified, be on form provided by clerk and
contain proof of mailing to adverse party); D. MONT. R. 14(a) (1) (cost bill must
contain itemized schedule of costs with verification by attorney that schedule is
correct and that costs were necessarily incurred); D.N.M.R. 11 (b) (cost bill must be
itemized, verified, and contain proof of service on counsel of adverse party); E.D.
PA. R. 85 (c) (opposing party must be given forty-eight-hour written notice if he
resides or his counsel maintains an office in Philadelphia; otherwise five-day written
notice); E.D. WASH. R. 23 (a) (one-day written notice if notice served in Spokane,
otherwise five-day written notice); W.D. Wis. R. 25 (a) (three-day notice).
1" 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1964).
,0, Such fees are provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) (1964) (filing fee) and 28
U.S.C. § 1917 (1964) (fee on no.tice of appeal). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(b), (d)
(1964).
' Such fees are specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1964).
90 Fees, subsistence, and mileage payments for witnesses who are not Government
employees are allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964). 28 U.S.C. § 1828 (a) (1964) pro-
vides for similar allowances for Government employees. Different rules obtain for the
District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1823 (b) (1964). See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 28.1,
.4 (1966).
,07 Such fees are specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964).
,18 While express statutory provision is not necessary in order for an item to be
taxable, see note 490 supra and accompanying text, the allowance of a given item
Vol. 1966: 1011] 1089
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The rules of the District of Alaska and the Southern District of
California add further substance to this statutory mandate by spe-
cifying in detail the circumstances under which the reporter's fee,4 10
witness fees,50 fees for copies of papers0 1 and various other items 02
generally finds some basis in a specific provision. For example, the taxing of an
unofficial reporter's fee for taking a deposition has been justified by analogy to the
taxing of the official court reporter's fee authorized by § 1920. United States v.
Kolesar, 313 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1963); Cooke v. Universal Pictures Co., 135 F. Supp.
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Perlman v. Feldman, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953).
Conversely, the existence of a specific statutory provision for given items has
formed the basis for a denial of the taxing of a related item. For example, extra
expenses for expert witnesses have been denied as taxable costs due to the fact
that ordinary witness fees, mileage, and subsistence are specified by statute with no
mention of an additional fee to expert witnesses. Scaramucci v. Universal Mfg. Co.,
234 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. La. 1964); Firtag v. Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C.
1957). In Braun v. Hassenstein Steel Co., 23 F.R.D. 163 (D.S.D. 1959), it was held
that special fees for expert witnesses could not be taxed, because in actions at law
the courts have no discretion regarding the imposition of costs and are limited to
items specified by statute. The court also asserted that costs statutes, being in
derogation of the common law, are to be construed strictly, and no item may be
allowed if it is not specifically mentioned by statute. Id. at 167. This rationale
seems dearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding that the district courts
have discretion in the taxing of costs. See note 490 supra and accompanying text.
,Only the reporter's fee for a copy of the transcript furnished to the court
upon request or by stipulation of the parties is taxable. Mere acceptance by the
court does not constitute a request, and counsel's copies are not taxable. D. ALASKA
R. 15 (B) (2); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (2) (a); see also E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (CIv.) R. 9; N.D.N.Y.R.
25.
G0o Witness fees, mileage, and subsistence are taxable even though the witness
appears voluntarily and does not take the stand, provided the witness "necessarily
attends the court." D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (4); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (3). E.D. WAsH. R.
23 (f) (1) and W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 31 (f) (1) provide that if attendance is not under
subpoena and if the witness does not actually testify, fees are taxable only upon
order of the court. E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 14 states that a witness who appears volun-
tarily is entitled to fees for attendance and travel "as if regularly subpoenaed,"
provided he files an affidavit as to miles necessarily traveled and days of actual
attendance. See Spiritwood Grain Corp. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th
Cir. 1950). Where the witness comes from outside the district the mileage is based
upon the most direct route to the court. See notes 514-20 infra and accompanying
text. Witness fees and subsistence are taxable only for the reasonable period during
which the witness is within the district. Where a witness appears on the same day
in related cases requiring appearance in the same court, one set of fees is taxable,
to be divided equally among the cases. No party is to receive witness fees for
testifying in his own behalf and witness fees for officers of a corporate party are
taxable if the officers are not defendants and recovery is not sought against them
individually. D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (4); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (3).
Allowance of fees to a witness on a deposition does not depend upon whether
the deposition is offered into evidence. Where the fee of the witness is taxable the
reasonable fee of an interpreter is taxable, as is the reasonable fee of a translator
if the translated document is necessarily filed or admitted into evidence. Bennett
Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Gotz v.
Universal Prods. Co., 3 F.R.D. 153 (D. Del. 1943); D. ALASKA R. 15(B)(4); S.D.
CAL. R. 15 (b) (3).
501 The cost of copies of exhibits attached to a document necessarily filed and
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may be included in the bill of costs.
Another desirable provision contained in the local rules of these
two districts relates to expenses in the taking of depositions, which
expenses have received no general statutory treatment. The tran-
scription expense and the fee of the presiding official are stated to
be taxable. 50 3 These rules then provide that counsel fees and the
expense of arranging and attending the taking of the deposition
are not taxable "except as otherwise provided by statute or by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 5°4 The reference is evidently
served is taxable when admitted into evidence in lieu of an original which is un-
available or not introduced at the request of opposing counsel, but the cost of such
copies submitted to facilitate the convenience of offering counsel or his client is
not taxable. Notary fees are taxable only for documents required to be notarized
and necessarily filed. D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (5); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (4).
The cost of compiling summaries, computations, and statistical comparisons is
not taxable, and the cost of models is taxable only by order of the court. The
cost of photographs eight by ten inches or less in size is taxable if admitted into
evidence or attached to documents necessarily filed and served, but the cost of larger
photographs is taxable only by order of the court. D. ALASKA R. 15 (B)(6); S.D.
CAL. R. 15(b)(5).
r02 D. ALASKA R. 15 (B)(7); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b)(6). The statutory docket fees for
counsel specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964) are taxable in default as well as contested
cases. Cf. FD. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(1). Such fees are deemed attorneys' fees not taxable
against the United States in Federal Tort Claims cases. North Atlantic & Gulf S.S.
Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954); McConville v. United States, 197
F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952); see note 488 supra.
Fees to masters, receivers, and commissioners are taxable unless otherwise ordered'
by the court. D. ALAsKA R. 15 (B) (8); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (7); E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.)
R. 6 (d); N.D.N.Y.R. 22. See FEr. R. Civ. P. 53 (a).
Cost of premiums on bonds or undertakings is ordinarily taxable where such
security is expressly required by law or .order of court or is necessarily required to
enable the party to secure some right accorded him in the action. D. ALAsKA R.
15 (B) (9); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (8); see also N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 11 (reasonable premiums
on all bonds); N.D. IND. R. 16 (same); S.D. IND. R. 5 (same); E.D.N.C. (Civ.) R.
11(A) (same); M.D.N.C.R. 27(a) (same); W.D. WASH. R. 31(f)(4) (premiums on
bonds expressly required by law or rule of court or order of court).
In removed cases, various specified costs incurred in the state court prior to re-
moval are taxable. D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (10); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (10).
5o3 The reporter's charge for the original of a filed deposition is taxable, regard-
less of whether admitted into evidence, Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
339 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1964); Modick v. Carvel Stores, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), or taken solely for purposes of discovery. Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals
Auction Co., 198 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Contra, Independent Iron Works,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9.th Cir. 1963). The local rule
reversed a prior decision of the Alaska District Court that the cost of depositions
taken solely for discovery is not taxable. See Gillam v. A. Shyman, Inc., 31 F.R.D.
271 (D. Alaska 1962). Regardless of the party taking the deposition, counsel's copies
are not taxable. General Cas. Co. v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58 (D. Mont. 1959);
Firtag v. Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957). Witness fees are taxable at
the same rate as for attendance at trial. D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (3); S.D. CAL. R.
15 (b) (2) (b).
504 D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (3); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (2) (b). -
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to rules 80 (d)505 and 80 (g),508 which permit the court to order pay-
ment of expenses upon the grant or denial of a motion to limit
examination of a deponent and upon the failure of a deposition to
be taken as scheduled.
A salutary practice followed by several cases 50 7 and local rules508
has been ignored by the comprehensive scheme adopted by the two
districts. In several instances, a party giving notice of the taking
of a deposition at a place far distant from the place of trial has
been ordered to pay the expenses of attendance incurred by the
other party or his attorney.5 9 The purpose of this practice is to
avoid hardship and harassment and also to secure the right of the
other party to oral cross-examination. 510 The authority for such an
order is usually predicated upon Federal Rule 80 (b), which pro-
vides that with regard to the taking of depositions "the court may
make any ... order which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."5 11 While
this proviso seemingly empowers the District of Alaska and the
Southern District of California to make such an order despite the
absence of a specific local rule, courts without a rule on this point
have in general been reluctant to make such an order, although
they might do so if "special circumstances" were present.51 2 In the
interest of clarification, it would appear advantageous for the dis-
tricts to promulgate a specific provision on this point, and two
possible tacks appear feasible. One model is posed by the Northern
District of Illinois, the rules of which provide that a party giving
notice of the taking of a deposition more than one hundred fifty
""FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (d).
086 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(g).
507 See, e.g., Gibson v. International Freighting Corp., 173 F.2d 591 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949).
:
0 8 See N.D. ILL. (Crv.) R. 4; E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 5 (a).
09 E.g., Detsch & Co. v. American Prods. Co., 141 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1944); Deep
South Oil Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). E.D. &,
S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 5 (a) specify that the applicant may be required to pay an adverse
party's expense of attendance, including a reasonable counsel fee, at a deposition
more than 100 miles from the courthouse. The Northern District of Illinois permits
imposition of such costs only when the distance exceeds 150 miles. N.D. ILL. (CxV.)
R. 4.
al1 Vareltzis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 20 F.R.D. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); cf. FE. R.
Civ. P. 31 (d) (court may order testimony of witness sought to be taken on written
interrogatory not to be taken except on oral examination).
511 FED. R. Crv. P. 30 (b); see Vareltzis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., supra note 510.
512 See Towe v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 188 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1960); Weeks v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 5 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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miles from the place of trial may be ordered to pay the reasonable
expenses of attendance incurred by the other party or his attorney.
13
Alternatively, several cases hold that payment of expenses of atten-
dance will be ordered only where there are special circumstances
demonstrating hardship or oppression. If the latter example is in-
corporated in local rules, a specification of the elements constituting
"special circumstances" would appear desirable in order that coun-
sel may determine in advance the most efficacious and economic
method of pre-trial discovery.
The local rules of the District of Alaska and the Southern Dis-
trict of California also contain sections relating to the cost computa-
tion of mileage allowances payable to a witness. Where the witness
comes from outside the district, the mileage taxable is based upon
the most direct route to the court, "subject to the additional pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 514 This latter
reference may be to the analogous provision of Federal Rule 45 (e)
(1) that, absent special statutory authorization, a subpoena com-
pelling attendance at trial may be served outside the district only
within one hundred miles of the place of trial515 and to the line
of cases which hold that taxable mileage for the travel of a witness
from without the district is limited to one hundred miles, since
that is the greatest distance outside the district from which atten-
dance may be compelled.510
While the "hundred-miles rule" seems inconsistent with the pro-
vision in these local rules that attendance of a witness under
subpoena is not required in order for that witness' mileage to be
taxable, 517 it is defensible as a measure to prevent inflated costs.518
It is submitted, however, that a better method of control would
113 N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 4.
'11 D. ALASKA R. 15 (B) (4); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (8).
515 FED. R. CIv. P. 45 (e) (1).
10 E.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1958); Consolidated
Fisheries Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 106 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Gotz v.
Universal Prods. Co., 8 F.R.D. 153 (D. Del. 1948); see also E.D. WASH. R. 23 (f) (2)
(mileage limited to greater of distance traveled within district or 100 miles); W.D.
WAsH. (Civ.) R. 81 (f) (2) (same). Contra, Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodi-
ties, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp.,
163 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
511 D. ALAsKA R. 15 (B) (4); S.D. CAL. R. 15 (b) (8).
51' In Gotz v. Universal Prods. Co., 8 F.R.D. 158 (D. Del. 1948), mileage from
Germany was unsuccessfully sought to be taxed. In Consolidated Fisheries Co. v.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 106 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1952), the court refused to tax
the cost of a 1900-mile round trip from Alaska.
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allow the court to exercise its discretion in the light of the facts of
a particular case, balancing the necessity of a witness' appearance
against the expense of procuring attendance. Such a method would
evidence recognition of the fact that the purpose of the rule is to
assess costs equitably rather than to parallel the subpoena require-
ments. 519 Once this is recognized, the arbitrary designation of a
given distance for cost purposes is difficult to justify.520 The Su-
preme Court has held 521 that the district courts are not bound by
the "hundred-miles rule," but are to use the discretion granted by
rule 54 (d) in determining whether and to what extent to limit the
mileage taxable in a given case. While on the facts of that case
the limitation of taxable mileage to one hundred miles was found
not to be an abuse of discretion, the case clearly holds that such a
determination is to be made by the application of reasonable dis-
cretion rather than arbitrary rule.
Despite these shortcomings in the local rules of the District of
Alaska and the Southern District of California, they appear to be
the best and most comprehensive local federal rules regarding the
items taxable as costs. It would appear that the discretion granted
by rule 54 (d) in this area should be exercised through local rules
which clarify local policy rather than through case-by-case reliance
upon often amorphous local customs. A party who has prevailed
in an action should not have to resort to extended litigation in
order to determine his right to compensation for expenses incurred
and the risk of bearing such costs should be assessable by the parties
in advance.
MOnONS FOR NEW TRILus
Although Federal Rule 59522 authorizes motions for new trials,
proper grounds therefor are described only in the most general
terms, 5 23 because the draftsmen of the rule considered an accurate
G"Reliance upon the subpoena requirements seems particularly inapposite in
the typical case dealing with mileage expense for travel from a foreign country
since 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964) provides for the requiring by subpoena of the atten-
dance as a witness of a United States citizen in a foreign country, upon order of the
court and tender of travel expenses.
120 The 100-mile distance is relevant, however, to a consideration of the necessity
of the appearance of the witness, due to FEn. R. Cav. P. 26(d) (3), which provides
that the deposition of a witness who is not within 100 miles of the place of trial
may be used by any party for any purpose.
52" Farmer v. American Arabian Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964).
5122 Fa. R. Civ. P. 59.
z
2SIn cases involving trial by jury, new trials may be allowed "for any of the
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and comprehensive delineation to be impractical.52 4 Nevertheless,
a few district courts have adopted local rules enumerating such
grounds,525 though they are not propounded as exclusive.
The grounds generally specified in these rules526 include the fol-
lowing: (1) irregularity in the proceeding of the court, jury or
adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by
which the losing party was deprived of a fair trial; (2) misconduct
of the jury; (3) accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could
not have averted; (4) newly discovered evidence, material to the
party making the application, which he could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial;527 (5) excessive
or inadequate damages seemingly awarded under the influence of
passion or prejudice; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision by court or jury; and (7) error in law
occurring at the trial. Although the terms of the first and last pro-
visions are probably broad enough to subsume most of the generally
accepted reasons for granting new trials, 28 the adopting districts,
by declining to delineate these grounds explicitly, have to some
extent sidestepped their assumied task of giving specificity to rule
59. Moreover, the enumeration of more precise grounds in the
other, less inclusive provisions noted above raises the question of
whether they occupy a preferred position. The courts demonstrate
willingness to specify some grounds, but at the same time relegate
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States." Identical phraseology is used in connection with new
trials in non-jury actions except the word "equity" is substituted for the word
"law." FEn. R. Civ. P. 59 (a).
524 Dobie, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 299 (1939).
52.nE.g., D. ALAsKA R. 17; S.D. CAL. R. 17.
520E.g., rules cited note 525 supra. Significantly, one district court has declined
to prescribe enumerated grounds even though it has substantially copied the content
of other provisions in the Alaska and Southern District of California rules. D.
NEv. R. 17. Moreover, another court which once had the most extensive new trial
rules of any district has, in a recent revision, deleted a comprehensive list of
enumerated grounds. Compare obsolete rule 48 of the Western District of Washing-
ton with W.D. WAsH. (Civ.) R. 29.
r-2 When this ground is utilized, most of the local rules demand an informative
presentation of the content of the evidence, an explanation of the efforts ex-
pended before its discovery, and why with reasonable diligence the evidence could
not have been presented at the trial. E.g., D. A.AsKA R. 17(B)(3); S.D. CAL. R.
17 (b) (5); D. NEv. R. 17 (3); M.D. PA. R. 29. Besides effectuating substantiation of
the claim, such requirements promote the presentation of all known material evi-
dence during the trial.
r28 See 3 BAReON & HoL'rzor § 1304 for an enumeration of grounds which have
been regarded by the courts as adequate for obtaining new trials.
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equally specifiable and acceptable grounds 29 to possible recogni-
zance under the generalized catchall categories. Consequently, not
unlike the advocate laboring under the common law theory of forms
of action, counsel might feel constrained to fit his objections into
one of those favored, or at least more secure, niches which have been
carved with definitude. This result would have the undesirable
consequence of discouraging flexibility in the presentation of objec-
tions and hence lessen the effectiveness of efforts to obtain new trials.
If, however, legitimate efforts by litigants to obtain new trials
are not effectively impeded, the enumeration of grounds might be
justifiable as a means of eliciting specificity in the presentation of
motions for new trials.530 By listing examples of the kinds of claims
which are considered meritorious, the court discourages motions
which are strictly pro forma or uninformative and consequently
fatally defective.531 Moreover, the parties are warned prior to trial
of specific hazards which they must avoid in order to achieve an
unimpeachable verdict.
In addition to an enumeration of grounds, some local rules pre-
scribe supplementary procedural requirements for motions under
rule 59. The rule simply provides that motions for new trials must
be served within ten days from the entry of judgment5 32 and must
be accompanied by affidavits when necessary to support the claim.13
Some of the local rules insist that the requisite service extend to
the adverse party534 and at least one district requires memoranda
"'Among .the well-recognized grounds which could have been specified are: (1)
erroneous instruction of the jury; (2) substantial error in the admission or rejection
of evidence; (3) erroneous submission of the case to the jury; (4) inconsistency of
the verdict on its face; (5) improper or prejudicial argument of counsel. Ibid.
580 Many of the local rules dealing with new trials explicitly require specifications
of claims of insufficiency of the evidence and errors of law and provide that all
unspecified grounds will be disregarded. E.g., D. ALASKA R. 17(B)(1); S.D. CAL. R.
17(b)(1); D. Nav. R. 17(1).
rs See 3 BARRON & HoLTzorr § 1906, at 178 (Supp. 1965). One eminent com-
mentator, however, argues that in most cases motions for new trials should be
broadly construed and "reasonable" specification of grounds should be held sufficient.
WRIGHT § 95, at 367.
532 FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (a). The period of time generally cannot be extended. See,
e.g., Nugent v. Yellow Cab Co., 295 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
828 (1962).
r"
8 FaD. R. Civ. P. 59 (c). The opposing party has ten days after service of the
affidavits to file opposing affidavits, but the period may be extended by as much as
twenty days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties upon
written stipulation. Reply affidavits are permissible. Ibid.
58, E.g., D. ALASKA R. 17 (B) (1); S.D. CAL. R. 17 (b) (2); D. Nav. R. 17 (1). Such a
requirement might be implied from the language of rule 59 without the aid of a
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of supporting authorities when motions are based upon questions
of law. 85 These provisions promote consideration of the claims in
an adversary climate and effectuate a reasoned judgment by the
court. Furthermore, in a meticulous effort to test comprehensively
the validity of the original trial, some local rules provide that mo-
tions may be heard with the aid of the pleadings, papers on file,
supporting affidavits, and the "minutes of the court," which include
the clerk's minutes, any notes and memoranda kept by the judge
and the reporter's transcript of his shorthand notes.5 36 Finally, some
local provisions command hearing of the motions whenever prac-
ticable by the trial judge,537 who because of his direct observance
of the proceedings is perhaps in the best position to evaluate and
correct deficiencies. Although the judge's ability to view his own
errata with an impartial eye may be limited, the alternative of per-
mitting another judge, who can rely only on the relative sterility
of a printed record, to rule on the motion seems less reliable.
In summary, it would appear that all of the aforementioned
procedural requirements tend to promote rule 59 by effectuating a
considered second look at the conduct and outcome of the trial.
However, the adoption of such rules probably should evolve on a
local basis, for an inquiry which is broad enough to test the fairness
of a complete proceeding necessarily demands flexible examining
techniques.
APPEALS
Under the Federal Rules an appeal to a court of appeals may
be taken in appropriate cases by filing a notice of appeal with the
district court within thirty days after the entry of judgment by the
lower court.538 Thereafter, the failure of the appellant to file the
record, docket the appeal, or take any further steps necessary to
secure appellate review does not affect the validity of the appeal.
5 39
This failure to act does constitute an occasion for the invocation
supplemental local rule, for the Federal Rule requires such a motion and accom-
panying affidavits to be "served," after which the opposing party may "serve" counter-
affidavits.
5811D. Aiuz. R. 24.
"E.g., D. ALASKA R. 17(B) (2); S.D. CAL. R. 17(b) (2).
37D.A sLAsKA R. 17(B) (6); S.D. CAL. R. 17 (b) (6); D. NEV. R. 17 (5).
538 FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (a); see generally 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF §§ 1551-60.
530 E.g., United States v. Fujiaski, 198 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Krause, 197 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952); Fong v. James W. Glover, Ltd., 197 F.2d 710
(9th Cir. 1952); Ispass v. Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 152 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1945),
remanded on other grounds, 380 U.S. 695 (1947); 3A BARRoN & HOLTZOF § 1551, at 55.
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of the remedies specified in Federal Rule 73, or if no remedy is
specified, for such action as the court of appeals may deem appro-
priate, including dismissal of the appeal.540 With one exception,
the district court rules governing appeals add little to the appellate
procedures set out in Federal Rules 73 through 76.641 Some local
provisions prescribe time limits for designation of the portions of
the record upon which the appeal is based54 and provide technical
filing requirements intended to simplify the clerk's task of giving
notice of appeal.543
The one exceptional district court regulation, rule 37 of the
Southern District of California,5 44 provides that where eight months
have elapsed after the filing of a notice of appeal and the appellant
has failed to docket the appeal or file the record, the district court
will order the appellant to appear and to show cause why he should
not be directed "either to docket the appeal in the Court of Appeals
or to file with the Clerk of [the district court] . . . a motion to dis-
miss the appeal pursuant to Rule 73 (a) . . . 545 Arguably, how-
ro Fm. R. Civ. P. 73 (a); 3A BARRON & HOLizOFF § 1560, at 93; see cases cited note
539 supra.
"IFED. R. Civ. P. 73 (notice, bond, docketing and record on appeal), 74 (joint
or several appeals, summons and severance abolished), 75 (contents of record on
appeal), 76 (agreed statement as to record on appeal).
The rules of seven district courts include specific provisions governing appeals.
S.D. CAL. R. 37; D. CoLo. R. 27; N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 17; E.D. & S.D.N.Y. (Civ.) R. 13;
N.D.N.Y.R. 31; W.D.N.Y.R. 30.
5S.D. CAL. R. 37(b);. D. CoLo. R. 27 (b); N.D.N.Y.R. 31(b); W.D.N.Y.R.
30 (b). These rules are obsolete as the amended rule 75 dispenses with the designa-
tion procedure and provides that the original papers and exhibits, the transcript of
proceedings, and the docket entries from the district court shall constitute the
record on appeal unless the parties by written stipulation agree that specific parts
of the record need not be transmitted to the court of appeals. FED. R. Civ. P.
75(a) (as amended July 1, 1966).
5"'FD. R. Civ. P. 73 (b) requires the clerk to mail copies of the notice of appeal
to the attorney of record of each party to the judgment, other than the party
taking the appeal; all the seven local rules, supra note 541, provide that notice
filed by the party taking the appeal contain the names of all the parties to the
judgment and the names and addresses of their respective attorneys, and that each
party filing a notice of appeal furnish a sufficient number of copies of such notice
to enable the clerk to comply with rule 73 (b). Similarly, all but one of the seven
local rules, S.D. CAL. R. 37, provide that a party making a motion to enforce the
liability of a surety upon an appeal or supersedeas bond pursuant to Fan. R. Civ.
P. 73(f) serve an additional copy of the motion upon the clerk, a provision formu-
lated expressly for the purpose of enabling the clerk to mail the extra copy to the
surety as required by FE. R. Civ. P. 65.1.
6" S.D. CAL. R. 37.
"' S.D. CAL. R. 37 (d). Subsection (c) of Rule 37 requires the clerk to ascertain
whether the record on appeal has been filed with the court of appeals and the
appeal there docketed after four months have elapsed from the date of the filing
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ever, this unique scheme collides with Federal Rule 73 (a)546 which
provides that "if an appeal has not been docketed, . . [the district]
.. .court may dismiss the appeal upon motion and notice by the
appellant." It is generally recognized that filing a notice of appeal
perfects the appeal and that thereafter the district court is without
jurisdiction to proceed further with the case or to dismiss it for
want of prosecution. 547 The dismissal provision of rule 73 is an
exception to this general principle 548 and is designed to eliminate
"the useless formality and expense of docketing the appeal and then
dismissing it in the appellate court . . . . 4 Although rule 37 of
the Southern District of California may expedite appeal procedure,
it would appear to be inconsistent with Federal Rule 73 by author-
izing the district court to compel an appellant to justify his failure
to docket the appeal at the risk of being ordered to move for dis-
missal.550 Both the language and the purpose of rule 73 indicate
that the initiative with respect to moving for dismissal before the
appeal has been docketed is to remain with the appellant. The
appellant's failure to take further action without good reason may
provide cause for dismissal, but this matter is within the discretion
of the appellate, not the district, court.551
Although the discretionary latitude afforded the district courts
by the detailed nature of Federal Rules 73 through 76 is scant, the
recently revised Federal Rules suggest several significant areas of
appeal procedure which could be profitably supplemented by the
of the notice of appeal. Subsection (d) provides that whenever a case appears for
a second time on the list of undocketed appeals prepared by the clerk pursuant to
subsection (c) (presumedly four months after the preparation of the first list), the
clerk shall forthwith prepare and present for the signature of the judge to whom
the case was assigned an order directing the appealing party to appear and show
cause why he should not be directed to docket the appeal or move for dismissal.
FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a).
5 E.g., Miller v. United States, 114 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1940); Piascik v. British
Ministry of War Transport, 83 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF
§ 1558, at 85-86 & n.97.
5 8 Id. § 1560, at 95.
540 Ibid.
550 Rule 73 does not sanction an order by the district court to an appellant to
docket his appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed with the court of appeals.
Fmn. R. Civ. P. 73; see authorities cited note 547 supra. Moreover, if an appellant
refused to move for dismissal and the district court dismissed the appeal on its
own motion, .this action would clearly be inconsistent with rule 73 (a), which author-
izes the district court to dismiss only upon motion and notice by the appellant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (a).
"I Authorities cited note 547 supra.
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formulation of local regulations. For example, the new rule 75 (d)"12
provides that if a difference arises as to whether the record on ap-
peal truly discloses what occurred in the district court, that court
shall settle the difference and revise the record accordingly. Further,
the district court may of its own initiative correct omissions from
or misstatements of the record. 53 The powers thus accorded might
well be expedited by a locally established procedure for hearing
such controversies and making the appropriate corrections. Given
the possibility that witnesses and other evidence may become un-
available soon after the termination of a particular proceeding, a
local rule which required such motions and modifications within
a short time subsequent to trial would appear to be salutary.
Furthermore, in the event that no stenographic report of the evi-
dence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, rule 75 (c)55 4
allows the appellant to prepare from his recollection or other means
a statement of those matters and serve it on the appellee, who may
tender objections or propose amendments thereto, after which the
district court shall settle what disputes exist on the record and
approve it. This provision, rarely invoked,"5 5 is in a sense ancillary
to the court's corrective power under rule 75 (d), but it may in addi-
tion be necessary to submit affidavits and even evidence where no
record has been preserved. A local directive designating the pro-
cedure to be followed and the evidence admissible in such a pro-
ceeding would appear most desirable in this regard, despite the
infrequency of an apposite situation.556
Finally, rule 76 provides the district court with the power and
the duty to approve, add to, and certify short-form appeal statements
of the case prepared by the parties.5 7 As Professor Moore notes,
the language of this rule does not in terms require the inclusion
of findings of fact or conclusions of law in this stipulated record,
but given the appellate court's need for a clear elucidation of the
case, "the district court should normally require their inclusion." 58
r2 FuD. R. Civ. P. 75 (d).
553 Ibid.
rr FED. R. COv. P. 75 (c).
5' 7 MooRE 75.22.
See Hawkins v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 188 F2d 348 (8th Cir. 1951), where the
court refused to accept the affidavits of courtroom spectators.
r F D. R. Civ. P. 76.
58 7 MooP, 76.03[2], at 3903.
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A local rule which delineated certain requisites for any agreed rec-
ord would clarify and efficaciously resolve such practice.
BANKRUPTCY AND RECEIVERSHIP
An unusual addition to the power of the local federal court to
promulgate rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules is found
in rule 66,z59 which governs the appointment of receivers0 60 by fed-
eral district courts.561 It provides in part that the procedural prac-
tice in the administration of estates by receivers and by similar
officers shall accord with previous practice before the district court
or with prescriptions formulated by local district courts. 62 Actions
in which the appointment of a receiver is sought, however, must
be prosecuted in accordance with the Federal Rules, as must actions
brought by or against a receiver.
The permissive mandate regarding "administrative procedure"
is nevertheless quite broad and is qualified only by the requirement
that no action in which a receiver was appointed by a federal court
may be dismissed without the consent of a federal court.5 63 The
latter proviso thus insures that interested parties will not secure a
I'" "An action wherein a receiver has been appointed shall not be dismissed
except by order of the court. The practice in the administration of estates by
receivers or by similar officers appointed by the court shall be in accordance with
the practice heretofore followed in the courts of the United States or as provided in
rules promulgated by the district courts. In all other respects the action in which
the appointment of a receiver is sought or which is brought by or against a receiver
is governed by these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 66.
rG0 Generally, a receiver is a person appointed by the court to take custody of
and to control or manage property involved in litigation. See Commissioner v. Owens,
78 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1935). The receiver is an officer of the court who may be
appointed as an incident to other proceedings, such as foreclosure, wherein certain
ultimate relief is sought. In re Granada Hotel Corp., 9 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Ill. 1935).
r," For a federal court to appoint a receiver, the complaining party must allege
a proper foundation for federal jurisdiction. Initially he must show either a federal
question or diversity of citizenship. The proper jurisdictional amount in controversy
must also be pleaded. See 2 MooRE 1 8.11, at 1666; 3 id. 23.13, at 3477. There may
also be some special basis for jurisdiction. E.g., Garden Homes v. United States, 200
F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1950) (receivership action brought by United States); 7 MooRE
66.09[l], at 1956 n.5 (receiver sought for national bank).
r02 See Rotwein, Pleadings and Practice Under the New Federal Rules, 8 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 188, 209 (1938). This broad delegation of rule-making power was in part
due to the reluctance of the draftsmen of the Federal Rules to undertake a revision
of federal receivership practice. Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, 109 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.
1940). See 3 BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 1451, at 512.
" "The first sentence added to Rule 66 prevents a dismissal by any party, after
a federal equity receiver has been appointed, except upon leave of court. A party
should not be permitted to oust the court and its officer without the consent of that
court." Advisory Committee's Note of 1946 to Amended Rule 66, 10 FED. ur.-ss Stv.
cxxiv (1948).
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dismissal before all claims are settled, a practice which would severe-
ly prejudice creditors who had not yet applied for relief.564 Aside
from these directives, however, receivership practice is completely
a creature of local conception. The sagacity with which the district
courts have implemented their power will thus become focal.
An interesting threshold question is posed by the scope of the
rule 66 grant, which allows local rules to govern receivership prac-
tice in the "administration of estates." One commentator"5 is of
the opinion that this is merely expository of the grant of rule 83,
which permits district courts to formulate rules not inconsistent
with the federal rules.566 However, by virtue of the inclusion of
the clause in rule 66, it is equally arguable that the power accorded
the district court in the "administration of estates" transcends what
would be permissible under rule 83.56 7 Should this interpretation
prevail, receivership rules could permissibly conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules, a result which is seemingly allowed by the language of
rule 6658 and by the illogic of enumerating the power specifically
with respect to receiverships if it were only designed to be coexten-
sive with the general authority granted in rule 83. Nonetheless,
absent any express indication by the draftsmen, it could readily be
contended that the language of rule 66 is to be narrowly construed
and thus constitutes a limitation upon rules which the local district
may promulgate in the area of receiverships.
The fact that the district court's rule-making authority under
rule 66 is limited to the "administration of estates" poses a further
See Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U.S. 530 (1890), where the Supreme
Court stated that when a court has taken jurisdiction of a debtor's property and has
appointed a receiver, the court may in its discretion retain such jurisdiction for the
benefit of other creditors, even though the claim of the petitioning creditors may
have been satisfied.
r,1 See 7 MooRE 66.02, at 1907.
,06 "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with
these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
16TThis seems to be the attitude of several districts as reflected in "preambles"
to local rules governing receivership practice. "The foregoing rule is promulgated
in the exercise of the authority vested in this court by Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 66 for the administration of estates by receivers or other similar officers
appointed by the court." D. KAN. R. 23 (d).
rl FE. R. Crv. P. 83 restricts local rules, requiring them to be consistent with
the Federal Rules. Fmu. R. Civ. P. 66, however, contains no such limitation. Rather,
the rule sanctions the use of rules formulated by the district courts or comporting
with previous practice. Absent an express statement to the contrary, previous prac-
tice arguably may by implication continue regardless of possible conflicts with the
Federal Rules. See notes 586-88 infra and accompanying text.
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definitional problem in an attempt to delimit the scope of local
prerogative. In Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp.,569 the Second
Circuit in dictum construed "administration" as including the ac-
tivities of the receiver in disposing of the property, spending money,
protecting the property, and distributing it among creditors, lien
holders, and the like. However, the court deemed it a "strained
and improper construction" to consider such things as a receiver's
final accounting and discharge as subsumed within the term "ad-
ministration," and expressed some doubt as to the inclusion of his
application for an allowance.570 "In short," ruled the court, "the
'practice' [in administration] means the procedure by which he gets
the power to do those things which an owner of the property would
have without court authorization." 571 Other matters would, under
this ruling, be governed by the Federal Rules or local rules in con-
formity therewith. It should be noted, however, that the term "ad-
ministration of estates" does not expressly preclude such activities
as the final accounting, a fact which the dubious Phelan court was
constrained to acknowledge.57 2 Thus, the ambiguity of the phrase
remains unresolved.
Despite this uncertainty as to the extent of unfettered rule-mak-
ing authority, thirty-one districts have promulgated rules touching
receivership practices, dealing both with the "administration of
estates" and with other areas of receivership practice. 573 These rules
are far from uniform, even when focused upon similar problems. 7 4
500 210 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1954).
57 0 Id. at 363.
117 1 Ibid.
572 1 bid.
57 E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 15; S.D. CAL. R. 18; D. CoLo. R. 30; D. HAWAII R. 9;
D. IDAHO R. 8 (b); E.D. ILL. (Crv.) R. 13; N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 9; N.D. IND. R. 14; S.D.
IND. R. 24; D. KAN. R. 28; W.D. MICH. R. 9; D. MINN. R. 17; E.D. Mo. R. XII; W.D.
Mo. R. 17; D. MONT. R. 21; D. NEV. R. 19; D.N.H.R. 15; D.N.M.R. 14 (bankruptcy
receivers); E.D. & S.D. N.Y. (GEN.) R. 16; N.D.N.Y.R. 24; W.D.N.Y.R. 23; D.N.D.R.
XVIII; N.D. OHio R. 9; E.D. PA. R. 88; W.D. PA. R. 17; E.D. TENN. R. 23, 24
(bankruptcy receivers); W.D. Tax. R. 21 (bankruptcy receivers); E.D. WASH. R. 26;
W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 83; E.D. Wis. R. 16; W.D. WIs. R. 17.
574 Compare D. HAWAII R. 9 with E.D. ILL. (CIv.) R. 13. The rule of districts
within the same state will often be the same. E.D. & W.D. ARu. R. 15; N.D. IND. R.
14 and S.D. IND. R. 24; E.D. Mo. R. XII and W.D. Mo. R. 17; E.D. Wis. R. 16 and
W.D. Wis. R. 17. E.D. WASH. R. 26 and W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 33, and E.D. PA.
R. 38 and W.D. PA. R. 17 are, respectively, identical except that the latter rule in
both states contains a preamble. However, E.D. ILL. (CIv.) R. 13 and N.D. ILL. (Civ.)
R. 9 are at variance with each other respecting, for example, times of filing reports
with the court; the Southern District of Illinois has no rules governing receiver-
ship practice.
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Because of the lack of uniformity and the uncertainty as to the per-
missible scope of such rules under the unrestricted authority granted
by rule 66, the validity of many of the local rules may be seriously
questioned. For example, rule 66 was framed to apply only to
equity receiverships and was not designed to regulate or affect re-
ceivers in bankruptcy.575 Several districts have specific rules regulat-
ing bankruptcy receivership practice,5 16 and their validity is thus
contingent upon consistency with the Federal Rules and the Bank-
ruptcy Act itself.577
Assuming that rule 66 is not meant to be viewed as exclusively
defining and thus pre-empting a district's power under rule 83, it
would be entirely consistent with rule 83 for district courts to pro-
mulgate local rules beyond the mere "administration of estates. '5 78
Thus, many districts have formulated rules encompassing all equity
receivership actions.579 Surprisingly few districts make any reference
to the procedure to be followed in the appointment of a receiver,680
despite the importance of affording adequate procedural safeguards
to affected persons. Those local appointment rules which have been
framed are essentially designed to insure the adequacy of notice and
hearing prior to appointmentY' This preoccupation with notice
may stem from the fact that the appointment of a receiver is con-
sidered to be in the nature of a quasi in rem proceeding 82 5 thereby
r75Advisory Committee's Note of 1946 to Amended Rule 66, 10 FED. RuLEs SRv.
cxxiv (1948).
1,70D.N.M.R. 14; E.D. TENN. R. 23; W.D. Tax. R. 21.
57The Federal Rules are to be followed in bankruptcy proceedings insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 18.08,
at 14-15 (14th ed. 1966). Local rules may be particularly pertinent in regard to the
powers of bankruptcy receivers. See 8 id. 6.10, at 883.
5 s See 7 MooRE 66.02, at 1905-07.
,9 The only district rules which seemingly limit themselves to the "administration
of estates" are D. COLO. R. 30; N.D. INn. R. 14; S.D. IND. R. 24; D. KAN. R. 23.
580 Cf. N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 9(a), specifying only to whom application must be
made and when.
:81 S.D. CAL. R. 18 (a); D. MINN. R. 17 (1); D. MONT. R. 21 (a); D. NEv. R. 19 (a).
582 See Meyer v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 776, 795, 254 Pac. 1108, 1116 (1927);
Ex parte International Harvester Co., 187 S.C. 124, 140-41, 184 S.E. 530, 535 (1926).
Equity has traditionally operated in personam and in an indirect way upon
property. Thus, since the appointment of a receiver is an equitable proceeding it
is conceptually difficult to appoint a receiver except in an adversary hearing. Never-
theless, the order of appointment has the effect of placing the res under the juris-
diction, control and possession of the court and the order appointing the receiver
is deemed to bind not only those who are parties to the appointive hearing, but
also all others who may interfere with the control and possession of receivership
property located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See 1 CLARK,
REcEvE.s §§ 82, 82.2, .4, .5 (3d ed. 1959) (notice requirements for receivership
proceedings).
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requiring notice to all persons who might have an interest in the
subject property. As a result, some rules delineate the usual in rem
requirement that the party seeking the appointment of a receiver
must give notice in accordance with court directions to all known
"interested parties"-creditors and litigants comprising the most
patent category-before the appointment will be made.513 Provision
has also been made in some districts for the ex parte appointment
of receivers in extraordinary circumstances. 584 To avert possible
prejudice emanating from the waiver of procedural safeguards, how-
ever, the conditions under which an ex parte appointment may be
made are usually and properly limited to emergency situations,5 5
and the receiver's term is, under several rules, only temporary.58s
Once a creditor receives notice of receivership proceedings, he
is usually required to file a claim with the court or the receiver.5 7
Unfortunately, however, the local rules provide no guidance regard-
ing what the creditor's claim must state, the form it is to take, or
the seasonability of presentation. Although a judicial decree author-
izing the presentation of claims will often clarify some of these
ambiguities, the extent to which they remain unresolved constitutes
a gap which future amendments to local rules might efficaciously
118 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 18 (a); D. MINN. R. 17 (1).
,81 S.D. CAL. R. 18 (a); D. MONT. R. 21 (a); D. Nav. R. 19 (a). An ex parte appoint-
ment is rare, but there are situations in which a receiver must be appointed before
notice is given to defendants or creditors. Such appointments are analogous to the
principle that an injunction will sometimes issue before actual notice and service.
In such cases it must be shown that relief and protection can be provided in no
other way and that (1) notice is impractical, or (2) that the greatest emergency
exists, or (3) that subsequent tender of notice will operate to nullify the appoint-
ment. See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 181 (1935); Shapiro v. Wilgus,
287 U.S. 348, 356 (1932). Cf. Taylor v. Easton, 180 Fed. 363 (9th Cir. 1910).
8"See S.D. CAL. R. 18(a) (immediate appointment "absolutely necessary"); D.
MINN. R. 17(1) (emergency); D. MONT. R. 21 (a) (good cause); D. NEv. R. 19(a)
(absolutely necessary).
98 0 S.D. CAL. R. 18 (a); D. MONT. R. 21 (a); D. NEV. R. 19 (a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P.
65 (b), prescribing the requisite procedure for obtaining a temporary restraining
order. It is arguable that provisions for the ex parte appointment of receivers should
be gauged by the same standard. See note 584 supra, which explores the analogy
of temporary receivers and injunctions.
517As an aid to administrative convenience, a court generally will grant an inter-
locutory order fixing the time within which creditors' claims should be filed. Such
an order does not prevent the court, however, from permitting a late-filing creditor
to share in the distribution of the remaining assets. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Fox Theatre's Corp., 91 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1937). Some local rules incorporate
administrative practice respecting bankruptcy estates, S.D. CAL. R. 18 (e); D. NEV. R.
19 (e), which may have the effect of imposing upon receivership creditors the six-
month limitation period for filing claims which is required of a bankrupt's creditor.
Bankruptcy Act § 57 (n), 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (n) (1964);
3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 57.26-.28 (14th ed. 1966).
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fill. 5s s Moreover, the receiver himself is seldom afforded guidelines
for passing on the validity, legality, and fairness of the claims pre-
sented or for determining any order of preference among the vari-
ous claims. Again, however, the ostensible infirmity may be illusory
insofar as the court's instructions to the receiver provide him with
sufficient guidelines.8 9
The receiver is also obligated in most districts to present to the
court a periodic inventory of the assets of the receivership estate500
and, at regular intervals, a current report of the receiver's transac-
tions. 9' Such rules vary substantially in their detail,50 2 a fact which
does not appear anomalous in view of their ministerial nature. Also,
the local rules commonly make provision for the receiver's compen-
sation, which is usually set by the court after an appropriate hear-
rss See 3 CLkAR, R.ECEvERS § 651 (3d ed. 1959). See note 587 supra for an exegesis
of the possibility of incorporating bankruptcy rules regarding the seasonable filing
of creditor claims. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 153-55, which specify the state procedure for
filing receivership claims.
58 Three districts require the receiver to petition for instructions:
"Every permanent receiver shall ... file with the court a report and petition for
instructions. Said report shall contain a brief summary of the operations of the
receiver, an inventory of the assets, a schedule of all receipts and disbursements, and
a list of all known creditors, with names, addresses, and amounts of claims, including
taxes of all kinds, conditional sales contracts and contingent claims, known or which
it is believed possibly exist.
"The petition for instructions shall contain the receiver's recommendations for
a continuance or discontinuance of the receivership and, if an appraisal of the
assets of the receivership shall not have theretofore been ordered, his recommenda-
tions as to the desirability of such an appraisal ..... S.D. CAL. R. 18 (b); D. NEv.
R. 19 (b). See D. MONT. R. 21 (e).
59 0 E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 15 (b); S.D. CAL. R. 18 (b); D. COLO. R. 30 (a); D. HAWAII
R. 9(a); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 13(a); N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 14(b); N.D.. IND. R. 14(a);
S.D. IND. R. 24(a); D. KAN. R. 23 (a); W.D. MICH. R. 9(a); D. MINN. R. 17(5);
E.D. Mo. R. XII (a); W.D. Mo. R. 17(a); D. MONT. R. 21 (e); D. NET. R. 19(b);
D.N.H.R. 15 (a); D.N.D.R. XVIII (a); N.D. OHIO R. 9(A); E.D. PA. R. 38(a); W.D.
PA. R. 17 (a); E.D. WASH. R. 26 (a); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 33 (a); E.D. Wis. R. 16 (a);
W.D. Wis. R. 17 (a).
,
91 E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 15 (a); 15 (a); S.D. CAL. R. 18 (b), (d); D. HAWAI R. 9 (b);
ED. ILL. (Civ.) R. 13(b); N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 9(c); N.D. IND. R. 14(b);
S.D. IND. R. 24(b); D. KAN. R. 23 (b); W.D. MICH. R. 9(b); D. MINN. R. 17(4);
E.D. Mo. R. XII (b); W.D. Mo. R. 17 (b); D. MONT. R. 21 (e); D. Nav. R. 19 (b), (d);
D.N.H.R. 15(b); D.N.M.R. 14(b); D.N.D.R. XVIII (b); N.D. OHIo R. 9(B); E.D.
PA. R. 38 (b); W.D. PA. R. 17 (b); E.D. WASH. R. 26 (b); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 33 (b);
E.D. Wis. R. 16 (a), (b); W.D. Wis. R. 17 (a), (b).
892 Such variances include (1) the time in which the inventory is lo be made:
e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 18 (b) (sixty days after appointment); D. KAN. R. 23 (a) (twenty
days after appointment); D.N.H.R. 15 (a) (ten days after taking possession of the
property); (2) the method, contents and form of the inventory: e.g., D. KAN. R. 23 (a);
(schedule to include known liabilities of the estate); (3) periodicity of receiver's
report: e.g., D. COLO. R. 30(b) (four-month intervals); E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 13 (b)
(nine-month intervals); W.D. MiC. R. 9 (b) (one-month intervals).
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ing.513 Again, variance regarding such practices appears unobjec-
tionable.
Although many of the local rules contain elaborate provisions
respecting the appointment of and administration by receivers, a
common provision will specify that in the event the local rules are
silent, the acts of the receiver or the court are to accord as nearly
as is possible with bankruptcy practice.594 Thus, such districts, given
the power to formulate their own rules, have reverted to a uniform
body of law for guidance. This does not appear undesirable to the
extent that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and those of equity
receivership do not diverge, but where considerations are not co-
terminous care should be taken to avoid the imposition of an in-
apposite bankruptcy proviso. 5
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE
In recent years, the federal district courts have received increas-
ing numbers of petitions for writs of habeas corpus,59 6 often pre-
93 E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 15 (c); S.D. CAL. R. 18 (c) (4); D. HAwAII R. 9(c);
E.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 13 (c); N.D. ILL. (Civ.) R. 14(d); N.D. IND. R. 14(c);
S.D. IND. R. 24(c); D. KAN. R. 23(c); W.D. MIcH. R. 9(c); D. MINN. R. 17(2);
E.D. Mo. R. XII (c); W.D. Mo. R. 17 (c); D. MONT. R. 21 (c), (f) (4); D. NEV. R.
19 (c) (4); D.N.H.R. 15 (e); D.N.D.R. XVIII (c); N.D. OHIO R. 9 (C); E.D. PA. R. 38 (c);
W.D. PA. R. 17 (c); E.D. WASH. R. 26 (c); W.D. WASH. (Civ.) R. 33 (c); E.D. Wis. R.
16 (c); W.D. Wis. R. 17 (c).
Compare N.D. OHIO R. 9 (C) stating that application for compensation shall be
in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 12, and D. HAWAII R. 9(c) leaving the matter
of compensation to the discretion of the court.
511E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 18(e); SJ). IND. R. 24(d); E.D. Mo. R. XII(d); D. NEv. R.
19 (e).
"I For example, the six-month period for filing claims in bankruptcy may be
unduly long in regard to a receivership which is administering only one property.
See note 587 supra. Likewise, considerations in the appointment of receivers may
vary with respect to the two actions; notice, for example, need no.t be as extensive
in bankruptcy as some local rules require for receivership. See Bankruptcy Act,
§ 2(a) (3), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (3) (1964); notes
580-86 supra.
r" U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Habeas Corpus, Report, Habeas Corpus and
Post Conviction Review, 33 F.R.D. 363, 410-11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Habeas
Corpus Report]. Recent Supreme Court cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), holding denial of counsel unconstitutional, have precipitated a flood
of the petitions. See 1965 DuKE L.J. 395 & n.l. The writ of habeas corpus is issued
to test the lawfulness of custody of the petitioner. SOKOL, A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
HABEAs CoRPus 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SOKOLl. In the federal courts the
writ extends to prisoners who are (1) in custody under the authority of the United
States or committed for trial before some court thereof; (2) in custody for an act
done or omitted in pursuance of a federal statute or court order; (3) in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4)
citizens of foreign states in custody for an act done or omitted under any right
claimed under the sanction of a foreign state and international law is involved.
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pared by prisoners without the assistance of counsel. 97 The formal
substantive requirements for these petitions are not rigorous,0 s and
the courts have liberally construed the allegations thereunder in
order to conform their contents to the required elements of the
petition.599 Nevertheless, some homedrawn petitions, reflecting de-
ficient legal skill, have been rejected because they lacked informa-
tion requisite to issuance of the writ.00 The result in many cases
The writ is also available to allow the release of a person so that he may be
brought into court to testify or to be tried. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). However, 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) provides a substitute procedure for habeas corpus for federal
prisoners in custody under sentence of a court established by Congress. The federal
prisoner may nat seek relief by a writ of habeas corpus unless he has made a
motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) or unless this remedy is
inadequate.
117 The federal habeas corpus statute provides that either the petitioner or some-
one acting in his behalf may apply for the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964). Similar
provisions are embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). Consequently, many federal and
state prisoners have sought the writ, aided only by a fellow prisoner. See Habeas
Corpus Report 868. Although the appointment of counsel has not been held con-
stitutionally required in habeas corpus proceedings, some commentators intimate
that this result is likely in view of the liberality of the Supreme Court decisions on
the subject of right to counsel. See SOKOL 154. Arguably, under this reasoning the
right to counsel would also extend to the filing of a petition for the writ in order
to invoke the proceeding. A committee of distinguished federal jurists has urged
that the states and the federal government provide for assistance of legal counsel in
the drafting of habeas corpus petitions. Habeas Corpus Report.
"'The petition must contain allegations of (1) the fact of custody, which is
generally satisfied by a statement that the petitioner is in prison; (2) the name of
the custodian; (3) the reason for the detention; and (4) facts showing the unlaw-
fulness of the custody. SOKOL 50-51. The federal habeas corpus statute simply
requires allegations of "facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention,
the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or
authority." 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964).
1" E.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 779 (1949); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 292 (1948); Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 & n.2 and cases cited therein (4th Cir. 1963); Thomas v.
Teets, 205 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1953). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide that all pleadings are to be construed so as to do substantial justice. FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(f). Moreover, the courts are empowered to grant amendments to habeas
corpus petitions as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1964). Rule 15 (a) provides that leave to amend shall be freely given when
justice so requires. Fuv. R. Civ. P. 15 (a). See, e.g., Huse v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, Inc., 227 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1955); International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 121 F.2d 561, 562-63 (8th Cir. 1941); Donohue v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 669, 670 (D. Conn. 1949). Without specifically
referring to rule 15 (a), some courts have allowed amendment of habeas corpus peti-
tions when the ends of justice would be sufficiently served thereby. See, e.g., Council
v. Clemmer, 165 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Benjamin v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp.
775, 776-77 (D.C. Kan. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948); Wing v. Pennsyl-
vania, 86 F. Supp. 485, 486 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
G0o See Bennett v. Robbins, 329 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Stephens
v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); Hawthorne v. Sanford,
161 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1947). Cf. United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d
934, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913 (1953).
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has been a delay in the consideration of claims and a debilitating
waste of time for both petitioners and the courts. However, the
situation has been ameliorated by novel local rules, adopted by
several district courts, which list the specific questions that must
be answered in an acceptable petition001 and require inclusion of
the answers in writing on forms furnished by the court.
60 2
The questions which these rules detail seek to elicit the follow-
ing information: the name of the petitioner;60 3 the name of his
custodian;604 the place of the petitioner's detention; 6 5 the name
and location of the court which imposed sentence;6 0 6 the offenses
for which sentence was imposed; the date upon which sentence was
imposed and the terms of the sentence;0 7 the specific pleas of the
301 E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 19(a); D. COLO. R. 29; S.D. FLA. R. 19; N.D. ILL. (GEN.)
R. 23; N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 27; W.D. Mo. R. 22; N.D. OHIo R. 11; D. ORE. (GEN.)
R. 19; W.D. TEx. R. 15. This type of rule was originated by the Northern District
of Illinois avowedly for the purpose of (1) curing administrative difficulties in ex-
amining a wide variety of petitions, many of which were hand-drawn, lengthy and
incomplete, and (2) overcoming difficulty in discovering the occasional meritorious
petition in a mass of heterogeneous applications. Habeas Corpus Report 382. Some
districts have local rules prescribing habeas corpus procedure only in general terms.
E.g., D. Aiuz. R. 36; D. ME. R. 9; D. NEv. R. 20.
002 Forms used in the Northern District of Illinois are reprinted in Appendix
II, Habeas Corpus Report 593-408. Some of the district courts have automatic pro-
cedures for mailing a copy of the forms or a copy of the local habeas corpus rules
to petitioners whose applications are defective. S.D. CAL. R. 19(a) (10); N.D. & S.D.
IowA R. 27(9).
003 This is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964).
0 Under the federal habeas corpus statute, the proper respondent is the peti-
tioner's immediate custodian. The latter must have power to bring the petitioner
before the court and to discharge him from custody. Moreover, he must be within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the writ is sought. SOKOL 39. The
statute specifically demands that the application contain both the name of the
custodian and authority under which the petitioner is being detained. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1964). Seemingly, this requires that the petition include the name of the
specific person responsible for custody and his official position. Perhaps the local
rules on this point could be more effective if they specifically explained whether the
petitioner is to list the name of an individual, his official position, or both.
605 This provision aids the court in determining jurisdiction, for the petitioner
must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the petition is
filed. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
000 This requirement assists the court in obtaining access to trial court records
for the purposes of testing the credibility of the petition and for ascertaining
whether the petitioner got a "full and fair evidentiary hearing" if required under
the standards of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See note 609 infra. More-
over, in the case of motions to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964), which
must be made before habeas corpus may be sought, the sentencing court is the
only court with jurisdiction to issue the writ. An underlying reason for adoption
of the latter procedure was to avoid the plethora of claims in districts located
near federal detention centers. See SOKOL 128.
00 Information involving offenses and terms of sentences is important in determin-
ing whether the petitioner is in "custody," a prerequisite to issuance of the writ.
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accused; whether the finding of guilt was made by a jury or by a
judge; 608 whether the petitioner has appealed and the names of
such appellate courts;60 9 whether he has completed an affidavit for
forma pauperis;6 10 whether previous petitions for the writ have been
filed;611 and the ground upon which the claim of unlawful custody
is based, accompanied by facts which support each ground.612 Some
rules also seek information as to whether the petitioner was repre-
For example, if the sentences have been suspended or if the petitioner has been
released on bail, some cases indicate that he would not be considered in custody.
See 1966 DuKx L.J. 588, 590 & nn.ll-12. But see id. at 590-98; Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236 (1963). Furthermore, the court may be informed of the need for rapid
facilitation of the petition, as in the case of a petitioner subject to immediate
execution. Finally, the date of imposition of the sentence is helpful to the court's
consideration of the possible mootness of the petition. If the petitioner's sentence is
about to end, the writ would likely be denied. Cf. Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245
(1913); Burrett v. Gladden, 228 F. Supp. 527 (D. Ore. 1964).
680 The court is thus apprised of the possible necessity of an independent evi-
dentiary hearing, for where the facts are disputed the federal court must hold such
hearing if the applicant did not receive a full and fair hearing in the trial court.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Townsend, the court held that a federal
court must grant an evidentiary hearing if (1) the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is
a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were
not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reasons it
appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the petitioner a full and fair
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 313. A finding of guilt by a judge might indicate the
possible presence of one of the aforementioned grounds. Moreover, the court may
be informed of a potential constitutional infirmity in the denial of right to trial
by jury under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
60O The court must be notified of all appeals from the trial court, for if the
petitioner has failed to exhaust all of his available state remedies, the writ will
be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
010 For the petitioner to proceed without costs to himself, he must file an affidavit
stating his inability to pay such costs or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(1964).
611 If the legality of the petitioner's detention has been decided on a prior appli-
cation by a judge or court of the United States, and the new petition contains no
new grounds, the writ will be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964).
010-This requirement, by demanding a statement of supporting facts, alleviates
the problem of insufficiently drafted petitions which merely assert bare legal objec-
tions to the detention. Nonetheless, the provision is potentially a Charybdis for
the unwary petitioner because he is not told what kinds of facts are relevant. See
text accompanying note 617 infra.
Most of the rules require a concise statement of the grounds upon which the
petitioner relies. E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 19 (a) (4) (b), 5 (b), 6 (b); D. COLO. R. 29 (3) (b),
4(b), 5 (b); S.D. FLA. R. 19 (c) (2), (d) (2), (e) (2). The requirement, although perhaps
idyllic, seeks to prevent the petitioner from filing an unmanageable and unneces-
sarily long application. See Passic v. State, 98 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1951), where
the petitioner filed a 2,000-page petition. The average petition should be four or
five pages in length and without supporting legal precedent. SOKOL 51.
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sented by counsel at his trial and, if so, the names and addresses of
counsel.61 3  Additional information must be supplied by federal
prisoners seeking writs of habeas corpus 61 4 or moving to vacate their
sentences under section 2255 of the Judicial Code. 15
Besides aiding the unskilled petitioner in drafting his own
claim, these detailed requirements effectuate faster and more pre-
cise preparation by counsel for other claimants. Moreover, the dis-
trict courts can likely give more exacting attention to claims which
are presented in a uniform manner. These practical advantages
suggest the need for universal adoption of local rules delineating
specific disclosures required for habeas corpus claims.616 However,
the existent rules might be made more functional by future adop-
tions and amendments. For example, in addition to the list of ques-
tions to be answered by an applicant, the court might provide an
untutored petitioner with a model form which contains examples
of proper answers in a hypothetical case. These examples could
be especially useful in demonstrating the kinds of facts which must
021 Notice of absence of counsel pointedly apprises the court of a probable con-
stitutional infirmity in the petitioner's trial, whether or not he raises the question
in attacking the detention. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Knowl-
edge of the names of counsel, if the petitioner was represented, may aid the court
either for appointment purposes or for more penetrating inquiry into the petitioner's
claim.
614The petitioner must state (I) whether he has filed previous petitions for
habeas corpus or a motion to vacate sentence under § 2255; (2) the ground upon
which the custody is allegedly unlawful; and (3) the reason why the petitioner's
remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
See the discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) in note 596 supra.
61628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
The petitioner must disclose the name of the judge who imposed sentence (see
the discussion of § 2255 in note 606 supra), the grounds supporting the claim of
invalidity of the sentence, and whether the petitioner has filed any petitions for
habeas corpus, motions pursuant to § 2255, or any other petitions.
610The Committee on Habeas Corpus of the United States Judicial Conference
recommended that these rules be adopted by all of the federal district courts. The
Committee asserted that the rules would "afford a constructive approach toward
the disposition of habeas corpus petitions, not only more expeditiously, but also on
a sounder factual basis .... ." Habeas Corpus Report 382. Moreover, the prescrip-
lions have been applauded by the commentators. See 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF §
1713, at 54 n.19. (Supp. 1965); SOKOL 53. Finally the rules have operated success-
fully in the lower federal courts. Federal Judge Hubert Will (Ill., N.D.), who
helped originate these rules, reported that they had proved "quite satisfactory" and
that petitions prepared thereunder "almost always contain the necessary basic in-
formation together with the grounds and factual allegations in support thereof...."
Habeas Corpus Report 384. He disclosed that since the rule was adopted his court
very rarely received "the kind of hybrid federal-state habeas corpus petition with
civil rights allegations thrown in which were not uncommon in the past." Ibid.
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be alleged to support the substantive claim of unlawful custody. 17
Finally, the court rules might well prescribe procedures for address-
ing inquiries to the court clerk when the petitioner is unable to
discern what is required in one of the detailed specifications.
a.l.s., co-ordinator
w.r.b.
j.a.f.
d.d.n.
r.a.c.p.
6 l? See note 612 supra.
